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EU research and innovation policy and the future of the 
Common Foreign Security Policy 
 
 
Genesis 
 
In 2004 ISIS Europe was awarded a tender under the Sixth Framework Programme for RTD to 
conduct a study into ‘EU research and innovation policy and the future of the Common Foreign 
Security Policy’. The main objective of the study was to analyse the future challenges for CFSP, to 
provide the European Commission with scenarios related to a European Foreign and Security 
Policy, and to examine their implications for EU research and innovation policy. In addition to 
issues relating to crisis management, the European Commission wanted a long-term view on the 
future of CFSP that could shed light on key issues that the EU will have to face on the international 
scene until 2015 and on research needs in relation to such issues.  
 
This is the Report that resulted from that study. It is divided into three parts: Part A identifies the 10 
most important threats and challenges confronting the EU up to 2015; Part B refines these findings 
into a more precise analytical framework through the construction of five scenarios relating to the 
future European security environment; and Part C identifies the major implications of the scenarios 
for future developments in EU research and innovation policies – in particular its external 
dimension   
 
 
Introduction 
 
This Report analyses the future challenges for the European Union’s (EU’s) Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and assesses their implications for EU research, technology and innovation 
policy. In doing so it attempts to look over the horizon, beyond immediate security threats, to give a 
longer-term perspective (up to 2015) that will help to shape the future direction of EU policy in 
these areas.  
 
The Report first identifies and examines the most important policy issues relevant to EU security 
over the next ten years. It then develops and refines that analysis through the use of five carefully 
defined scenarios. The major implications of those scenarios for the future of EU research, 
technology and innovation policy in relation to supporting CFSP are then explored. The Report 
concludes with a number of recommendations for particular research priorities, instruments and 
policies. 
 
The Report aims to supplement the conclusions of the European Commission Report ‘Security 
Research: the Next Steps’, but does not address questions related to priorities for the Community-
funded European Security Research Programme (ESRP) that will be launched by 2007 as part of the 
next Financial Perspective (FP7) 2007-13. 
 
The Report is not tied to any particular research programme: rather, the aim is to inform overall 
research agendas in support of European security. The Report supports the recommendations 
contained in the Report of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee ‘Security 
Research: the Next Steps’ – produced in response to the Commission’s Report – which call for a 
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more balanced interaction between research in the natural sciences and technology and other 
sciences, in particular political, social and human sciences.1 The main recommendations of this 
Report address topics in social and human sciences.  
 
This Report does not dispute the importance of research into technology to provide more security 
for the community’s citizens. However, the Report also recognises the importance of understanding 
complex socio-technical systems requiring a more comprehensive approach to understanding the 
role of science and technology in both threatening and promoting security.  Furthermore, the 
authors of this Report saw a particular need to take a comprehensive and forward-oriented look at 
security challenges, strongly endorsing the Commission’s desire that any European initiative on 
security research should respect individual rights, democratic values, ethics and liberties. Security 
research should also work to promote social justice and cohesion, equality of opportunity, 
environmental quality, public health and human dignity. In a post-national world, the design of 
research and innovation policy should also take into account the other - potentially detrimental - 
effects that a predominantly military or technological orientation may incur.
                                                 
1 Security Research – the Next Steps, Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, A6-0103/2005, para.15, p.6. 
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A. Meeting the key threats and challenges to 2015  
 
 
The purpose of Part A of the study was to identify the 10 most important threats and challenges 
confronting the EU – drawing on the in-depth analysis of 15 leading experts (from various 
disciplines: social sciences, physical sciences; and institutions: universities, research institutes, 
NGOs, and think tanks), each of whom wrote a paper that was presented to, and discussed with 
members of the European Commission at a workshop in Brussels in 2004.2 These threats and 
challenges were divided according to regional, horizontal and technological trends. A particular 
emphasis was given to identifying issues that were relevant to DG Research’s considerations for FP 
2007-2013.  
 
Introduction 
 
Global insecurity is now brought about primarily by various impacts of the networked political 
economy and the ‘clash of civilisations’ in a world of borders that are highly permeable to flows of 
information, finance, goods and people. It arises from societal changes related to scientific and 
technological developments as much as from new types of vulnerabilities to human aggression and 
unanticipated byproducts of various types of human activity.   
 
In the 21st century, the EU has turned its attention to how best to preserve and enhance its long-term 
security interests. A major step in this direction, in addition to practical activities within the 
European Security and Defence Policy, was the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) 
in December 2003, by the European Council.3 The ESS provides, on the basis of a broad perception 
of security, a list of major threats to European security, political principles on how best to respond 
to them, and an outline of instruments already available to - or in need of development by - the EU.  
 
Part of the challenge of how to achieve sustainable security in an increasingly interdependent world, 
is to add security concerns to the community’s research, science and technology agenda. This 
requires a review of research priorities, instruments and policies, a job partly already done within 
the framework of the Preparatory Action on ‘Enhancement of the European industrial potential in 
the field of Security Research 2004-2006’ and the European Security Research Programme foreseen 
for FP7.  
 
Several key tasks remain to be done, however. One is to improve the dialogue between those 
conducting ‘peace and security’ research and those researching ‘science and technology’. Although 
there is an appreciation in both ‘camps’ that the work of the other is important to their own field, to 
date there has been comparatively little interaction between them. Another task is to mainstream 
within EU policy a common, but much wider definition of security.  
 
                                                 
2 This Report contains a synopsis of the findings produced by these 15 papers. The full text of each paper from Part A 
can be found in the Annex attached to this Report.   
3 A secure Europe in a Better World, Report drafted under the responsibility of EU High Representative Javier Solana, 
Brussels, 12 December 2003. 
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As the ESS clearly acknowledges, we need to move beyond relying solely on military means and 
develop a spectrum of policy instruments. These instruments should range from civilian ones - 
employed in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and in neutralising terrorism - to those intended to 
tackle the root causes of insecurity and conflict.   
 
Understanding the socio-economic and cultural dimension of geo-strategic threats is often under-
rated, and certainly under-funded, compared to simply seeking technological ‘solutions’ to the 
various manifestations of threats. By that time, it may be too late to prevent threats from becoming 
conflicts and materialising into seriously damaging situations.  Investing in science, social and 
natural, and technology to forestall threats before they become critical is clearly a more cost-
effective application of scarce resources than pouring money into coping with the consequences of 
them once they have become ‘live’.  
 
Social sciences and humanities can offer no foolproof ‘solutions’ about how to bring about peace 
and security any more than “magic bullets” can be developed to perfectly safeguard European 
security.  Consequently, it will remain important to continue to invest in applications of emerging 
technology to deal with the manifestations of threats as well as seeking their eradication at source.  
Moreover, it is important to develop greater understanding of the complex nature of socio-technical 
systems as related to security, an area that is under-researched at present. 
 
This Report identifies the ten most important security challenges facing the EU until 2015 drawing 
upon the findings of 15 leading experts (from various disciplines: social, physical and engineering 
sciences; and institutions: universities, research institutes, NGOs, and think tanks). These are 
defined under three thematic headings namely, regional security trends, horizontal security trends 
and technological security trends. For the purpose of clarity and focus, the findings outlined below 
follow a designed template, which indicate recommendations respectively for FP 2007-2013 and for 
DG Research until 2015. These recommendations are based on future-orientated analysis structured 
under three sub-sections, namely: threats, challenges and opportunities. The main conclusions and 
recommendations are presented at the end of the Report, and set out a conceptual framework for the 
design of research and innovation policy to promote European security for the long term.   
 
 
 
A.1 Regional Security Trends  
 
 
A.1.1 Russia and Eastern Neighbours   
 
Threats 
Any serious deterioration in the relationship between Russia and the EU - very difficult to envisage 
at present – would raise once again the risk of the possible use of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) in Europe. . The illegal export of nuclear material, as well as expertise, to countries of 
concern will continue to be a major worry over the next ten years at least. Organized crime and 
terrorism will also become more of a danger, partly because of the inability of some Eastern 
European neighbours adequately to enforce the rule of law and control their frontiers.  While 
conventional military capabilities will decrease in the long term, some groups could acquire 
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advanced systems in the next decade (Global Positioning System jammers; rudimentary Unmanned 
Aerial Combat Vehicles etc.) that would improve their ability to conduct asymmetric attacks. 
 
Challenges 
The possibility of a further deterioration of civilian control over national territories, due to the 
collapse of legal systems, organized crime or the outbreak of civil wars, could require European 
intervention – perhaps even military intervention. The need to respond early and timely to secure 
materials and weapons of mass destruction as well as civilian research institutions would be 
necessary.  
 
Opportunities  
Between now and 2015 it seems preferable and possible to improve and develop those conflict-
prevention and crisis management tools that are capable of containing local or regional conflicts.  
 
Research recommendations  
• Enhancing research-based knowledge of internal, national and transnational political and 
security developments in the region, including technological developments and capacities, in the 
context of the role of European security policy looking to 2015. 
• In the long run, the aim of a European research plan for improved security responses should be 
to understand and influence the information flow in the conflict region. Thus, all the 
technologies for information gathering and assessment as well as social science-based analysis 
that is useful for understanding events should be developed. 
• European security policy needs to start developing the capabilities necessary to negate the 
exploitation of networked systems by adversaries (media; C3 systems; dispersed weapon 
systems).  
 
 
A. 1.2 Mediterranean Neighbours 
 
Threats  
By 2015 there could be a growing feeling of resentment towards the EU in the Mediterranean 
region, both in Northern Africa and in the Middle East, due to EU-imposed reforms (conditionality) 
and to a growing perception that the EU is not living up to its side of the bargain. Poor governance 
may also contribute to a possibly worsening economic situation in the South. The Israel/Palestine 
conflict could also flare up again, possibly leading to a wider regional military conflict. Although 
the conflict will not pose a direct security threat to the EU, it could have important negative 
consequences for EU interests. For instance, it is already an important cause of the stagnation of 
cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), and still feeds terrorism. 
 
Challenges 
Many existing regimes to the South do not have good records vis-à-vis democratization and the rule 
of law, nor do they inspire confidence for the future. The incomplete application of human rights 
clauses in the framework of the EMP has certainly not contributed in a positive way. As a result, the 
EU is often perceived as favouring stability over democratization. Given the gravity of the security 
environment, the future challenge for the EU is not only to focus on stability, but also to focus on 
representative grassroots democratisation processes.   
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Opportunities 
There is a need to develop a new type of policy dialogue that includes security cooperation between 
the EU and Southern partners. This holds true especially in the field of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP), where the appointment of liaison officers to the EU Military Staff and, 
eventually, participation in ESDP manoeuvres and operations could be pursued.  
  
Research Recommendations  
• How to successfully build institutions in weak and/or undemocratic states that contribute to 
knowledge creation and to political, social and economic development. 
• How to achieve accountability and benchmarking - with a sense of ownership - in the 
framework of ‘positive conditionality’. 
• Understanding the interaction between state and non-state actors and external partners in the 
framework of ‘positive conditionality’. 
• How to reform the security sector in authoritarian states. 
• Development of communications policy and improving the perception of the EU.  
 
 
A.1.3 Transatlantic relations  
 
Threats 
Although US unilateralism, especially in respect of a number of security-related issues, risks a 
strategic rift opening up with the EU, it is hard to imagine this developing to the extent that the US 
becomes a direct threat to the EU.   
 
Challenges 
In the short/medium-term, ideological shifts in the White House may reinvigorate a differentiated 
bilateralist US approach towards European states rather than a more symmetric US-EU partnership. 
This could be exacerbated if the differences in security perspectives are amplified by economic 
differences, possibly resulting in ‘trade wars’ that would affect the EU as a whole. Despite the solid 
foundation of common values, the fact that the US and the EU are the two most capable power 
blocs in the world, could lead to destabilising forms of competition and conflict.  
 
Opportunities 
Under Javier Solana’s guidance, the EU has chosen to stick very closely to US initiatives, by 
developing its own strategy on WMD (despite disagreements about threat assessment), by writing 
together the ‘roadmap’ for peace in the Middle East (despite skepticism about the US’s pro-Israel 
bias), and by using a very similar style of vocabulary and structure in the ESS to that used in the US 
National Security Strategy. Because of converging structural interests and because the US 
Administration will face difficult consequences of its policies (especially in the Middle East) there 
is room for a transatlantic rapprochement.  
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Research Recommendations  
• Develop EU-US co-operation in major science and technology programmes and investments 
(ITER, through organisations such as the European Space Agency (ESA) and CERN, and 
joint research programmes in areas such as energy, environment and climate change, and on 
social science research related to security). 
• Upgrade Science and Technology co-operation with other regional frameworks like the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), South African Development Community 
(SADC) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); 
• Reinforce multilateral research cooperation between NATO countries, and involving North 
and South America and the EU. 
• Conduct research on the EU-US New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint Action Plan, not only 
at the level of ministerial meetings and senior officials, but also medium and lower levels. 
• Maintain investment to enable strategic autonomy from the US when necessary.  
• Establish an EU Think Tank in Washington to conduct security analysis and to engage US 
decision makers and opinion formers in debates on transatlantic relations from a European 
perspective. 
 
 
A.1.4 China and South and East Asia  
 
Threats  
The coming decade will witness a significant shift in the ‘balances of power’ associated with the 
growing wealth and power of China, which will raise inevitable security concerns. Risks of inter-
state war and conflict will tend to pre-occupy Asian states, and this is a region where war between 
the major powers, including nuclear powers, may occur. US military power will continue to loom 
large for virtually every state in the region, either as a potential threat, ally or welcome outside 
‘balancer’. Many states in the region will invest heavily in accumulating major conventional arms. 
A particular risk is the further nuclearization of Asia beyond the Indian subcontinent, including 
South Korea, Japan and Iran. Some states are at risk, in particular Indonesia, which could have 
major regional ramifications. Currently, the EU’s engagement with China is generally weak on key 
political and security issues. This situation needs to be rectified. 
 
Challenges 
There are several weak or failing states, raising associated concerns about transnational crime, 
terrorism, piracy, and complex internal or transnational violence. Numerous conflicts are ongoing, 
including in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Kashmir and Irian Jaya.  India and Pakistan both possess nuclear 
arsenals, and North Korea poses direct challenges both to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to 
its North East Asian neighbours. Democratisation processes are powerful across much of these 
regions - including fragile states like Indonesia - which are welcome but will continue to instil 
tension and unpredictability.  
 
Opportunities 
External actors will have an important contribution to make to conflict prevention and reduction 
efforts in Asia. Appropriate wider international assistance from international organisations, the EU 
and ‘donor’ states such as the UK, France, US, Canada and Australia is vital (especially in the wake 
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of the 2004 Tsunami). A particularly important issue is to engage with actual or possible new 
nuclear states.  
 
Research Recommendations 
• More comprehensive research is required on the nature of inter and intra-state disputes, 
including economic, religious and cultural factors, and on cross-national institution building that 
could promote stabilisation and reduction of conflict. 
• A greater research focus is required on the nature of failing states and how the phenomenon can 
be redressed.  
• More expertise on Chinese International Political Economy is required. 
 
 
A.2 Horizontal Security Trends 
 
 
A.2.1 Trends in internal warfare - particularly in Africa 
 
Threats 
Sub-Saharan Africa is in particular danger of remaining within the conflict trap in the next decade. 
Political institutions and economies will continue to remain weak in most African countries. GDP 
per head is the lowest of all major regions of the world; economic growth is slack, economic 
diversification limited, and population growth high. HIV/AIDS will dramatically worsen the 
situation, because it predominantly disables and kills people in their most productive years and 
burdens social systems. Low economic growth is a major cause of civil wars.  
 
Challenges 
One future challenge is to find and promote technologies that support income generation in 
situations marked by political instability. Civil wars in Africa have potential spillover, particularly 
through increased refugee flows, health crises (HIV/AIDS) and inflow of illegal drugs. Media 
coverage - the ‘CNN effect’ - also may lead to stronger public calls for Europe to intervene in 
Africa, although the transience of media attention makes it difficult to sustain support for assistance 
over time. Other challenges include implementing effective development strategies, persuading 
African governments to accept institutional reforms, and the preparedness of EU Member States to 
invest in peace support operations.  
 
Opportunities 
There is a need and opportunity to increase our knowledge of particular conflicts and wars – 
requiring regional expertise on political institutions, social structures and conflict formations. 
Developing the New Economic Pact for African Development (NEPAD), African Union would be a 
good start.  
 
Research Recommendations 
• Social science research: regional expertise, research into the causes of internal wars and conflict 
resolution. Regional security analysis, effectiveness of development assistance, including the 
generation, uptake and application of knowledge to indigenous problems. 
• Research on developing cheaper airlift capacity, as this would lower costs of military and 
humanitarian intervention. 
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• Peace support operations should become a particular focus of attention in military research.  
• An important field of research involves exploring the conditions for re-establishing safe and 
stable post-conflict environments, for instance, security sector reform, turning war economies 
into peace economies and restarting devastated economies. 
• Developing tagging techniques or small arms, ammunition, and equipment used in illegal 
exploitation of natural resources, to make it easier to disrupt illegal trade routes. 
• Surveillance: sensors on various platforms, including satellites, are needed for better control 
over the flow of many types of goods (and people) traded illegally. 
 
A.2.2 Trends in International Terrorism 
 
Threats  
The primary terrorist threat is likely to come from fundamentalist Islamists and their development 
of new methods - perhaps deploying chemical, biological, radiological, or even nuclear (CBRN) 
devices - as part of suicide attacks upon civilian targets. They will also deploy psychology and 
cyber-warfare techniques and continue to use the media. They will exploit failing states (sometimes 
in conjunction with organized crime) arising from empires disintegrating, under-development, and 
regional conflict.  
 
Challenges  
Counter-terrorist activities need to be applied in ways that are not counter-productive, resulting in 
the alienation of extremist communities. There is a also a danger that a failure to provide proper and 
transparent risk assessments to populations will result in confusion and unrealistic expectations, a 
draining of support, and a backlash against political establishments. We need to be able to track, 
arrest and prosecute terrorists before they strike. The protection of key strategic assets can best be 
achieved through an integrated Homeland Security strategy. It is important to address the ‘supply 
side’ of CBRN by tightening controls, and the ‘demand side’ by influencing state behaviour using a 
variety of instruments (diplomacy, deterrence, protection). Regional diplomatic initiatives e.g. in the 
Middle East, are required, as well as educational programmes for allies (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan), 
spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and the 
abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights.  
 
Opportunities   
Terrorism can be tackled by addressing some of its root causes, including political repression, 
regional conflicts, poverty etc. Improved homeland defence will raise the cost of terrorism. 
However, we should avoid the temptation of attempting to deploy technological countermeasures to 
meet every conceivable threat scenario. It is unrealistic to defend every public building and every 
airport and highway. There will continue to be a need for states to protect key strategic assets, but 
overall efforts should be concentrated on trying to mitigate the generic threat. Homeland security 
and foreign policy need to be integrated into a coherent and genuine Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) which includes positive measures to stabilise civil conflict and overcome 
polarisation, ghettoisation and discrimination. The EU should recognise the strengths and 
limitations of technology and not to divert scarce resources into wasteful technological ‘fixes’.  
  
Research Recommendations 
• Application and further refinement of biometric technology to prevent identity theft and 
identity forgery.  
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• Investment in financial tracking technologies. 
• Development of enhanced verification technologies, especially in relation to biological 
weapons and radiological materials. 
• Cross-cultural research on conflict reduction strategies, including legal, educational and 
financial instruments, and on institution building. 
• There is an urgent need to educate a new generation of arms controllers that understand the 
scientific and technological application of CBRN weapons and that can help devise effective 
means to control them through multilateral mechanisms.  
 
 
A.2.3 Trends in nuclear proliferation  
 
Threats 
The ESS identifies WMD proliferation as potentially the greatest threat to the EU’s security. It also 
links the issues of proliferation and terrorism that would allow a small group to inflict damage on a 
scale previously possible only for states and military organisations. In the near term, the main state-
based proliferation concern is and will continue to be the risk that states remain within the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but these states could go on to covertly develop the elements of a 
nuclear weapon. On a number of occasions non-state groups have shown an interest in using nuclear 
materials to commit a mass impact terrorist attack. An expanded role for nuclear - as part of a 
balanced energy strategy - will increase the number of nuclear facilities around the world and the 
volume of trade in proliferation-sensitive materials and items. To avoid vulnerabilities that could be 
exploited by terrorist groups it is of great importance to locate and safeguard fissile material and 
contain the spread of relevant knowledge. 
 
Challenges 
We need a deep and wide understanding and shared diagnosis of the problem that would provide the 
platform for EU policies that can be sustained over an indefinite period.   
  
Opportunities 
An analysis of nuclear proliferation trends demonstrates the inter-woven political, strategic, 
economic and technological dimensions of the issue. Therefore, when tackling the nuclear 
proliferation question, the EU must keep in mind that approaches to energy strategy, sustainable 
development, the willingness to strengthen governments in failing states and the preparedness to 
invest in peace support operations could all impinge on the likelihood of nuclear proliferation in 
specific states. 
 
Research Recommendations 
• Research on how arms control doctrine can respond to a possible ‘second nuclear age’ in light 
of the expiration of existing bilateral strategic arms control agreements and including 
exploration of the potential of regional mechanisms. 
• Research future energy policies to explore the relationship between economic competitiveness, 
secure energy supply, environmental sustainability and regional and global security. 
• Research into the future of the international nuclear safeguards system along two axes: 
legal/political and technical. Examine enhanced nuclear safeguard technology and analytical 
techniques that could facilitate the IAEA’s ability to verify a states’ compliance with its 
safeguards obligations (e.g., by improving nuclear material accountancy at bulk handling 
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facilities) and be applied by international organizations and bodies other than the IAEA to detect 
clandestine activities, including trafficking in nuclear weapon-related technologies and 
expertise..  
• Studies of the research establishments in countries of potential proliferation concern, including 
the identification of facilities (such as specialized research institutes) where nuclear-related 
knowledge and materials are located, and how the proliferation relevance of R&D at such 
locations may be evaluated. 
 
 
A.2.4 Trends in poverty  
 
Threats 
Poverty can fuel internal instability, with all that entails for local and regional security. It can also 
lead to voluntary migration, which not only robs developing countries of dynamic and valuable 
human resources, but also can cause problems in host societies. It is particularly in the EU’s interest 
that countries on its borders are well governed and that violent or frozen conflicts are resolved. 
Combating poverty, inequality and marginalization both inside and outside of the EU’s immediate 
neighbourhood will also continue to be relevant for European security. The concern is that 
development should not become an objective only in a security context, but should remain a goal in 
its own right.   
 
Challenges 
Ongoing poor governance often lies at the heart of these problems. Corruption, inefficiency and a 
lack of commitment to undertake policy and institutional reforms due to lack of internal social 
cohesion are inimical to reducing poverty. The post-Cold War period has additionally seen state 
failure characterized by weak (and in some cases collapsed) state institutions, abuse of power, 
corruption and lack of accountability. This situation compounds regional instability, while 
providing opportunities for organized crime, which thrives on the opportunities for illicit profits 
presented by conflict.  
 
Opportunities 
Trends in poverty reduction and the key resulting impediments all have important implications for 
future EU strategy, including in terms of science and technology policy.  While progress towards 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) rests on the combination of a large number of factors, 
the EU, with the Community and its Member States has a vital role to play – especially given that it 
provides some 55 per cent of global Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), is the world’s 
largest multilateral grant provider (at 63 per cent), the world’s largest single market and the main 
trading partner of most developing countries. 
 
Research Recommendations  
• In order to enable swift, effective and useful EU intervention in pursuit of poverty reduction, EU 
research funding should aim to ensure a multi-faceted character, with the cooperation of partner 
countries that are the most seriously affected. DG Research should aim to ensure that the results 
and recommendations resulting from such research are fed into the appropriate Directorates. 
• Research into the effectiveness of the use of resources under various constraints (land, people, 
capital) 
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• Technologies for more efficient use of resources (agriculture, industry) and research into 
reliable distribution mechanisms for food, equipment and information. 
• Social science research into the links between poverty and governance. 
 
 
A.2.5 Trends in organized crime 
 
Threats 
Organized crime was one of the five ‘key threats’ identified in the ESS: principally involving drugs, 
small arms, trafficking (people, money, arms). Ethnic distinctions that define most organized crime 
groups are now beginning to erode.  In the years ahead organized crime is likely to adopt a more 
ethnologically pragmatic, network-based approach. This makes sound business sense in a globalised 
world and amongst actors unfettered by political constraints.  It will, however, make the roots and 
dynamics of organized crime more difficult to analyse, comprehend and counter.   
 
Challenges 
The virtue and efficacy of biometric passports and associated identification in tackling organized 
crime is highly controversial. Some view such ‘technical fixes’ with great suspicion, and the 
majority of developing countries will certainly take many years longer to introduce their biometric 
equivalents.  
 
 
Opportunities 
There is a growing political will at EU level to tackle organized crime e.g. EU support programmes 
in third countries now specifically demand its suppression. 
 
Research Recommendations  
• Given the link between organized crime, terrorism and failing states, DG Research programmes 
should aim to coherently research the three dimensions collectively, while acknowledging the 
demarcation lines between them.  
• An audit should be conducted in order to gauge the extent to which Security Sector Reform 
(SSR) is capable of eroding organized crime, based on research into appropriate indicators. 
• Social science research on preventing dangerous technology falling into the hands of criminals 
(dual-use problematic). 
• Technologies for crime prevention and fighting. 
 
 
A.3 Trends in Technological Security  
 
 
A.3.1 Trends in nanotechnology 
 
Threats 
In the longer term, certain applications of nanotechnology will pose risks that will need regulation. 
Future military R&D in several countries could lead to nanotechnology proliferation that endangers 
international peace and security. In general, the nearly complete lack of resources for military-
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technology assessment and preventive-arms-control research should be corrected. In the near future, 
specific studies should be devoted to the prevention of new chemical and biological weapons and 
appropriate transparency and compliance measures, and the limitation of autonomous fighting 
systems. 
 
Challenges 
The EU should co-ordinate nanotechnology restraint among its Member States active in military 
high technology. On the international stage, the EU should promote discussions at various levels 
with a view to agreed nanotechnology limitations, preferably by global treaties, alternatively by 
export control measures. Politically, one of the most important tasks should be to engage the US - as 
well as its potential opponents - in talks about preventive limits. Adherence to ethical and specific 
procedural rules should be demanded from R&D contractors. 
 
Opportunities 
Ethical rules for dealing with nanotechnology dual-use should be developed. Such rules can build 
on the regulations currently in force in the areas of human experimentation. Questions relating to 
the proliferation of knowledge about nanotechnology should be assessed. Exploratory studies 
should be conducted on the potential of nanotechnology in the verification of compliance with 
national and international rules and agreements. 
 
Research Recommendations  
• The EU should support R&D in the areas of better protection against terrorist attacks using 
chemical or biological agents. This type of research concerns mainly sensors as well as 
neutralisation and decontamination substances and devices. 
• Research required regarding the question of dual use, given the ethical, legal and societal 
implications. 
• Research on how co-operative international limitation of dangerous technologies can be 
implemented in the EU’s best interest. 
• The development of civil society participation in the international system that would allow the 
control of nanotechnology and other potentially dangerous new technologies. 
 
 
A.3.2 Trends in Biotechnology  
 
Threats 
The future threat posed by the hostile use of disease will manifest itself on three levels. First, state 
programmes will continue to remain a serious cause of concern. Second, non-state entities appear to 
have an ever-growing interest in non-conventional weapons, including biological agents. Third, a 
significant segment of the biological weapons (BW) threat lies in the future as developments in 
science and technology may enable states, or even individuals, to develop stable and controllable 
agents to cause widespread and indiscriminate harm. 
 
Challenges 
At the core of the biotechnological revolution is information: data collection and processing, 
knowledge, techniques and skills. With today’s globalization and growing interdependence this 
knowledge and the capacity to use it inevitably diffuses across national borders. While lateral 
proliferation processes are undeniably taking place, the greatest challenge to the future Biological 
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and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) regime may actually come from a sudden massive 
application of civilian biotechnology for the purpose of acquiring a biological warfare capability by 
a state party facing a security threat. There is a need to strengthen the BTWC and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC). Generic countermeasures are possible, cost-effective, and necessary, 
however such measures must be undertaken long before an incident. 
 
Opportunities 
If a future BTWC verification regime is to remain relevant for many decades, it will require 
mechanisms to deal with the possibility of instant realization of the dual-use potential of 
biotechnology. In addition to the traditional verification and monitoring of the destruction and non-
production of BW, it will have to incorporate an understanding of biotechnology and technology 
transfer processes that go beyond mere products (agents, production equipment, etc.). The aim of 
this new set of tools is to render transparent technology transfers between economic units (e.g. 
individuals, laboratories, companies, etc.) within a state and between economic units across national 
boundaries (including states and transnational companies and organizations).  
 
Research Recommendations  
• Research is required on how governments and public authorities can take wide-ranging 
preventive measures against biological terrorism without resorting to mass mobilization of 
national resources. Such measures must be generic and cost-effective, and benefit society as a 
whole through, for example, improvements in health and emergency infrastructure. 
• Need to develop detection technology, and innovative means for engaging with research 
communities who may be involved with potentially dangerous developments in biotechnology, 
including the development of ethical rules within research and professional institutions. 
 
 
A.3.3 Trends in Info-technology and cognitive sciences 
 
Threats 
Some information-technology (IT)-based military applications, in particular autonomous fighting 
systems and preparations for net/cyber war, could bring dangers for international peace and 
security, the security of citizens and even for democratic society itself. If preventive/limitation of 
the most dangerous military IT applications are not successful, serious and previously unrecognised 
threats to European security are likely to materialise. 
 
Challenges 
There is a need to reconcile or balance contradictory goals in IT R&D, to monitor and assess the 
potential adverse impacts of new developments, and to support technology for crisis-intervention 
capabilities, monitoring and verification. 
 
Opportunities 
IT provides options for monitoring and verification of compliance with rules and agreements. With 
its dominant political, multilateral approach to the resolution of conflicts the EU may be in a good 
position to affect the worldwide climate towards co-operative limitation of dangerous technologies 
including military applications. 
 
 17
Research Recommendations  
• Research is required on how cognitive science can be more relevant to security or defence 
research and policy, including human-computer interaction, and monitoring activities such as 
computer simulation of weapons testing through community building in the appropriate 
scientific and technological professions. 
• Research on how to contain information warfare. 
• An overview study should be devoted to the potential of IT to monitor events and information 
with a view to verify compliance with rules and agreements. Specifically, automatic tools to 
find indications of illegal or unethical R&D or other activities – specifically in scientific 
literature, in the public media and on the Internet. 
• Interdisciplinary research should study how to balance the increasing need for transparency with 
the right to privacy. 
 
 
A.3.4 Trends in Military technology 
 
Threats 
 
There should be a distinction made between immediate threats directed at the EU, demanding direct 
EU science and technology/research and development (S&T/R&D) responses, and potential as well 
as indirect threats. What are not risks today may be risks tomorrow if the right actions are not 
performed. The problem of conventional weapons proliferation needs to regain political saliency as 
an issue. We need to understand better how the arms trade operates and what the consequences of 
proliferation of all types of conventional military technology are; how proliferation is likely to 
occur in the future and what the security consequences could be. There is a danger that EU-US 
disagreements on civilian aerospace subsidy will spill over into the defence field, and that the 
perceived need to compete with the US could draw the EU into an economically destructive ‘arms 
race’. However, ensuring that needs are defined by users rather then industry should help to limit 
this threat.  
 
Challenges 
The security sector needs to better understand how civilian technological advances can be altered in 
order to meet internal and external security needs, as defined by user groups. There should be funds 
made available for the evaluation, testing and demonstration of the potential of these technologies 
for security use. A particular aspect of western societies is the quick spread of IT and related goods 
and services. This is also reflected in the S&T/R&D military planning for network-centric warfare. 
This creates a particularly high degree of societal risk given the vulnerability of the structures/ 
networks themselves; while making such structures/networks secure is costly. Sweden currently 
seems to be managing this successfully in the field of network centric warfare, and their system 
should be investigated. 
 
Opportunities  
• It should be possible for the EU to formulate a long-term ‘baseline’ for an EU Science and 
Technology-based innovation system: one in which societal/individual security and military 
security-related threats as well as creative perceptions, aims and ambitions are presented in a 
strong policy and institutional framework. That baseline should directly relate S&T/R&D 
disciplines or activities to the ESS. This baseline needs to be discussed and revised at 
regular intervals, especially in light of changing EU policy aims. In order to avoid 
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duplication, ways of encouraging national defence research organisations to put in joint bids 
for funds should be investigated. Could a special scheme, including all the necessary 
security provisions, similar to that currently operated by the European Science Foundation 
be put into place? Also, a focus on the specific needs articulated by the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) should help funding to be targeted in a way that moves ESDP further down 
the path of being able to fulfill all Petersberg tasks (humanitarian, peacekeeping and crisis 
management) as quickly as possible. It will be necessary to develop new types of arms 
control strategies to deal with new types of actors and technologies.  
 
Research Recommendations 
• Ensure that the money available for testing, evaluating and demonstrating the potential of 
civilian technology for internal and external security purposes is both open to small, niche firms 
or research programmes.  
• Develop research links between the EDA and European defence research agencies and the 
European Commission. 
• Science and Technology-based military innovation skills, competences and potential in smaller 
EU members including new members. 
• Developments in and potential (deliberate preparations) for military use of commercially 
available technologies and equipment. 
• The importance of military S&T/R&D skills for the creation and use of asymmetric force. Such 
a study could be combined with studies of conflict developments in general and in EU 
neighbouring countries or regions, particularly the Middle East. 
 
 
A.3.5 Trends in Space Technology 
 
Threats 
The informal US policy of refraining from putting weapons in space seems increasingly in question 
as perceived risks to US space assets from a variety of sources grow. The capacities and intentions 
of the North Korean regime remain unclear, and the US suspects China of developing lasers 
designed to destroy satellites in orbit. Moreover, the very dynamic of modern warfare threatens to 
blur the line between militarization and weaponization of space, increasing the likelihood of conflict 
in outer space.  An attack on Western space assets could be a ‘grand equalizer’, denying the most 
developed countries the ability to use their most lethal and sophisticated weapons which are 
dependent upon space-based Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence systems. 
European militaries are a part of this dynamic as well, as they are increasingly dependent on space 
assets.  
 
Challenges 
The increasing proliferation of ballistic missile technology is another element driving the 
militarization, and possibly weaponization, of space.  Faced with the challenge of shooting down a 
missile in flight, the US is looking to space both as a platform for detection sensors and a potential 
launch point for anti-missile munitions to strike enemy missiles upon launch or mid-flight.  This 
would be a destabilising development, as it could be perceived as developing a first-strike 
capability, or encourage other states to develop and deploy space-based military platforms. 
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Opportunities 
Confidence-building steps between the EU and US hold the promise of reducing the likelihood of 
space warfare. Both the US and Europe will need to gain mutual assurances that they will continue 
to enjoy access to and use of their space assets.  A more ‘water-tight’ regulatory regime for the 
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) and Galileo satellite systems, for 
example, could significantly lessen US fears of a potential breach of the systems’ neutrality – thus 
reducing one incentive for putting arms in orbit. 
 
Research Recommendations 
• Research required in ballistic missile development and WMD developments in countries of 
concern and ability to weaponize missile, i.e. make delivery vehicles with warheads. 
• Non-missile strike capabilities: laser, other forms of energy 
• Research into the use of space-based remote sensing for verifying compliance with international 
agreements on arms control and the environment, and for monitoring industrial accidents and 
natural disasters. 
• Vulnerability of current and future EU space assets. 
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The 10 most important policy issues for EU security until 2015:  
 
1.The EU needs to mainstream a strong conflict prevention mechanism horizontally across all major foreign 
policy fields, including international cooperation in science and technology. This mechanism requires 
substantive analytical capacity and the technical backup in order to pursue upstream conflict prevention. 
2. The EU Homeland Security agenda needs to be coherent with its foreign policy agenda. The technical 
capacity of both Homeland Security and foreign policy also needs to be augmented, specifically regarding 
intelligence sharing and retrieval. EU military capacity also needs to specialise (demarcation of tasks) and 
streamline (battlegroups concept), while airlift capacity needs to strengthen dramatically. 
3. Technology should become a centrepiece of EU foreign policy in the future. However, there is a need for a 
clear technological code of ethics governing dual-use, which safeguards individual privacy and increases 
necessary transparency. Also, there is a need to ensure that potentially harmful technology is kept out of the 
hands of terrorists and organized crime, while stabilising technologies are shared as widely as possible. 
4. Arms Control: there is an urgent need to invest in a new generation of arms control, non-proliferation and 
technology experts able to understand the new scientific challenges posed by existing and emerging 
technological breakthroughs (across Nanotechnology, Information Technology, and CBRN technologies) and 
the means for their regulation and constraint through multilateral and regional frameworks. 
5. There is a need for a renewed emphasis upon area studies combined with security studies/conflict studies 
in the social sciences to investigate the regional contextual sources of contemporary security concerns 
(regional security complexes, terrorism, failed states, “risk society”, poverty, organized crime etc) 
6. There is a need to understand further the importance for EU Co-operation with neighbouring countries and 
key partners such as China and the US as well as the need for strategic autonomy in responding to 
contemporary and future security threats, as well as opportunities for the future evolution of the ESS. A co-
operative and synergistic approach needs to be balanced with the ability to go it alone if needed, in terms of 
research, technology and action. 
7. There is a need to further our understanding, as the basis for developing a European strategic culture on 
security matters, on what a common European security and threat assessment includes and continually revisit 
this analysis in the face of a changing security environment and in order to deepen further our understanding 
of threats, risks, opportunities and common (foreign and security) policy responses.  Similarly, greater 
understanding is needed of the causes of insecurity in Europe and about strategies for security building.   
8. State failure and disintegration, internal conflict and organized crime, could trigger major threats to 
European security. This is most likely to happen in the poorest area of the World, particularly in Africa and 
on Europe’s eastern and southern borders – but also in pockets of deprivation within Europe. Despite a recent 
surge in analysis, there remains a great need for further study of the causes and consequences of civil wars on 
the African continent. Fighting poverty and improving governance throughout the world is a major security 
challenge for Europe. 
9. It is important for the governments and public authorities to realize that counter and preventive measures 
must be taken long before a terrorist incident, in particular using the technologies surveyed above, occurs. 
10. The security sector needs to better understand how civilian technological advances can be altered in order 
to meet internal and external security needs.  The potential contributions of other sectors, both public and 
private, need to be recognised and supported as well. 
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 B. Responding to specific security scenarios 
 
 
The analysis in Part A was refined into a more precise analytical framework through the 
construction of five scenarios relating to the future European security environment. These served to 
illustrate how the key threats and challenges identified earlier might manifest themselves in 
particular contexts.   
 
It should be understood that the scenarios are not predictions, nor are they even considered 
probable developments.  They are just useful as instruments for organizing thinking and helping to 
prepare for future developments in light of uncertainties. The scenarios were able to provide more 
precise ideas about geo-strategic regional issues, horizontal security trends internationally and on 
technological security trends.  
 
These scenarios were presented to the European Commission at a workshop attended by the 
authors, project partners and Commission officials in June 2005. 
 
 
B.1 Geo-strategic scenario:  
Nuclear device detonated in Europe 4
 
 
B.1.1. Context in 2015 
 
Europe remains a potential target for mass impact terrorist attacks. There are significant 
geographical areas not far from the borders of the European Union, outside government control, that 
could provide armed groups with places to train and accumulate materials and weapon-relevant 
items. Large stockpiles of fissile material stockpiles remain in Russia, the security of which 
continues to be a cause for concern. 
 
Terrorist groups may further develop their links to organized crime and to individuals working 
inside nuclear establishments. When combined with weak international nuclear safeguards, there is 
a risk that the thefts of small quantities of materials will go undetected. These thefts may be 
undertaken for financial and not political or ideological reasons but the internal network between 
terrorists and organized crime provide a pathway to extremist groups.  
 
The amount of nuclear material in Russia is not known and no official figures on Russian stocks 
exist. While estimates involve large uncertainties, varying by several hundreds of tons, the upper 
limit of the current estimates of HEU held in Russia is 1,400 tons, enough for some 30,000 crude 
nuclear explosives. These stocks are managed with very little transparency and are not subject to 
                                                 
4 This scenario is not a prediction, nor even a probable development.  It is a useful instrument for organizing thinking 
and helping to prepare for future developments in light of uncertainties. 
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any international safeguards. Confidence that they are safe and secure rests entirely in the level of 
faith we have in the Russian authorities.  
 
For the purposes of the scenario it is assumed that security upgrades continue to be implemented in 
Russian facilities, but that these are given a relatively low priority.  
 
 
B.1.2 The Scenario 
 
In this scenario, the main uncertainties (and uncertainties are inevitable in judgments about the 
future) relate to the developments in the political sphere. There are fewer uncertainties in the 
technology sphere because the properties of nuclear explosive devices are reasonably well 
understood and possible to predict based on information in the public domain.  
 
Having spent ten years accumulating highly enriched uranium (HEU) in small quantities, a terrorist 
group has sufficient material to construct a simple gun-type nuclear explosive device. The material 
is used to assemble a device, which is then detonated in a city of a country bordering the EU. 
Between 40,000 and 100,000 people are killed. Understandably, the capacity of the targeted state to 
respond to the immediate consequences of the attack is quickly overwhelmed. The scenario is only 
driven by technology to a limited degree, and preventive approaches and humanitarian responses 
are equally if not more relevant to consider here.  
 
Trigger: The event that is the trigger for the scenario is clearly hypothetical. Efforts have been 
made to ensure that the projections that set the initial conditions for the event are credible and 
plausible. Each of the background conditions is considered likely, given what we currently know.  
Therefore, while it is not suggested that the event at the centre of this scenario is probable (let alone 
likely) it is argued here that there is a clear possibility of such an event.  
 
The risk of a nuclear terrorist attack taking place in future is significant given the identified trends 
amongst mass impact terrorist groups combined with the availability of fissile material, the 
questionable quality of nuclear security and the relative ease with which a functioning device could 
be constructed once adequate quantities of suitable material had been acquired. However, such an 
event is almost certainly not imminent, given that very considerable quantities of fissile material 
would need to be accumulated to compensate for the lack of sophistication in weapon design that a 
terrorist group would be likely to use. Therefore, a systematic preventive programme would have a 
very high probability of succeeding and forms the main part of a credible positive outcome to the 
scenario described below. 
 
The design for a nuclear explosive device is different from that likely to be used to build a nuclear 
weapon as traditionally understood in state arsenals. However, there are continued refinements in 
the technology of nuclear material protection, control and accountancy and in the EU (including in 
fact inside the European Commission) there is a very great deal of technical expertise that can be 
applied in understanding and addressing the technology issues raised in this scenario.  
 
The security of Europeans is affected in several ways by such an event. First, a successful terrorist 
attack on the borders of the EU would have a serious impact on the domestic politics of the targeted 
country. Second, the demonstration effect of such an attack would have an impact on the wider 
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effort to fight global mass impact terrorism. Third, the quantity of material available to the group 
that carried out the attack would be unknown along with its location and their intentions concerning 
further attacks. Fourth, the nature of the international response, and in particular by the US, would 
be difficult to predict. 
 
The terrorist group issues a statement that it has in its possession sufficient material for a second 
device and states that unless its political demands are met this device will be used to attack a second 
major city. Large numbers of people spontaneously begin to evacuate major cities in the country in 
question. Many of the evacuees travel to the borders of the EU.  
 
If the negative outcome to the scenario actually came about, there could be a technological 
component to the response where it could be necessary to manage large numbers of people 
assembled at the borders of the EU, including the delivery of medical and other humanitarian 
assistance on the other side of the border. In this case there would be a need to respond at the border 
of the EU in conditions where a significant number of sick and wounded people are trying to enter 
the Union. The technological implications of responding to this credible negative outcome of the 
scenario would include understanding what kinds of medical and humanitarian treatment would be 
required, where this treatment would be delivered and by whom.  
 
 
B.1.3 EU preventive measures 
 
An expanded nuclear security programme 
There is a strong case for Europe to support increased efforts to secure and, where possible, reduce 
the stockpiles of fissile material that could be used to make nuclear explosive devices, in particular 
those stocks of materials that could be used to make a device without the need for additional 
processing. HEU and plutonium stockpiles should be consolidated in fewer locations, which are 
easier to protect. The process of consolidation could also take into account the possibilities for 
decommissioning research reactors that are no longer needed for the purpose of separating isotopes 
for experimentation.  
 
Expanded capacity to respond at the borders of the EU 
The EU has established mechanisms to combat terrorism, organized crime, environmental threats 
and threats to public health and safety within its border. Many initiatives exist to develop integrated 
border management at the EU’s external borders. However, these efforts do not always connect 
together in all of the fields that would be required to ensure security within the EU. In particular, 
existing programmes for cooperation with countries that share borders with the EU lack cross-
border dimensions in WMD-related areas.  
 
An enhanced programme on counter-terrorism cooperation with Russia 
The common interest in combating terrorism has been a key theme in recent political statements 
from the EU and Russia. The documents agreed at the recent EU–Russia summit included the 
desirability of exchanging ideas and models for combating terrorism as one among many 
suggestions for enhanced cooperation in this area. This could increase the degree of commonality in 
the approaches taken towards counter-terrorism operations in the EU and in Russia. Moreover, at 
the declaratory level the question of how to develop an effective counter-terrorism programme that 
remains proportionate and respects democratic values, protecting individuals while upholding 
human rights, is one of shared interest.  
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Relations to EU science and technology policy 
There is a strong case for the development of further knowledge and intelligence related to the 
security situation in Russia, including the questions of the future developments in the security sector 
(including a better understanding of the scale of financing that is being directed to security-related 
activities and the wider economic impact of such financing), in civil-military relations, and in 
relations between the centre and the regions in Russia (in light of the wider political development 
within the country). 
 
There is a strong case to continue to investigate the approaches to preventive action in the field of 
nuclear security. These investigations should include a natural and applied science element focused 
on issues related to nuclear material control and accountancy. These types of investigations should 
engage the nuclear pole of DGs Transport and Energy as well as the Joint Research Centre.  
 
There is still a need for a systematic and dedicated programme to build a nuclear security culture in 
Russia and in other countries. This is a programme that should engage the scientific and the 
industrial communities from the EU and from Russia in multi-disciplinary projects in the nuclear, 
biological and chemical functional areas.  
 
The development of a mobile capability able to respond to CBRN terrorist events could assist the 
delivery of post-event humanitarian and emergency assistance either within the EU, at its borders or 
to populations within the affected country. The feasibility of including this capability as one 
element in programmes to manage the borders of the enlarged EU could be one area of further 
investigation. The response in case of a request for assistance would depend partly on the capacities 
that exist and partly on the effectiveness of a deployment of those capacities. Forward planning and 
exercises in which participants from both EU countries and countries adjacent to the EU think 
through how responses could be organized in different scenarios would be potentially useful areas 
for further attention.  
 
The organisation of an integrated border security management system around the periphery of the 
enlarged Union could aid border control. The inclusion of a WMD-related component into the 
integrated border security management system of an enlarged EU should be investigated, taking 
into account both preventive aspects of border management and crisis responses.  
 
 
B.1.4 Recommendations  
 
From the brief outline above a number of areas emerge in which scientific- and technological 
research could make a valuable contribution to gaining a better understanding of future problems 
and fashioning responses. Our analysis concludes that a systematic preventive programme would 
have a very high probability of succeeding. This should focus on: 
 
• Research focused on assessing the risk of nuclear terrorism in countries close to the enlarged 
EU should be given a high priority as part of EU WMD non-proliferation effort. The 
research should also focus on identifying responses to identified risks.  
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• In a similar vein, focus should be placed on coordination and cooperation with the countries 
around the periphery of the enlarged EU to take preventive actions and to prepare responses 
to a nuclear terrorist event or other act of catastrophic terrorism.  
 
• It is crucial to identify and support the nuclear security measures that can safeguard and 
control all relevant materials that a terrorist could use (over and above current efforts in 
Russia and Ukraine). Equally, the EU should help to develop a programme for building a 
‘nuclear security culture’ to be introduced as part of the curriculum in scientific and 
technical training programmes within the nuclear establishment of Russia and other 
countries. 
 
• In designing such a research programme, representatives of the relevant internal actors (such 
as the Joint Research Centre, other nuclear safeguards specialists, border management and 
security specialists as well as relevant country and regional desk officers) should be 
engaged. Experts from Member States, the Council and other competent partners could also 
form part of an advisory body. 
 
• Any EU sponsored and managed research programme in this area should draw on the 
knowledge of, and be conducted in, cooperation with international organisations with 
relevant expertise. Special reference is made here to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) in Moscow and the 
Science and Technology Centre of the Ukraine (STCU) in Kiev.  
 
• Another research focus should be on the linkages between the domestic economic, political, 
social, ethnic and demographic development of countries around the periphery of the 
enlarged EU and tendencies in the development of international, mass impact terrorism.  
 
 
B.2 Homeland security scenario:  
Biological incident in Europe 5
 
 
B.2.1 Context in 2015 
 
The reality of the threat posed by bio-terrorism can no longer be denied. Today the nature of this 
threat lacks specificity. Terrorist organizations may be more likely candidates for large-scale bio-
terrorist attacks than criminal organizations, although the latter might be involved in extortion 
schemes involving the threat of poisoning with toxins (poisonous substances derived from living 
organisms). Criminal acts involving biological agents (mostly toxins) are in the overwhelming 
number of cases committed by individuals as an act of revenge or out of a grudge against another 
individual or company. 
 
There are many types of agents. Biological agents differ in infectivity and pathogenicity, and 
therefore pose different levels of threat. However, while certain agents primarily affect human 
                                                 
5 This scenario is not a prediction, nor even a probable development.  It is a useful instrument for organizing thinking 
and helping to prepare for future developments in light of uncertainties. 
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health, other ones target animals or plants, and may consequently be used for economic terrorism 
while they would pose less of a danger to the perpetrator. These types of threats might escape from 
common EU policies as a consequence of the human health approach to bioterrorism. Targets can 
be humans, animals or plants and the purpose of bioterrorism may be societal or economic 
disruption rather than mass casualties. 
 
The present scenario assumes that by 2015 the EU has adopted a counter-bioterrorism policy 
focusing on particular threat agents. These agents are being researched for the development of 
effective prophylaxis, medication and vaccines. In addition many research programmes funded by 
the EU and individual member states address the growing concern about emerging and re-emerging 
diseases, which are responsible for a large number of outbreaks inside Europe and in the continent’s 
periphery. 
 
In several EU member states high-containment laboratories have been set up in which researchers 
are looking into genetically modified pathogens in order to determine to what extent existing 
medication and vaccines might be overwhelmed. As part of the efforts to reduce the risk of 
disaffected scientists and laboratory workers in neighbouring countries (Russia, Ukraine, as well as 
Middle Eastern and North African countries) being involved in illegal weapon programmes, the EU 
has set up several collaborative programmes promoting peaceful uses of biology and biotechnology.  
 
In addition, individual EU member states are promoting extensive scientific and technology 
exchanges with some of the neighbouring countries to counter the threat of newly emerging 
diseases plaguing different parts of the world. They invite foreign scientists to participate in 
research programmes inside the EU. In comparison to ten years earlier, the overall fear of biological 
warfare has receded as a result of more peaceful security interactions in Europe’s periphery. 
Nonetheless, some societies remain unstable as a consequence of unequal distribution of wealth and 
religious rivalry. 
 
 
B.2.2 The Scenario 
 
On 31 June 2015 some vague reports appear in the national press of an EU Member State about 
several people having come down with a mysterious illness. It emerges that whatever is causing the 
disease, the symptoms progress fast and it has a high fatality rate. Although initial symptoms are 
flu-like, specialists in infectious diseases are baffled because of the lack of response to available 
medicines. By mid-July the first cases emerge in two other Member States, and the disease spreads 
further thereafter. There is the suggestion that truckers driving across Europe may have carried the 
disease, as the initial local cases in the other countries appear to have their presence in petrol 
stations along motorways or motels in common. It is soon clear that the picture about the epidemic 
health officials have is hours, if not days behind the actual situation.  
 
Governments close borders, and attempts are being made to quarantine infected people. However, at 
the same time, economic activity grinds to a halt as supplies no longer come through and people 
refuse to go to work. Soon this turns into social unrest as a consequence of the lack of food supplies 
and other essentials, on the one hand, and the rapidly dropping confidence in the ability of the 
authorities to handle the crisis. 
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Preoccupied with the unfolding crisis, nobody links the disease outbreak to a news story that had 
appeared on 4 June about the murder of the wife and three children of a microbiologist working in 
the EU and his disappearance. These events were then widely viewed as a family drama. In fact, a 
criminal syndicate had held them hostage while he was forced to smuggle genetically modified 
pathogens out of the high-containment laboratory. 
 
 
Trigger: The trigger for this event was a criminal syndicate using extortion to gain access to 
genetically modified pathogens out of a high-contamination laboratory. The lessons learned, 
however, are applicable to whether the disease results from deliberate, accidental or natural 
causes. While the revolution in biotechnology will bring numerous new nefarious applications of 
disease, it will also - if applied appropriately - create many new opportunities to deal with health 
threats from benign/natural or accidental causes as well as from hostile sources. In other words, 
some of the policy development should be geared towards harnessing biology and biotechnology for 
peaceful purposes. 
 
 
B.2.3 EU Preventive Measures 
 
The goals of biological terrorism may be diverse. Not only is it possible for terrorists or criminals to 
select biological agents with effects ranging from incapacitation to a high risk of lethality, they can 
also target agriculture or infrastructure to cause economic damage. No government can prepare to 
deal with all contingencies. The measures to be taken in order to prevent acts of terrorism, protect 
the population and infrastructure, and deal with the consequences of a terrorist event must be 
designed and executed in such a way that they cause the least disruption to economic and social 
activities and do not diminish the fundamental organizing principles of a society. While it is 
necessary for policy makers to sufficiently prioritize the threats posed by biological terrorism, it is 
equally important not to excessively dramatize the threat and especially the consequences of 
hypothetical events. 
 
Development of health infrastructure 
The basic options with regard to countering the dangers of deliberate disease or poisoning with 
biological agents (toxins) are the development of (1) a nation’s general health infrastructure with 
some supplementary measures that target some specific risks, or (2) countermeasures against 
specific threat agents. The first option is the preferred one. A range of generic measures that bolster 
the existing health and emergency infrastructure and procedures may go a long way in dealing with 
such threats. Rather than disrupting a society, they may actually be beneficial to the population in 
ordinary as well as extraordinary circumstances. As governments and public health officials are 
increasingly confronted with threats posed by emerging and re-emerging diseases (e.g. Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), polio, Marburg virus, influenza, etc.), the generic measures 
would also help to build the necessary capacity to deal with naturally occurring emergencies. Some 
of the generic measures are set out below. 
 
Of particular importance is that there is a good regional distribution of emergency wards (including 
staff) and a spare capacity of beds. In the case of an emergency following the release of a biological 
agent against humans, there is an immediate need for a surge capacity to deal with the emergency. 
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Many other measures will lose much of their effectiveness if the ability to deal with a sudden 
massive influx of patients is non-existent or inadequate. 
 
Rapid detection and identification of an outbreak is of critical importance to take the correct 
emergency measures. This is crucial, as with certain diseases (e.g. anthrax) it is still possible to 
administer vaccines or medication immediately after the infection has occurred. Highly contagious 
diseases may have spread much farther than the latest intelligence would indicate to decision 
makers. The longer the delays in identification, the greater the emergency they would have to 
confront. Early and up-to-date intelligence on the progress of the epidemic is critical for early 
decisions on containment and quarantine strategies. It will be important to mobilize distribution 
channels and production capacity of vaccines or medication, as well as to mobilize international 
assistance. 
 
Many of today’s physicians will not be familiar with some of the diseases that are of the greatest 
concern for use in warfare or by terrorists. Such refresher courses would improve their ability for 
rapid and accurate diagnoses (a doctor who had taken an emergency course quickly suspected 
anthrax in the first victim of the letters with anthrax spores in the US in October 2001). 
Furthermore, regular training would be a very cost-effective contribution to the need for early and 
reliable intelligence about an outbreak. Often civil emergency services are well equipped to deal 
with industrial disasters. Their equipment should be complemented to deal with cases of deliberate 
outbreaks, and the staff should be trained in how to deal with suspicious outbreaks. 
 
The size and nature of stockpiles of vaccines, antibiotics and antidotes are a function of the 
emergency plans the public health authorities develop. In the case of the anthrax letters in the US in 
2001, there was a rapid shortage of adequate antibiotics and the dependence on a single (foreign) 
supplier exacerbated the situation. Also, the recent failure of influenza vaccines in the US because 
of the forced halt in production in the UK demonstrates the need for adequate stockpiles until such 
time that the distribution channels become operational or the production can be increased. 
 
Communication equipment should be adapted or developed to common standards. These standards 
must be applied not only to emergency services on the territory of a single EU member state, but 
also among member states, neighbouring states and more widely as disease will not stop at borders. 
In addition, common protocols must be designed and adopted in order to address the issue of the 
many languages within the EU. 
 
Development and adoption of crisis communication strategies 
Crisis communication strategies are designed to be able to inform the public in a responsible way. 
Among the measures to be considered are the identification of authoritative sources of information 
for the public at both national and EU level and the establishment of procedures to maintain 
communication even under the gravest of circumstances. Both the national and EU authorities 
should conclude agreements with different sectors of the press in order to prevent – as far as 
possible - sensationalist reporting that might contribute to panic with attendant pressures on 
stockpiles of antibiotics and social disturbances. In addition, political authorities and key personnel 
should receive training in crisis communication. The communication strategies at high-risk 
industrial facilities and industrial evacuation procedures probably offer a good starting point. 
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Training and simulation 
Simulation exercises and training of crisis response and management are required at all levels of 
decision-making and across the multiple agencies that would be involved in a large-scale 
emergency. They must involve local, regional and national politicians, the people responsible for 
managing and overseeing emergency responses, and the press. Tabletop exercises for the highest 
levels of decision makers would focus on overall coordination and communication strategies with 
the different services and commanders on the scene of the incident. While single-day exercises are 
sufficient to test certain components of the emergency procedures, it is also necessary to plan 
occasional simulations that may last several days, in order to examine the overall integration of 
these components. The tabletop exercises are complemented by realistic field exercises simulating 
the exercise on the ground. It is imperative that the simulations are concluded, even if situations 
emerge that are unpalatable to democracies (e.g. quarantine measures for humans for highly 
contagious diseases, and their enforcement by means of lethal force if necessary). 
 
EU members are already conducting such simulations with regard to incidents at nuclear or 
industrial facilities or major accidents, and the exercises for biological and chemical terrorism can 
build on these experiences. However, industrial disasters like the ones in Seweso (1976) or Bhopal 
(1984) or the recent outbreak of SARS suggest the need to develop and test the emergency 
procedures at all levels. Many lessons in this respect can also be learned from the terrorist strikes 
against the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC on 11 September 2001.  
 
In Europe, with its many small countries, a need exists to run cross-border training exercises 
whereby the organization of emergency response procedures among EU members is tested and 
improved (e.g. by discovering and resolving legal and bureaucratic obstacles preventing emergency 
and law enforcement or specialized military units to operate on the territory of another EU 
member). Similarly, EU-wide technical assistance programmes must be tested in practice. The 
important point to bear in mind is that the preparation and fine-tuning of procedures takes many 
years, and these activities should be undertaken soon. 
 
Specific measures for countering CBW threat 
The generic measures described above (which probably make up 80–85 per cent of the preparedness 
against a biological attack) should be supplemented by some specific measures. They include the 
stockpiling of vaccines and medication against low-probability, but high-consequence biological 
agents for both military and civilian use. Before there is a serious incident - especially with a highly 
contagious pathogen -government authorities should identify the priority services and personnel 
who should have access to pre-treatments and medication. These groups of people extend beyond 
the obvious categories of first responders, medical staff, and police forces. In the economies of 
advanced industrialized states, personnel responsible for the energy supply, food distribution, and so 
on, are equally vital to prevent the collapse of a functioning society. Such an assessment should be 
based on the careful analysis of the functioning of critical infrastructure and integration of services 
in the EU member states. 
 
For the civilian authorities it is equally important to realize that the military standards for chemical 
and biological decontamination differ fundamentally from those required in a civilian setting. 
Military standards for decontamination are governed by operational necessity on the battlefield and 
under certain circumstances military commanders have to accept chemical or biological casualties. 
There is no such tolerance for casualties in civil society. However, if the civilian standards are set at 
unnecessarily low levels or, worse, no commonly accepted levels have been adopted, then the 
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normalization of activities will be considerably delayed and this could cause considerably more 
social disruption and economic losses than the actual terrorist attack. 
 
 
B.2.4 Recommendations 
 
To conclude, since it is impossible for any policy maker or health official to predict what a 
biological attack might involve, it is important not to become fixated on certain types of biological 
threats that might be used, as this would only drain resources from the public health infrastructure 
and divert much of the research, vaccine and medicinal development away from naturally occurring 
disease outbreaks.  The response, therefore, should be driven by generic considerations, such as: 
 
• Investments in health infrastructure should ensure that there is a good regional distribution 
of emergency wards and a spare capacity of beds, with some supplementary measures that 
target certain specific risks. Establishment of specialized, well-equipped laboratories for 
rapid identification of pathogens; enhanced production capacity of vaccines or medication; 
familiarizing all health ‘first responders’ with unusual diseases; investments in 
communication technologies for emergency services etc. 
• The EU should continue to engage in international programmes to employ scientists, 
technicians and other professionals who were formerly involved in offensive BW 
programmes, both within Europe and in partner countries as appropriate.  
• It is imperative that the EU develops its independent intelligence capabilities and interprets 
the data in accordance with European security needs. Moreover, it needs to adopt common 
standards and criteria for interpreting risk and threat data so that the analyses are acceptable 
to all member states. 
• The EU should develop a new generation of vaccines and medication. This would not only 
deal with emerging and re-emerging diseases, but also be prudent vis-à-vis ‘traditional’ 
diseases. 
• The EU should develop early warning and detection technologies. At present detectors exist 
for specific agents. However, considering that many different types of pathogens could be 
used in a biological attack there is a need to develop early warning and detection systems 
that are more generic. Investment in leading edge technologies is needed, which may require 
public funds to stimulate industry interest.  
• There needs to be improved mental adaptation to risk. Proper information provision from the 
authorities, along with familiarization with the emergency procedures, help to alleviate 
people’s fears. 
• It is important to strengthen the disease surveillance infrastructure and procedures in the 
2005 accession states and in current EU candidate states – especially in the transitory period 
just after they accede – as these are currently seen as an Achilles’ heel to current EU bio-
security policies. 
• The EU needs to monitor and develop a response capability with regard to non-human 
pathogens too. Although the EU can deal with the terrorist BW threat as a consequence of its 
competences in the field of human health, attacks against plants and animals (agriculture) or 
against the economy in general are outside its remit. 
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B.3 Regional security:  
Turmoil and Crisis in North East Asia 6
 
 
B.3.1 Context in 2015 
 
The selected geographical focus here is North East Asia: a region of major geo-strategic importance 
to the EU and to the wider international community. It is also important for many other reasons as 
well (technology, economy, regional security, transnational issues). There are secondary but 
important transnational dimensions to the scenario, including issues of poverty and development, 
financial risk, migration and refugees, ideology, internal turmoil and transition from entrenched 
authoritarian government. 
 
From the perspective of 2015, a number of factors have accumulated in recent years that undermine 
North East Asian States’ continued capacity to manage and avoid key domestic and regional 
conflicts. China, after several decades of rapid economic growth (of 8 – 10 per cent per year), has 
entered a period of relatively slow growth (4 – 5 per cent) and uncertainty.  
 
Meanwhile, the regime in North Korea (DPRK) has successfully retained power, but on the basis of 
strict authoritarian control rather than reform. The international community has long become 
accustomed to this, though security anxieties associated with the development of a modest DPRK 
nuclear arsenal had gradually legitimised the development of a more ‘normal’, i.e. robust, Japanese 
defence policy, and reinforced US military alliances with South Korea (RoK) and Japan. 
 
 
B.3.2 The Scenario 
 
The Trigger: In late 2014, centralized state control within North Korea collapses, and fractures 
within the ruling elite in DPRK open up. South Korean troops (but not those of the US or Japan) 
are invited in to assist with restoring order. The outcome of the increasingly violent struggle for 
power in North Korea is not clear. 
 
The location of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons remains unclear, but fears of a launch against South 
Korea and Japan are high. China, the US and Japan are on high military alert, amid intensified 
mistrust. In the Taiwan Straits, Taiwanese authorities also go onto high military alert. The risks of 
further escalation, and widening military conflict appear high. The EU and the rest of the 
international community struggle to prevent and defuse the conflicts. 
 
The scenario is designed to clarify and illustrate the challenges and priorities for the EU and its 
partners in addressing factors and trends relating to possible major geo-strategic security issues. It 
also contributes to appreciating issues relating to regional security and the interaction between 
domestic, international and transnational processes.   
 
                                                 
6 This scenario is not a prediction, nor even a probable development.  It is a useful instrument for organizing thinking 
and helping to prepare for future developments in light of uncertainties. 
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North East Asia continues to be a region of immense strategic importance, with relationships 
between China, Japan, US, Russia, Taiwan and the Koreas – all strong or medium military powers – 
continuing to exhibit a complex mixture of tension, suspicion and co-operation. Difficult disputes 
between these states/entities remain unresolved, as policy-elites from these states hope and assume 
that economic and other self-interested considerations will continue to prevent crisis or war. Even in 
relation to North Korea, the status quo appears to many to be better than the collapse of the regime, 
with resultant upheaval, migration and uncertainty. However, there is a real risk that the region will 
enter a period of turmoil and crisis by 2015, threatening devastating war. In this context, this 
scenario is well adapted to highlight the significance and need for effective measures to prevent, 
reduce and manage conflicts in this region by the EU and its partners.    
 
 
B.3.3 EU Preventive Measures 
 
The EU needs to consider various confidence-building and conflict prevention, management and 
reduction policies and programmes relating to North East Asia, including a broad range of security 
co-operation mechanisms. It should advance policies and programmes that promote domestic 
reform (good governance, rule of law, democratic institution building, tolerance, restraint, etc) in 
China, DPRK and other relevant countries. Capacity building in relation to the UN and other 
international regimes is important to develop the capability to respond to crises and aid stability and 
security. Partnerships and common approaches need to be forged between the US, Russia, Japan, 
China and others to engage constructively with conflict prevention and management in East Asia, 
along with the promotion of civil trade and economic development. 
 
There is a range of credible variants relating to the outline scenario described above. A relatively 
benign and a relatively malign scenario are possible, both of which have the same essential factors: 
slowing economic growth rates, crisis in North Korea, and unresolved issues over the Taiwan 
Straits leading to a regional crisis.  
 
Within this framework, the relatively benign scenario is one in which policies, programmes, reform 
processes and regional/international security-building processes help to limit and contain the 
intensity of the crisis and facilitate relatively successful responses to it. The EU and other OECD 
countries become increasingly engaged with the challenges of promoting security and co-operation 
in North East Asia. Having long stood on the sidelines of US military and political engagement with 
China and DPRK, and North-East Asia more generally, the EU decides to add an important politico-
military dimension to its economic, trade and cultural relations with the countries in the region. This 
comes at some cost, since it raises difficult issues that some EU member states would prefer to 
defer. But, perhaps stimulated by the need to address DPRK nuclear weapons programmes, EU 
Member States join Japan and the US in mounting concerted pressure on China to take stronger 
action to pressure DPRK in relation to its nuclear weapons programme.  
 
As the scenario proceeds, the EU and its allies review overall policy towards the region, strengthen 
political and security relations with Japan, South Korea and ASEAN countries. The EU’s military 
presence in the region remains low, certainly compared to that of the US. However, conflict 
management and prevention is given a higher priority in EU policy and programme engagement. A 
decision is taken to ensure that EU and other, non-European states play an active, multilateral role 
in promoting co-operative security and defending non-proliferation regimes, rather than leaving the 
US to act largely independently. This is manifest in several areas. One is to engage more forcefully 
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in supporting efforts by ASEAN states and by Japan to establish military confidence-building 
measures and other co-operative security frameworks in East Asia, to facilitate conflict prevention 
and conflict management capacity. Although EU influence is limited, this has the impact of 
clarifying global multilateral interest in these issues. 
 
The relatively malign scenario is more in line with ‘business as usual’ trends, in which pressures to 
tackle the factors underlying the crisis have been modest, and the crisis catches the international 
community relatively unprepared, without the capacities, shared confidence and understandings to 
respond in a co-ordinated and co-operative manner.  
 
 
B.3.4 Recommendations 
 
This scenario highlights a wide range of issues specifically relating to EU and its partners’ 
engagement with North East Asia and also other key geo-strategic regions far from Europe. 
Following the specific scenario, there are many issues for scientific and technological research 
raised. However, there are also generic issues that would be raised also in relation to possible crises 
in other regions. A key point to notice in relation to this scenario is that understandings and 
enhanced EU policies, programmes and technology transfer regulations over a period of time can 
contribute to relatively modest incremental steps toward stabilisation over the next decade in geo-
strategic areas that can nevertheless make all of the difference when/if a crisis occurs.   
 
The outcome depends on a combination of prior development of frameworks for security co-
operation and availability of instruments for crisis management. Considerations here include the 
degree to which political/security networks are created, developed and sustained in North East Asia 
over the coming period. Within that broad framework, will be the extent to which transfers of 
military (including actual weaponry) and dual-use technologies (including civil nuclear 
technologies) can be controlled. It will be important to build confidence-building mechanisms, 
including the development and applications of verification and intelligence technologies.  
 
In many key respects the North East Asia scenario demonstrates the need for a number of 
enhancements to current research that have generic applications. For instance, in order to help us to 
prevent such a scenario requires:  
 
• Social science research into: the key political and security developments and trends in the 
region, and of the countries that comprise it; the relationships between economic, societal 
and political processes (including democratization) and security issues; lessons learned from 
crisis response and conflict prevention missions, and humanitarian/peace-support 
interventions;  
• Enhanced research into conflict prevention, management, reduction and resolution, and 
development of the institutional and technical instruments available to the EU and its 
partners to pursue these; 
• More research of strategic/security linkages between science and technology, especially 
dual-use technology transfers from the EU and its partners to East Asian states - particularly 
China - and the political/security implications; 
• Relevance of transnational science and technology communities to regional conflict 
prevention, management and reduction; 
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• Enhanced understanding about the use, and limits of use, of EU instruments (aid, trade, 
preventive diplomacy etc.) to exert pressure on states for internal reform and regional 
confidence and security building processes. 
 
In other words, social science research is needed to help European and regional policy makers to 
improve the conditions for regional stability, confidence and security building, crisis management 
and reduction, good governance, and the legitimacy and stability of governments. The scenario also 
highlights a number of natural and engineering science and technology priorities, including: 
 
• Enhanced technology assessments relating to dual-use and military transfers; 
• Improved capacities to detect, monitor and verify the presence or movements of sensitive 
WMD technologies and materials; 
• Enhanced EU capacity to monitor and assess developments (including population and 
military movements) in areas such as North East Asia.  
 
  
 
B.4 Regional security scenario:  
Turmoil in Gulf of Guinea 7
 
 
B.4.1 Context in 2015 
 
In addition to the colonial history and political, economic and personal ties that grew out of it, the 
Gulf of Guinea has become one of the major oil-producing regions in the world. While most of the 
oil produced in the sub-region will likely go to the US in the future, it is also likely to become an 
increasingly important supplier to some countries in Europe. The countries in the sub-region as well 
as the US will look to Europe to contribute to securing the flow of oil.  
 
Most of the states in the sub-region are very poor. The legitimacy of governments is low. Parts of 
the territory in the region are currently out of reach of government control. In the Niger Delta 
violent clashes between various armed groups and government forces take place from time to time 
while in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda the militant Front of Liberation of the State of Cabinda 
(FLEC) continues to operate. 
 
All of the states in the region maintain strong ties to Europe, all having been European colonies (of 
the UK, France, Spain). Elites in these countries continue to be oriented towards Europe. Children 
are primarily sent to France and the UK for education. Migration to Europe is a common and 
desirable ambition. Family ties between migrants and relatives at home are strong. However, 
economic relations between the sub-region and Europe are unbalanced. Europe is important as a 
trading partner and source of investment for the countries, while the countries are economically of 
minor importance for Europe. Some countries, such as Cameroon and Republic of Congo in the 
region continue to be major recipients of economic assistance from Europe.  
 
                                                 
7 This scenario is not a prediction, nor even a probable development.  It is a useful instrument for organizing thinking 
and helping to prepare for future developments in light of uncertainties. 
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The Gulf of Guinea region hosts a number of major oil producing states, particularly Nigeria and 
Angola (Cabinda). Oil from the region already constitutes a major share of oil imports of some 
European states, and, even more so, the US. Oil, and also gas, production in the region will grow as 
new production comes on stream (because its oil needs to be transported through the Gulf of 
Guinea, Chad, a coming major producer, often is seen as being part of the region). The US is not 
only the leading importer of oil from the region; US companies are also dominating the oil business. 
In the US, the Gulf of Guinea is often seen as strategically important. Estimates from various 
sources, including the US National Intelligence Council put the share of oil coming from Sub-
Saharan Africa, with more than half of if coming from the Gulf of Guinea, at up to 25 per cent of 
US imports by the year 2015. As the share of the region in US imports is likely to grow, the 
strategic importance of the region for the US will also increase. 
 
People in the region are overwhelmingly poor, and are likely to remain so by 2015. Income per head 
is very low in Nigeria, with more than half of the population living on incomes below the 
internationally defined poverty line of US $1 per day. Incomes in other oil producing countries are 
higher, but only Gabon can be considered a (lower) middle-income country. Income distribution is 
highly skewed in all countries. Even in the relatively better off countries, some areas are very poor. 
This includes some of the oil-producing regions, such as the Niger Delta region in Nigeria. 
Migration is high, with Europe and the US as preferred destinations. Levels and quality of education 
are low. Qualified students strive to attend quality tertiary education institutions in Europe and the 
US, contributing to major ‘brain drain’. Increasing oil production may raise income per head in 
some countries, including Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Chad. However, theory 
indicates and history demonstrates that this may not necessarily be the case.  
 
While it is difficult to make any prediction about the political systems prevailing in 2015 in the 
relevant countries, it is fairly easy to predict that the level of legitimacy of the state, whoever rules, 
will be low unless there are major improvements in economic well-being and internal conflict 
between social groups. Research-rich countries are surprisingly often afflicted by bad governments 
– in the sense of not delivering public services to citizens, including security and welfare. 
Corruption is often rampant and governments rule autocratically in the majority of states in the Gulf 
of Guinea region. In a number of these states, the combination of poverty and incapable government 
has weakened already weak state institutions, reduced people’s confidence in politicians and 
officials and led to civil unrest. As a result, all states in the Gulf of Guinea region are widely 
regarded as being ‘fragile states’.   
 
 
B.4.2 The Scenario  
 
Trigger: Massive parallel demonstrations, acts of sabotage and shutdowns of oil and gas 
installations in oil producing regions of Western Africa are escalating into widespread violence. 
The objectives of the uprising are unclear (unfriendly regional governments? independence? ethnic 
tensions?). Some groups with possible connection to international terrorism may be behind the acts 
of sabotage. One African government government reacts by sending troops into the region, which 
further intensifies the conflict and it spreads to other countries in the region. Massive population 
movements result, including increased refugee flows within Africa and to Europe The US 
government, which draws 25 per cent of its oil from the wider sub-region, is extremely worried 
about the situation and calls for European intervention.  
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With violence growing and oil production stopped, one African government decides to act with 
military force. Some groups with possible connections to international terrorism are conducting acts 
of sabotage on offshore oil installations and attacking pipelines and tankers. Other governments in 
the region remain silent, even though violence has spread to their territories. It is not clear whether 
they support the violence, which now spreads further and government forces cannot quell the 
unrest. Instead, large parts of the region become unstable and the situation degenerates into civil 
war. Fighting is increasingly brutal with atrocities committed on all sides. Massive population 
movements result, including increased refugee flows to Europe but primarily to other parts of the 
region.  
 
The US government is very worried about the situation. US warships are engaged in patrolling 
offshore operations. While this results in fewer attacks of offshore installations, warships 
themselves become targets of sea-mines and crude missiles. Pressure on the US government to also 
protect installations on shore grows. In turn, the US government calls on Europeans, with their 
historical ties and their own oil interests in the region to joint action to stabilize the situation.  
 
The lives and livelihoods of Europeans are not directly threatened by the events described in this 
scenario. However, with major disruption in oil imports, oil prices are rising. European oil 
companies are losing income and assets. With continued fighting, immigration levels may become 
so high that they present a burden to economies and societies in Europe. If acts of sabotage are 
really committed by terrorists, than these groups may also extend their activities to Europe, 
presenting a threat to the lives of European citizens. Clashes among militant groups and between 
these and government forces lead to significant battlefield deaths. However, much worse is the 
situation of civilians, particularly the refugees, in affected African countries. Humanitarian 
organizations cannot work properly because of the ongoing fighting and the general chaos on the 
ground. 
 
While not a security threat in itself, the strong stand of the US government is a major security 
concern for European political decision-makers. An unwillingness to help the US would contribute 
to a deterioration of the relationship between the US and Europe. Whilst no direct threat to the 
security of European, the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe, the level of oil imports, migration 
flows and US interests will put pressure on European policy makers to take steps to contain, 
possibly help to solve, the crisis. 
 
If things go well 
The members of the EU increase humanitarian aid, promise additional development aid to the 
countries, focusing on particularly poor regions. At the same time, the EU offers its good services to 
help facilitate the settlement of the conflict. Mediation by the EU Foreign Minister and EU Special 
Representatives is successful. Officials benefit from the advice of social scientists with regional 
expertise and a good grasp of the situation in the region. Part of the success lies in their ability to 
offer packages of development assistance and trade measures to improve the economic situation in 
the respective countries, utilising the expertise and connections of the expatriate communities based 
in Europe. 
 
In the affected African countries, the EU uses a number of instruments for short-term stabilization 
of the situation. After further assessment of the situation, which again benefits from the input of 
academic country and regional expertise, teams of policemen and administrators are dispatched. 
This provides the foundation for a more long-term engagement in economic and political 
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reconstruction. Refugee flows to the Southern borders of the EU are at a manageable level. 
Refugees are properly screened at entry points and brought to pre-established refugee camps for 
later temporary settlement in communities all over Europe. The US is content with the European 
stand, and is also following a policy of constraint. After some further bloodshed, and death from 
starvation and diseases, parties to the conflict establish a truce. The uprising ends, and production 
and export of oil and gas resume. 
 
If they don’t 
Fighting and humanitarian crises in those African countries affected reach levels that neither the US 
government nor European governments and public are willing to tolerate. Open war between these 
African countries seems imminent. Refugees increasingly move to other countries in the region, in 
the wake also spreading turmoil and chaos to other states in the region. The sinking of a patrolling 
US warship by a missile triggers a US decision to send troops to the region. The UN Security 
Council sanctions military action on humanitarian grounds. European decision-makers decide to 
participate with forces in a US led military action to occupy the Niger Delta. Refugee flows to the 
Southern periphery of Europe are growing. Screening of refugees becomes a problem. It cannot be 
excluded that militants from the region now see Europe as an enemy and plan to conduct acts of 
terrorism in Europe. 
 
 
B.4.3 EU preventive measures 
 
European science and technology policies with effects on situation factors  
The appropriateness of European reactions to the unfolding crisis is contingent on understanding it 
properly. Two factors seem of particular importance for such understanding:  a) a solid knowledge 
base about the conflict formations in the relevant region (see above, structural factors) and b) 
intelligence on leadership, actions and plans of militant groups, as well as governments and political 
opposition groups in the region. While government authorities will likely have to primarily rely on 
intelligence service with appropriate means (signal intelligence, informants, photo-intelligence), 
knowledge resources are best built in academic institutions. (These will also be an important 
recruiting ground for intelligence services.) 
 
The probability of a reasonably good outcome is increased with the availability of, and experience 
with, a wide range of instrument for conflict resolution. Research is needed to support the 
development and use of appropriate instruments for conflict prevention, resolution and 
management, including topics such as how to deal with states in various forms of decay or decline, 
how to mix instruments of development, diplomacy and coercion (sanctions), and on priorities for 
external aid in crisis situations.  
 
If the situation deteriorates, the members of the EU will need to decide about sending troops. If 
troops are sent, they should obviously be sent with the best possible technology for logistics, 
intelligence, reconnaissance and, ultimately, fighting. As this is a vast field of technologies, this will 
not be deepened here.  
 
Refugees from West Africa will reach Europe primarily by boat over the Mediterranean. In 
addition, some entries via commercial airliners (with false passports and visas) can be expected. 
Prevention of refugee flows to Europe has many facets. From the point of view of science and 
technology policies, border patrol technologies are particularly pertinent. Screening of refugees will 
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require, in addition to physical searchers, interviews and other techniques for checking of identities. 
Again, this is not the place to expand on an area that recently has received much attention in 
Europe. 
 
How well the countries in and around the Gulf of Guinea could be doing by 2015 will largely 
depend on whether they have democratic, open governments, reduced poverty and economies that 
are growing even outside the oil and gas sector. Economic dependence on oil and gas production 
may well still be high, but efforts can be made to reduce it through investment in other economic 
sectors. One of the forms of investment is into education, where Europe has a major role by 
accepting students to European schools and universities and providing support to educational and 
training institutions in the sub-region, with the aim of building indigenous capacity rather than 
succumbing to the temptation to recruit “drained brains” into European employment.  One approach 
could involve support for European/African partnerships, whereby franchising, distance learning 
and other arrangements would benefit educational establishments both in Europe and in the region. 
 
European science and technology policies  
It is assumed that the level of attention given to the sub-region remains fairly constant between 
2005 and 2015. The discussion on how European S&T influences the trajectories of the major 
factors identified above focuses on scientific exchange and other forms of training, reductions of 
dependence on oil and gas, research on the improvement of livelihoods outside the oil and gas 
sector, and the promotion of social science for good governance. 
 
S&T for improvements outside the oil and gas sector 
Improvements in agricultural production, as well as in a broad range of manufacturing activities are 
crucial to improve living conditions in the countries concerned. Oil and gas income provide the 
opportunities to invest in the diversification of production and exports, in agriculture, industry and 
services. S&T can help leverage such investments. Without further detailed analysis of bottlenecks 
and opportunities for economic improvement, it is not possible to prioritize S&T fields. However, in 
view of the continuing importance of agriculture in the countries concerned, improvement in 
agricultural production would be an obvious candidate.  Other research priorities would be in public 
health and the delivery of online education to rural communities.  A related issue is that of conflict-
effects of economic growth and development. A number of strategies and instruments have been 
developed under the heading of conflict-sensitive development; however more research is needed to 
improve their practical application in various circumstances.  
 
Reductions of dependence on oil and gas 
This has been and continues to be a major field for S&T in Europe. Obviously it is important quite 
apart from the topic discussed here, but the security dimension adds to its weight. Achieving a 
reduction in the dependency on oil and gas will depend on the success of diversification. Investment 
in immediate down-stream activities can assist here, supported by research on which sectors are of 
particularly good development potential for each of the countries in the region.  
 
Scientific exchange, training 
The application of modern technology in the oil and gas sector, including in down-stream activities 
as well as improvements in other income earning activities, will yield increasingly better results 
with growing numbers of high class researchers, engineers, technicians, and educators from the 
relevant countries. The basis for scientific work in these countries is very weak. Until 2015 it will, 
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at best, be possible to lay some of the foundations by increased training of students from these 
countries in Europe and support for educational institutions in the sub-regions. 
 
Social science for good governance 
Another area with potential to have some influence on the trajectory of major variables until 2015 is 
social science research that helps policy makers in Europe and the sub-region to improve the 
conditions for good governance, focusing on the legitimacy and stability of governments, and better 
mechanisms for the delivery of public services. Relevant areas of social science research include 
research into the functioning of the control of small arms and light weapons, conflict formations and 
resolutions, constitutions and other institutional arrangements.  
 
 
B.4.4 Recommendations 
 
This scenario predominantly covers issues of regional security in a region of some political and 
economic interest for Europe, arising from poverty and government failure made worse by resource 
scarcity. Recommendations for S&T policies illustrated in this scenario are primarily in the fields of 
social science, particularly area research, development research and research on good governance 
and technologies relevant for conflict prevention and crisis management, particularly intelligence 
and military capabilities. Other S&T policies with relevance for the scenario include energy 
conservation and border control. Prevention strategies that Europe could consider include: 
  
 Improvements in agricultural production are crucial to improving living conditions in the 
countries concerned. Oil and gas income provide the opportunities to invest in the 
diversification of production and exports, and S&T can help leverage such investments.  
 
 Although a number of conflict sensitive development strategies and instruments have been 
developed, more research is needed to improve their practical application and effective 
integration into the productive economy.  
 
 The application of modern technology in the oil and gas sector, including in down-stream 
activities as well as improvements in other income earning activities, will yield increasingly 
better results with growing numbers of high class researchers, engineers, technicians, and 
educators from the relevant countries.   Institutions are needed that are capable of educating, 
training and sustaining their work in the region.  
 
 Effective, humanitarian immigration control needs to be able to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate refugees. Technology for identification of documents and 
persons, as well as for information collection and storage can be useful in this respect.  
 
• Research to support the development and use of appropriate instruments for conflict 
prevention, resolution and management includes topics such as how to deal with states in 
various forms of decay or decline, how to mix instruments of development, diplomacy and 
coercion (sanctions), and on priorities for mobilising external aid in crisis situations.  
 
• Social science research is needed to help policy makers in Europe and the sub-region to 
improve the conditions for good governance, the legitimacy and stability of governments. 
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Area studies to enable European reactions to the unfolding crises being based on solid 
knowledge about the region and the causes of potential conflict (as in previous scenario).  
 
 
B.5 Technology driven scenario:  
Cyber Warfare and New Weapons 8
 
 
B.5.1 Context in 2015 
 
The use of new weapons - based on information technology, nanotechnology and biotechnology - 
provide a potential for much more clandestine and unexpected types of attack, and the ability to 
destabilise the military situation. Counter-technologies, such as software agents, are deployed to 
help to find the violators of limitation treaties or sensors to detect explosives or chemical/biological 
warfare agents. 
 
Since most of the dangerous new weapon technologies are still under research and development, 
there is an opportunity for preventive limitation: prevention being much more effective than 
“therapy”. New technologies can be used to monitor for dangers (at borders, important traffic 
centres, government buildings), contain the consequences of incidents (protection) and help in 
overcoming them (decontamination). 
 
Clouded in secrecy, most countries with strong armed forces have prepared for information warfare. 
Cyber attacks would use secret `backdoors` in widespread operating systems. Co-ordinated action 
by thousands of network computers, in part using sleeper agents, both of the electronic and the 
human variety, would be augmented by physical destruction of central communication trunk lines 
and nodes, and possibly satellite communications infrastructure, both earth-based and in space. 
 
Following the US introduction of unmanned combat aircraft, other leading producers develop them 
too and some export them with few restrictions. Lightweight carbon-nanotube (CNT) composites, 
very powerful computers and small sensors and actuators are used widely in civilian industry so that 
imports of hardware components are easy to arrange without arousing suspicion. Flight-control, 
target-recognition and other algorithms for (semi-) autonomous movement and action can be 
developed based on publicly available information; there is suspicion that specific algorithms and 
programmes have been sold illegally or stolen. 
 
Technology for weaving/spinning carbon-nanotube-based fibres into arbitrary forms and forming 
strong, lightweight composites is used in many countries. One large country that produces small 
arms develops all-plastic small arms with CNT-composite barrels and (maybe recoilless) metal-free 
ammunition and exports them in large numbers. Via civil wars in Africa they spread to criminals all 
over the world. Security equipment for their detection is being developed, but has not yet been 
deployed at many locations. 
 
                                                 
8 This scenario is not a prediction, nor even a probable development.  It is a useful instrument for organizing thinking 
and helping to prepare for future developments in light of uncertainties. 
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Based on the same principle, and using more powerful nano-particle-based propellant, smaller 
missiles are developed. Using small sensors, actuators and guidance computers `child-portable` air 
defence systems are developed (30cm long and 2kg mass) that are capable of reliably shooting 
down civilian aircraft. Rockets just 2m long are routinely used to launch miniature satellites of 
below 1kg mass. Even though docking on, or hitting, another satellite is extremely difficult, 
suspicion about the intention to do so are high.  There is also an increasing fear that very small 
ballistic missiles (of 2-5m length) may be used to hit strategic nuclear targets with high-precision, 
small, non-nuclear warheads (maybe using target-seeking sub-munitions). 
 
Suspicion grows that new biological or chemical weapons against organisms - based on advances in 
biotechnology, pharmacology, nanotechnology, genomics and proteomics - are being researched 
and developed in many countries. In Europe, in order to deter a threat, calls grow for the pursuit of 
an offensive research and development programme for biological weapons. 
 
The consecutive steps set out below address different technologies in isolation, whereas, in reality, a 
number of events would take place in rapid succession or simultaneously involving a mix of 
technologies. The intent is to emphasise systemic thinking (in terms of the international security 
systems) and to stress the high leverage that prevention provides. If prevention is unsuccessful, once 
certain thresholds are crossed, action-reaction cycles are likely to occur that will be very difficult to 
stop until the system arrives at a new - perhaps uncertain - stability. One present example of such a 
threshold would be the introduction of space weapons. A near-future threshold would be the 
introduction of autonomous combat systems (aircraft at first). 
 
 
B.5.2 The Scenario 
 
It is difficult to devise a realistic purely technology-driven scenario. In reality, aspects of 
technology would enter other conflict scenarios in various forms and to various degrees. 
In order to demonstrate the technological aspects, this scenario is an artificial, condensed 
combination of events tied to information technology, nanotechnology and biotechnology. It is 
intended to highlight the importance of preventive limitation of cyber warfare and new weapons 
based on information technology, nanotechnology and biotechnology. Recommendations for 
science and technology policy follow from that. 
 
Trigger: civil war breaks out in a state adjoining the EU - in a situation similar to former 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.  Among immigrants from A and B, there is strong support for the 
respective causes with money being collected and volunteer fighters being recruited. Apart from the 
warring factions other non-state actors get involved (terrorists, supporters, unknown); this spills 
over into EU territory and leads to attacks on the communication infrastructure (with resultant 
breakdown) leading to severe economic consequences; terrorist attacks on decision-makers; 
escalation to large-scale armed conflict involving the EU. 
 
Bad Case Scenario  
In response to the EU intervention, terrorists linked to side A attack buildings of the European 
Commission and of national governments with small missiles programmed to deliver an explosive 
payload through the windows of particular rooms. Because new, expensive detection equipment has 
not yet been set up at many airports, hijackers from side B are successfully smuggle all-plastic 
firearms onto several aircraft, take them over, and crash them into government buildings. Unknown 
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actors launch a large-scale, software-virus attack on European computer/communication networks. 
Communication is severely hampered, damaging mostly the civilian economy. The computers used 
in the attack are based in a country outside Europe – country C - and make it appear that it was this 
government that conducted the attack.  
 
While the EU and member states ponder retaliation, after a few days side A exploits the opportunity 
and launches a cyber attack against country C, making it appear to come from the EU. Except for 
independent military lines, communication in country C collapses for several weeks. Fearing that 
country C – in the belief that the cyber attack has come from the EU and no longer able to react in 
kind – would attack Europe, EU member states have autonomous mechanised combat aerial 
vehicles (UACV) patrol along its eastern borders. They repeatedly pass country C’s combat aircraft 
at short distance. At one encounter, the control computer of one EU UACV mistakenly thinks a 
country C aircraft is attacking it. Due to the programmed short reaction time, it shoots the aircraft 
down. As a consequence of communication to the other UACV and programmed fast reaction, 
aircraft of both sides go into firing mode and armed conflict starts. 
 
The bad-case outcome is extremely negative. There is no doubt however that it is possible. The very 
knowledge about this possibility will instil considerable caution in rational decision-makers; they 
would only escalate to the point of attacking an opponent if under extreme pressure. However, there 
is a risk that such perceived pressure could be the result of false information. Another possibility 
could be that one party gambles with a show of force that does not go as expected. And one should 
not discount the possibility of less rational decision-making, mistakes in the interpretation of 
information and accidents. Finally, there are many possibilities for systemic human and technical 
errors, or for human insubordination.  
 
Good Case Scenario 
Terrorists linked to A, while trying to smuggle mortars for attacks against government buildings, 
are interdicted at a European border. Intensified police checks find a van transporting artillery 
rockets. One car bomb explodes in front of a government building, but roadblocks with portable 
explosive-detection equipment prevent three others from coming close enough to injure a high-
ranking decision-maker. 
 
Sympathisers of B are caught when they attempt to smuggle pistols into the airports of Country C. 
No aircraft are hijacked. Unknown actors launch a large-scale, software-virus attack on the 
European computer/communication network. Communication is severely hampered, damaging 
mostly the civilian economy. They use computers in Country C and make it appear that the its 
Government conducted the attack.  
 
EU and member states have doubts if the attack was indeed carried out by Country C. Side A has 
not prepared a large-scale cyber attack and does not act against Country C. As a precaution, EU 
member states have piloted combat aircraft patrol along the EU’s eastern borders. They repeatedly 
pass Country C’s combat aircraft at short distance. At one encounter, one EU pilot has the 
impression that a Country C aircraft prepares an attack, but waits to be certain. Recognising that he 
was wrong, he does not shoot at this aircraft. In another instance, a missile is actually fired and an 
aircraft downed, but because there is no automated fast transmission and reaction of the full 
squadron, the incident remains isolated and does not trigger general shooting. 
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A terrorist group spreads anthrax spores in several metro stations, but due to small, relatively cheap 
BW-agent sensors mounted in most stations, the consequences remain limited. Using new nano-
porous decontamination agents, the stations are cleaned in a few weeks. 
 
Preventive arms control is not a new concept. It is not about outlawing whole areas of technology. 
Instead it focuses on specific applications or, in a few cases, on military/hostile uses of generic 
technologies. The arguments and criteria derive from considerations of ethics, security, health, 
democracy etc. – similar to the usual technology assessment in the civilian sphere, but here applied 
to the tools of large-scale security activities of states. Examples of preventive arms control are the 
Protocol banning blinding laser weapons of 1995 and the BTWC of 1972 (that already prohibits 
development of biological weapons). 
 
Except for cyber warfare and some aspects of precision weapons, all other new technologies 
mentioned below will probably only start to arrive by 2015. Thus, they may be more relevant at a 
later period of time; nevertheless they should be included because they would be based on 
tendencies starting much earlier. 
 
Under more benevolent scenarios, international negotiations have led to agreements limiting 
armaments and to new humanitarian-law protocols, and this approach could be applied to this 
scenario. For example, there should be a new rule in humanitarian law forbidding cyber attacks 
against computer networks, and a treaty that bans unmanned combat aircraft (and similar vehicles 
for land combat). Further agreements rule out small arms and ammunition that contain no metal, 
and small missiles altogether. The BTWC remains in force and has been augmented by a 
compliance and verification protocol. Pharmaceutical and biochemical companies are inspected 
randomly. Software agents scan the scientific - including `grey` - literature, the Internet and public 
media for indications of illegal behaviour in all areas. Challenge inspections investigate the 
suspicious cases. 
 
 
B.5.3 Recommendations 
 
International preventive arms control is the central means of dealing with cyber, nanotechnology 
and biotechnological threats. Counter-technologies, such as software agents, are deployed to help 
find indications of non-compliance and sensors to detect explosives or chemical/biological warfare 
agents.  
 
The main findings from the scenario suggest that in order to counter threats from nefarious 
applications of emerging technologies, EU research policy should be oriented towards: 
  
• Interdisciplinary research on the design of preventive limits of dangerous new technologies 
or new military options, including consideration of the verification of compliance.  
 
• Interdisciplinary (at least natural and social science) research on the risks of misuse of new 
technologies and consequences for international security, explicitly including military 
applications and civil-military interactions/exchanges, considering also the capabilities of 
small groups and second-level arms-producing countries. 
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• Social- and cultural-science research on the conditions necessary for agreeing to preventive 
limitation. Among the specific priority topics should be cyber warfare, autonomous combat 
vehicles, small robots, small missiles, new chemical agents, new biological agents, space 
weapons. Generic areas to be studied should include information technology, molecular 
biology and nanotechnology. 
 
• RTD: of sensors for chemical and biological agents, radioactive, explosive and other 
dangerous material (smaller, cheaper, more sensitive – to be carried by security personnel), 
and of filtering, neutralising and decontaminating material; of co-operative technical means 
of verification (close-range sensors, remote sensing, tags/seals, inspection equipment, 
methods to find preparations for cyber attacks); of software agents that evaluate the 
scientific literature, public media, the Internet for indications of illegal or unethical R&D or 
other activities: complemented with broadened science ethics and community-building 
within scientific and technological communities across borders, particularly where active 
research with dangerous potential is known to be undertaken. 
 
• Research on: how to set up an international high-level scientific committee on developments 
in science and technology that are relevant for security, to conduct observation, analysis and 
advice; systematic inclusion of the potential for misuse into the research and development 
process, incorporating consequences of military applications of technology and possibilities 
for internationally agreed limitations; the possible roles of professional societies and codes 
of conduct in such a process. 
 
• Improved monitoring of compliance and early warning of potential problems. 
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C. Implications for EU Research and Innovation Policy  
 
 
Part C of the project sought to identify the major implications of the scenarios for future 
developments in EU research and innovation policies – in particular its external dimension. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Reflecting a wider shift in the EU’s development,9 European research and innovation policy is in 
transition. In future, rather than being tied to industrial competitiveness - the raison d’être of the 
Framework Programme in the past - policy will increasingly have to include a stronger focus on 
other public policy objectives, including security. This is because, to date, European foreign and 
security policy has outpaced the modification of research and innovation policy. Consequently, 
there is not a Europe-wide basis for establishing a good understanding of issues that underpin 
security policy choices. Europe as a whole lacks expertise in some functional and geographical 
areas, whilst in other areas expertise is highly concentrated in certain countries. Those who might 
wish to make use of research findings do not have a wider European research community at their 
disposal.  
 
Promoting a European Research and Innovation Area that includes a security component is crucial, 
therefore - regardless of CFSP-related developments in the EU Treaty provisions. National 
programmes, especially in smaller countries with insufficient resources, are unable to address the 
problem across a spectrum of different research areas. If the EU wants to continue to expand its role 
in the world it will require a research community of sufficient capacity, quality and breadth to 
sustain it.  
 
An effective security research programme needs to be based on the best possible understanding of 
anticipated trends and developments across a wide spectrum of different functional areas and in 
different parts of the world. It also needs to encompass areas of research, particularly in the social 
sciences, that may not previously have been considered relevant to security building.  In the next 
budget cycle, therefore, it would be unwise to allow concerns over the limits of Commission 
competence artificially to restrict areas where research is sponsored. In respect of innovation, 
insofar as this refers to the development of specific technologies through applied science and 
engineering, the situation is different. The use of Community resources would probably not be 
appropriate where there was a risk of duplicating the efforts of Member States. 
 
The scenarios examined earlier suggest that developments in ‘hard science’ are more predictable 
than those in social science. Overall, the EU needs a better understanding of social, political and 
demographic developments in different parts of the world. Specifically, it needs to incorporate that 
information into better security assessments, to understand both the origins of threats, whether 
hostile or as by-products of other natural or human causes, and the efficacy of measures designed to 
                                                 
9 As noted earlier, with the publication of The international dimension of the European Research Area (EC, 2001), EU 
research and technology policy became linked with foreign policy objectives for the first time. This development is 
described and elaborated in the Commission Report entitled Security Research: The Next Steps, published in September 
2004, found at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2004/com2004_0590en01.pdf. 
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mitigate or to prevent conflict. This requires research programmes and projects to be structured in 
ways that facilitate both international and cross-disciplinary studies and analyses. 
 
So what are the wider implications for the EU’s overall research and innovation policy? Drawing on 
the findings above, the aim should be to develop a vision for research and technology that enhances 
European security over the next ten years. Accepting the reality of globalisation and increased 
interdependency, the premise is that European security now depends upon extending to others the 
power sharing and cooperative regime it has itself so effectively applied internally. And that this 
include forms of cooperation in research and innovation, science and technology similar to those 
that helped to pave the way for the accession of ten new Member States in 2004.   
 
Through the Framework Programme and the European Research Area in particular, the EU has 
already developed a wide range of instruments for international cooperation, and refined associated 
concepts and approaches. For example, it has successfully designed pragmatic and effective policies 
for intellectual property rights and for balancing cooperation in research and technology 
development with fostering industrial competitiveness.   
 
 
C.1 Implications for conflict prevention and crisis management  
 
The above clearly points towards a greater emphasis being placed on conflict prevention and crisis 
management capacities.  Research is needed to generate knowledge that can guide various 
investments in security building measures. A renewed emphasis in bolstering the social sciences - 
including Area Studies – would help us to better understand the causes of conflict and hence help us 
to prevent future ones. The causes and consequences of state weakness and failure, the changing 
nature of weapons proliferation, and the consequences of mass impact terrorism all require deeper 
analysis and comprehension. This could be followed by an investigation into the effectiveness of the 
application of existing policy instruments relating to development, diplomacy and coercion 
(sanctions). This is needed because although the ESS recognises the need to apply a broad spectrum 
of instruments it has yet to fully understand the implications of doing in particular combinations and 
in specific locations and contexts.  There is also a need for the exploration of alternative 
mechanisms for security building associated with the re-conceptualisation of economic and social 
development in these terms.  This could apply to consumer movements and corporate ethics 
development, for example, or research initiatives in agriculture, information infrastructure and 
animal health, by international charities, and their inter-linkages with more conventional “security 
research”.      
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Another recurring theme has been the importance of providing ‘enabling’ skills - practical and 
technological assistance - to potential accession states and neighbours, and in regions affected by 
possible or actual conflict. The EU has an obvious vested interest in ensuring that these countries 
can properly enforce their border and export controls. It should also expand those programmes that 
employ scientists, technicians and other professionals who were formerly involved in WMD 
programmes or where there is a risk that scientific knowledge will be misapplied. New cooperative 
threat reduction programmes should be developed in countries wherever appropriate, and should 
involve biological, as well as nuclear and chemical weapons. Developing joint science and 
technology projects that engage the relevant scientific community in peaceful research and 
development activities would have multiple and tangible security benefits to the EU, in addition to 
economic, environmental and other benefits in an interdependent world.  
 
Successful conflict prevention and crisis management also still requires enhancements to existing - 
and the development of new – technologies (for example, transport capacity, communications 
capability and quality of intelligence). In respect of controlling the illegal trade in weapons, tagging 
technologies need to be developed, along with sensors to improve monitoring and tracking the flow 
of goods. 
 
When considering how to expand and improve information/intelligence requirements, again it is the 
quantity, quality and analysis of such information that will make Europe more secure, rather than 
technology per se. In confronting terrorists who rely on minimal technological support and who are 
linked through familial bonds, technology serves to generate, intercept, and translate actionable 
intelligence - as the use of closed circuit television images and mobile telephone intercepts has 
recently demonstrated in respect of identifying and arresting suspects in the London terrorist 
bombings. However, technology is not sufficient; trained interpreters and analysts also need to 
engage with increasingly sophisticated technologies and networks of agents, which requires 
research into knowledge management to improve recognition, evaluation and rapid, appropriate 
response to threats. 
 
Promoting cross-cultural understanding and dialogue among and within different ethnic and 
religious groups - especially in relation to young people and in areas of high unemployment - is 
vital in combating terrorism. The engagement of research and educational institutions in Islamic 
countries, in partnership with their counterparts in the EU, should be made a priority here. 
Developing innovative ways of conducting research using new media and information technologies 
– such as the Internet and satellite television - should be supported.  
 
 
C.2 Structural versus thematic elements in EU policy 
 
A mixture of thematic, horizontal and structural elements, and approaches which combine these 
elements, is needed in any successful EU research, technology and innovation policy. Themes that 
emerge include crisis prevention and management, and understanding the sources of conflict and 
terrorism.  New structural elements would include incorporating security assessments into 
technology development policies. The need to strengthen particular research fields, such as 
increasing the funding of area studies, could constitute a key horizontal element across all thematic 
areas.  
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In a rapidly changing security environment it is important to anticipate the types of research that are 
orientated towards societal - rather than traditional military - security.  A redefinition of security to 
encompass economic, social cohesion, environmental and other issues, requires new research into 
how best to build and sustain that security. For instance, research is needed into how to stabilise 
international financial markets, develop industrial ecology, control greenhouse gas emissions, 
construct social capital, enable endogenous innovation and economic development, and so on.     
 
As internal borders in Europe have dissolved, so too will the dissolving boundaries of the European 
Union make territorial defence of the EU as a whole increasingly less relevant.  The armaments 
industry is not irrelevant to defence against contemporary threats, but much of it will need to be re-
oriented to deal with the very different nature of those threats, some of which have become more 
internalised. So, military technology will continue to make a contribution to future security, and will 
find limited derivative application, for instance via the control of smuggling of illegal goods, drugs 
and immigrants.  
 
But the growth area for technological applications to security challenges is likely to be in the 
implementation of internal surveillance systems such as the introduction of biometric identification 
cards, and data mining activities, ostensibly as measures against terrorism, but also in relation to 
combating crime and preventing social security fraud. Nevertheless, serious questions remain as to 
whether such increased surveillance methods will in effect improve security. The deleterious impact 
on privacy and civil liberties that would result from this state-sponsored surveillance could - by 
undermining the trust of those sections of society whose cooperation is essential in combating 
terrorism - actually decrease security.  It is essential therefore that ‘security impact assessments’ are 
applied before any decisions are made to apply new technologies in this way.  
 
Although technological trajectories can be extremely complex to identify - and the link between 
military and civilian technologies difficult to decouple - certain patterns have emerged.  Aerospace 
technologies, for instance, are generally highly transferable between military and civil applications 
in either direction. Electronics are more complicated. In the US, for instance, electronic-based 
inventions developed by civilian industry were ‘captured’ early on by military sponsorship. But 
subsequently, civilian markets overtook military contracts in commercial value, and innovation in 
non-military electronics made more rapid progress, with the ironic consequence that a significant 
number of US weapons systems became dependent upon imported Japanese electronics.   
 
The situation in Europe is different again, in part because many countries’ armaments industries 
never developed into a separate and economically significant industrial sector. Nevertheless, there is 
considerable evidence that the US experience in microelectronics applies across the board in Europe 
as well.  As long as the ‘pull’ from the civilian market is sufficiently ambitious and demanding, 
most of the demands of the military market could be met by using civilian-driven technological 
developments.   
 
The EU’s Framework Programme is well equipped to support RTD related to security in areas that 
traditionally have not been associated with the military.  Each Framework Programme’s six-year 
duration provides the necessary continuity and flexibility to cope with changing requirements. It is 
also important to stress that parts of the Framework Programme that are not associated with the 
European Security Research Priority within FP7, may nevertheless have significant security 
implications.   
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For those industries in decline for which economic conversion or dual-use technology policies are 
appropriate, the Structural Funds may be more appropriate vehicles for innovation support than the 
Framework Programme. Moreover, the Structural Funds can leverage innovation support 
mechanisms with other types of support for economic development, such as training and regional 
infrastructure.  
 
 
C.3 Consequences for Science and Technology 
 
Europe has an industrial policy focused on making military industry more competitive. But it must 
ensure that this policy serves – and does not drive – its foreign and security policy. For instance, in 
the initial phase of constructing a ‘Security and Space’ theme within FP7, the consultative process 
was conducted largely within those industries and communities associated with the development of 
armaments and military systems.  It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the four priorities identified 
as part of the proposed FP7 were oriented towards protection against terrorism and crime; 
infrastructure security; border security; and emergency management. Within the sub-category of 
‘Space’, there is also a call for the development of Global Monitoring for Environment and Security 
(GMES).   
 
Three of these four priorities are already orientated towards security within Europe as opposed to 
more traditional territorial defence, and GMES incorporates environmental security.  Hence, the 
means of reorienting science and technology priorities for European security towards non-military 
applications already exist. The crosscutting themes within the security sub-category are: security 
systems integration and interoperability; security and society; and security research co-ordination 
and structuring. Of which, ‘Security and society’ has the potential for identifying ‘mission-
orientated research’ based on citizens’ perception of security-related needs such as technologies for 
crime prevention, detection and prosecution, for reducing other types of risk (e.g. financial, health, 
employment, accidents) for safeguarding privacy and civil liberties, and research on ethics.  It will 
be important to involve social science disciplines to investigate and analyse risk perceptions among 
European citizenry.   
 
Other priority areas of science and technology relevant to European security enhancement can be 
identified within other parts of the Framework Programme as well. For instance, biotechnology 
poses a range of new threats and opportunities that need careful assessment and application. 
HIV/AIDS is one example of how a global pandemic threatening to Europe can be addressed 
through international research cooperation.  The GMES activity has already provided a platform for 
space technology focusing on satellite systems for global navigation and remote sensing, relevant 
for both military and non-military use.   
 
 
C.4 Implications for the external dimension of EU policy 
 
Cooperation in military technology development has occurred through intergovernmental 
agreements, and through small-scale programmes such as EUCLID. But mainstream science and 
technology cooperation in the EC/EU and in other organisations such as European Cooperation in 
the field of Science and Technology Research (COST) and Eureka, has been deliberately restricted 
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to non-military R&D.  This civilian, cooperative approach should now be exported to the wider 
world.   
 
European international cooperation (INCO) policy for research and technological development is 
also in transition.  With the publication of The International Dimension of the European Research 
Area in 2001 (EC, 2001), EU research and technology policy became linked with foreign policy 
objectives for the first time.  Rather than being tied to industrial competitiveness (the raison d’être 
of the Framework Programme), policy for INCO focuses on largely non-economic objectives more 
typically associated with public sector responsibilities and services.   
 
 
C.5 Implications for transatlantic relations 
 
NATO scientific cooperation has been relatively small-scale in comparison with intra-European 
science and technology cooperation programmes, although it also has mainly concentrated on 
civilian research areas. Unlike the industrial focus of European programmes, however, NATO 
prioritised areas of basic science and mathematics.  From the early 1990s, Partner countries from 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union became eligible for support, which broadened to 
address security concerns such as economic conversion. 
  
In 2003 NATO renamed its Science Programme the NATO Programme for Security Through 
Science.  There are currently two main priority areas. The first is scientific collaboration for defence 
against terrorism, which concentrates on rapid detection of WMD agents or weapons, rapid 
diagnosis of their effects, physical protection, decontamination, destruction of agents and weapons, 
medical countermeasures etc. The second is scientific collaboration to counter other threats to 
security, including environmental security (e.g. desertification, pollution, etc.), management of 
water and non-renewable resources, modeling sustainable consumption (e.g. food, energy etc.), 
disaster forecasting and prevention, information security, and so on.   
 
To the extent that European objectives align with those of NATO’s Security Through Science 
programme, therefore, EU Member States already have a vehicle for transatlantic cooperation. This 
could be further developed, although there would not appear to be a case for participation at EU 
level unless a specific demand were to emerge. 
 
 
C.6 Technology relations with neighbours  
 
The International Dimension of the European Research Area document (EC, 2001) specifies 
various technologies that are priorities for cooperation with Mediterranean and Western Balkan 
countries as part of the FP6. These include specific reference to the promotion of co-development 
for greater ‘stability, prosperity and security’, with an implied need for technology transfer.  Priority 
areas include ‘integrated management of water, agriculture and the agro-food industry, health and 
environmental protection…’ - consistent with the types of security-building activities identified 
earlier in this report. Perhaps most interestingly, there are measures specifically aimed at meeting 
social challenges, for example, the preservation of cultural heritage: particularly important when 
building trust and good relations between nations of different faiths.    
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EU cooperation with certain neighbouring countries is further developed and formalised through 
Association Agreements. Specified research priorities for cooperation with Russia and the Newly 
Independent States have also been identified. The latter are intended to stabilise the research 
capacities of these countries, with particular attention to conversion of military research to civil 
applications, and cooperation on problems such as non-proliferation, health and environmental 
safety related to industrial change.   
 
 
C.7 Importance of arms control  
 
The inadequate level of knowledge about states’ weapon programmes has been highlighted as a 
general problem in arms control in recent years. The risk of states acquiring nuclear, biological or 
chemical (NBC) weapons has been exaggerated in some cases and either underestimated or simply 
not recognized in others. Arms control is particularly relevant vis-à-vis scientific cooperation and 
technology transfer: for instance, in the fields of treaty verification; the provision of alternative 
research for those engaged in military R&D; and in arms export controls.  
 
The verification of arms control treaties requires technological expertise in the weapons systems 
under control, a system for monitoring technology development and testing, and the deployment of 
weapons (through remote sensing, seismology, radiation detection, through intercepting 
communications, and other techniques) and a method for evaluating the implications of information 
gathered. There are serious deficiencies in all three respects in Europe. It would seem sensible to 
build upon the types of research expertise and accumulated knowledge through EU initiatives, in the 
first instance through consulting experts and then by consolidating existing arms control, 
verification and peace research in Europe.   
 
The EU has played a useful role in helping scientists who participated in the massive Soviet military 
industrial complex to find peaceful employment. This research effort needs to continue to focus on 
a finite set of individuals in known locations in countries that previously have invested in military 
research. However, this needs to be supplemented by proliferation prevention measures that can be 
applied more widely, including in the scientific communities of countries not known to have 
developed NBC weapons.  
 
Building on an assessment of the extent to which the work already carried out in the science centres 
established in Moscow and Kiev contributes to non-proliferation, alternative ways to expand and 
modify this approach should be the subject of cooperative research. The development of new 
technologies, for example in the fields of biotechnology, cyber warfare and nanotechnology, against 
the background of the threat of mass impact terrorism requires the expansion of non-proliferation 
efforts into new functional areas and new parts of the scientific community.  
 
Another example of cooperation between Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union in the 
area science and technology is INTAS:  the International Association for the Promotion of Co-
operation with Scientists from the New Independent States (NIS). Interestingly, INTAS supports 
research in social and human sciences, as well as in the natural sciences. Apart from its aerospace-
related research, the INTAS research programme is more closely related to that of COST than the 
Framework Programme.  Developing space-related security in relation to the proposed FP7 research 
in the ‘Security and Space’ thematic area may be one way to build upon INTAS’s achievements to 
date.   
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For other areas, linkages to COST may be the most fruitful way to realise synergies with existing 
INTAS partnerships.  Research organisations in eleven non-COST countries currently participate in 
COST actions and the extent of this international cooperation, as well as a good match of COST 
with INTAS thematic coverage, makes closer cooperation between the two a realistic prospect. 
 
Export controls are a preventive measure that already engages industry and the research community 
in non-proliferation efforts. However, the traditional approach to export controls has been 
challenged by a variety of changes - in technology, in the ways that industry operates, and in the 
increasing sophistication of proliferators. A control system that accounts for the movement of 
intangible technology and prevents unauthorised access to dangerous items is needed: a system that 
still allows the legitimate growth in international trade and commerce.  
 
 
C.8 Implications for a European Research and Innovation Area 
 
Europe provides a tried and tested model for S&T partnership that manages scientific, legal, 
commercial, intellectual property, and financial aspects of collaboration - for the most part 
successfully.  Evaluating proposals with reference to existing foreign policy objectives already 
occurs. So, adjusting this to address security policy objectives would be a natural extension.     
 
Europe has shown that collective decision-making and the distribution of research responsibilities 
are not only workable but also help to build capacity and stability within dispersed research 
communities.  This experience is translatable to the wider world.  While most European researchers 
are likely to appreciate the need for genuine partnership with collaborative partners, many in the 
rest of the world – accustomed to more hierarchical, nationally-based and non-collaborative models 
– may find it harder to adjust. And certain Europeans themselves may need to overcome traditional 
patterns of ‘partnership’ that have not always adequately recognised the skills of non-European 
partners. 
 
The EU is already highly active in external relations and the Commission currently has a diplomatic 
presence in over 120 Delegations and Offices abroad, with a network of science councillors posted 
around the world.  It maintains liaisons with various S&T-related international organisations or their 
agencies or subsidiary bodies.   
 
There is significant participation by non-EU countries in the mainstream consortia of the 
Framework Programme.  Typically this participation is self-financed, but any non-EU research or 
international organisation may participate (as long as this conforms with Community objectives) 
and receive EC funding in order to fulfill European objectives. COST currently involves more than 
80 organisations in 11 non-COST countries and international organisations. 
 
It is not only the research community that is gaining international collaborative experience; a 
growing body of S&T policy-makers and civil servants have experience of negotiating priorities for 
European research, monitoring and evaluating programmes, and participating in policy fora.  A 
scientific advisory system is emerging in Europe to support the full range of research objectives: 
priorities for knowledge generation and diffusion; policies to promote industrial competitiveness; 
regulatory development for consumer, public health and environmental protection, and so on. 
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One of Europe’s under-utilised resources is its own immigrant population.  As Europe has been a 
training ground for scientists and engineers from around the world, many have remained in Europe 
and are employed in all types of innovation-related activities. Along with foreign students, these 
expatriates have helped to establish diasporic networks connecting communities within Europe to 
colleagues around the world.  These international links can be used to develop collaboration in 
security-related sectors and to enlist expatriate researchers in the design and implementation of 
policies for international S&T cooperation.   
 
 
C.9 Implications for scientific advisory systems 
 
There are three principal implications of European security for the organisation of science advice, 
related to both internal and foreign policy.  As understanding of security-related research and 
technology development inevitably moves beyond traditional military concerns, it is important that 
scientific advice is set up in a way that anticipates new aspects of security-related innovation and 
can react to incremental technological developments emerging from the armaments industries.   
 
Scientific advisory committees will be important to ensure that international extensions to existing 
RTD instruments (Framework Programme, EUREKA, COST) and S&T cooperation agreements 
negotiated between the EU and other countries are consistent with European security objectives. 
Advisors should: be drawn from as many of the EU25 as possible (those with a significant 
armaments industry as well as those without); have expertise in defence, aerospace and electronics 
industries, and in related areas such as border control and domestic surveillance; some should be 
drawn from academia (including medical, environmental, and social science); and at least 40 per 
cent should be of the opposite gender to the majority.  
 
In areas such as trade, where the EU represents the interests of all its Member States and is 
responsible for negotiating international agreements, technical experts in areas such as 
biotechnology, disaster response, Internet regulation, and refugee health should be mainstreamed 
into the ‘diplomatic’ process.  Finally, Europe needs to participate actively in international scientific 
advisory systems related to European and global security concerns. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
It is incumbent upon Europe to share the solutions it has developed over the past half century with 
its global partners, and to find collaborative means of applying lessons learned in a way that is 
applicable to science and technology partnerships globally.  
 
The research that underpins this study has identified a number of key areas of science, technology 
and innovation where EU investment as part of FP7 would significantly enhance Europe’s long-
term security and that of the wider world. The following recommendations explicate the priorities 
identified as part of the proposed FP7 (2007 – 2013) namely: protection against terrorism and 
crime; security of infrastructures and utilities; border security; and restoring security in case of 
crisis – with a strong emphasis on social science and humanities as well as the interaction between 
security and technology.  
 
• Developing the basis for a European ‘strategic culture’ on security matters, including the 
identification of a common European security and threat assessment. The objective would be 
to deepen the EU’s understanding of threats, risks, opportunities and common (foreign and 
security) policy responses. These assessments should be continually revisited in the face of a 
changing security environment. 
 
• Renewed emphasis in the social sciences to combine area studies with security studies, in 
order to investigate the regional context of contemporary security concerns, such as civil 
wars, terrorism, failed states, weapons proliferation, poverty, organized crime etc., but also 
threats arising from natural causes, and as byproducts of socioeconomic and technological 
activities.   The aim here is to explore how best to combat the root causes of emergent 
threats by enhancing conflict prevention, improving the targeting of aid, investing in poverty 
reduction, sustaining engagement in post-conflict peacebuilding, promoting good 
governance, and so on. This must include a recognition that threats occur within the EU as 
well as from outside, or from systems in which the EU is dynamically linked to other parts 
of the world (former colonies, for example), and a recognition that such linkages can be 
exploited for building systems and institutions to strengthen European, and global, security. 
 
• Invest in a new generation of arms control experts with the necessary scientific skills to be 
able to understand the new challenges posed by existing and emerging technological 
breakthroughs (across traditional WMD fields - chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear - but also those in IT, nanotechnology, and new conventional weaponry) and the 
means for their regulation and constraint through multilateral and regional frameworks, 
including verification technologies and methods.  
 
• Expanded co-operative threat reduction programmes – providing technical assistance in 
disarmament, conversion of military industries and alternative employment for weapons 
scientists. Targeted research into sensors, communications and other technologies relevant 
for the detection and monitoring of programmes for the production of WMD. Expand 
ISTC/STCU-type of activities to other countries that have given up the option of producing 
WMD, or are prepared to do so. 
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• Provide greater near-term and sustained practical and technological assistance to the EU’s 
potential accession states and neighbours to enable them properly to enforce export controls 
(especially in relation to dual-use technologies and materials) and the control of their 
frontiers (primarily as a means of tackling organized crime and terrorism). This will involve 
fairly rudimentary technological assistance as well as building partnership with these 
countries, which both assimilate ongoing technological innovation and have the capacity to 
contribute to mutual learning and cooperation.  
 
• Promote a transatlantic rapprochement, while simultaneously reinforcing the EU’s strategic 
autonomy to be able to act without the US when necessary, through carefully designed S&T 
policy. The EU should seek to engage the US in ways that promote research into sustainable 
development, solutions to problems in health, agriculture and the environment, and into 
improving mutual understanding and cooperation around the world. It should orient its 
technological innovation along its own political/security requirements, keeping in mind that 
international peace and security will in many cases be better served by international 
preventive limitation and cooperation in non-military S&T than by military expansion e.g. 
into space. 
 
• Creation or strengthening of expert bodies - reporting to the Commission - capable of 
advising on the security effects of research and new technology. Priority thematic areas 
include biotechnology, nanotechnology, electronics and communications systems, nuclear 
technology and aerospace. Compulsory consideration of security implications in 
applications to the research programmes of the EU, both by applicants and reviewers. 
Support for dialogue fora of security and technology experts on relevant themes, particularly 
in the biotechnology and nanotechnology areas.  
 
• Increased investment in research on alternative energy sources and the promotion of 
improvements in agricultural production with the aim of reducing threats stemming from 
energy dependence and poverty. 
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1. Major policy issues in the Eastern neighbouring 
countries, including Russia 
  
Dr Andrea Grazioso, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies (CEMISS), Rome, Italy 
 
 
1. Major Issues 
 
This short paper covers those countries that will border the EU after the next round of 
enlargement. Thus, we have included Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova / Transnistria, Croatia, 
Serbia & Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia, Georgia and its secessionist regions 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Also, special attention has been 
given to Russia and its exclave of Kaliningrad. 
 
In all these countries we can easily detect some long-term trends that are going to 
constrain the political modernization in the next decades. Natural demography is one of 
these constraints, because the shrinking population, with its related aging factor, will 
further reduce the availability of young workers and fresh minds, while worsening the 
dependence index, or the share between un-productive population and the productive one. 
The availability of natural resources will remain low for the vast majority of the 
examined countries, but the few with a natural abundance of resources, like Russia and, 
to lesser extent, Azerbaijan, will likely play a greater role in the region and globally. 
Most of these countries suffer a geographical isolation from the richest part of Europe 
and its commercial axis. Such isolation is often a combination of geographic remoteness 
and poor infrastructures. Due to the long time required for the construction of main axis 
of communications or for the redirection in the priorities for the development of new 
trade corridors, also these factors could be included in the long-term constrains to 
political changes. 
 
Summarizing the main characters of these countries, we find low income levels, with 
large part of the population below the poverty line and accentuated differences between 
the richest citizens and the rest of the population; high rates of migration, that further 
exacerbate the negative trends in natural demography; high levels of economic 
dependence from external resources, foreign direct investments, international or bilateral 
aids; little diversification in internal economy and wide presence of oligopolies; 
environmental deterioration; weakness in political and legal institutions; wide presence of 
organized crime; operational terrorist networks in some of them. 
 
If we look at the leading elites, we can find again some distinctive characters in most of 
these countries. Some of the present political leaders have been the outcome of internal or 
border conflicts; they emerged as leaders of their respective states or territorial entities 
due to their ability to manage ethnic or local wars, but remained in power after the end of 
the conflicts. Some others seem to be the political expression of the change against a 
previous regime, a sort of dramatic reaction to the inability of the former regimes to deal 
with social or economic needs. Also, there are some leaders that could be described as the 
remnants of the Cold War era, due to their direct participation in the political 
establishment of the Soviet Union and their re-proposition of a political agenda based on 
a centralized control of the economy and social dynamics. Some common guidelines 
could be traced for the description of these political systems. 
 
There is not a virtuous swing between different leaderships or ruling groups; usually, the 
political change occurs as a dramatic shift from the existent, in favor of a substantially 
different leadership and political agenda. Thus, each political change is suffered as a sort 
of revolution, rather than a physiological modernization. There aren’t any more strong 
ideologies, able to simplify the political framework. It seems impossible to identify 
common beliefs useful to unify large sectors of the public opinion around a non-partisan 
political agenda. Usually, political leaders or parties tend to promote the interests of a 
specific component of the civil society, on the basis of ethnic, cultural, economic or 
familiar criteria. Also, there is a proliferation of the so-called single-issue groups, paying 
attention to the acquisition of specific benefits, without any real interest in broader 
political programs. 
 
These elements, combined with the embryonic constitutional systems, cause a 
fragmentation of the political landscape, worsening the poor results of the inexperienced 
political elites. As a consequence, leaders are not committed to reach consensus through 
the mediation among diverging priorities or interests, or through the general improvement 
of socio-economic conditions. 
 
In terms of governance problems, local authorities usually have poor available resources 
for addressing huge macroeconomic imbalances. Their base of political consensus is 
usually narrow and volatile, while the government apparatus, including civil servants, are 
of doubtful trustworthiness. This unfavorable set of circumstances has often prompted 
vicious behaviors in the ruling elites, like kleptocracy, close association with economic 
power centers or the exploitation of nationalistic attitudes of some part of civil society, 
both against internal minorities or external enemies. 
 
In this general scenario, Russia presents several peculiarities that can deeply differentiate 
its position vis-à-vis European and world affairs. First of all, in Russia the political 
leadership seems to be more stable and can rely on a far greater self-estimate of its role. 
As a consequence, this elite can adopt long-term policies, even paying a price in terms of 
popularity, but pursuing far-reaching objectives, able to modify the established trends. 
Also, in Russia there is a real alternative between the adoption of a values-driven strategy 
for the relation with the outer world and a realistic approach to the international affairs. 
Russia maintains a global relevance in several strategic context, being a major civilian 
and military nuclear power, holding huge oil and gas reserves, possessing a 
technologically advanced industrial - military complex. It can effectively influence 
strategic balances in most of the world, being clearly a major political player in the Euro 
– Asian space. Hence, its leadership can opt for the pursue of an hegemonic position over 
its former sister republics of the Soviet Union, while negotiating pragmatic compromises 
with the European Union, China or the United States on reciprocal interests. For these 
reasons, any European policy toward Russia cannot avoid to consider that (a) Russia is 
both a main regional player and a global actor, with its own multifaceted political 
strategy; (b) there is a sort of competition between Brussels and Moscow over the 
political developments in the respective and overlapping “near abroad”; (c) Russia can 
shape functional bilateral relations with China, India or the United States, either in 
accordance with or against European interests. 
 
The political developments in the countries surrounding the EU after the next 
enlargement will be deeply influenced by the combined effect of the European attitude 
toward the future status of these countries and the Russian ability to exercise an attractive 
influence. Without any explicit, although remote opportunity to become a full member of 
the Union, many Eastern European elites will consider to join Russia in a sort of  
“alternative consortium”, for addressing their needs of energy, technology, social stability 
and, moreover, political identity. Very likely, the Russian political and economic system 
could provide only a partial answer to these requirements, but it seems pretty improbable 
that any country would face the challenges of the globalization without a close 
association with either the European or the Russian centre of gravity. But a rigid posture 
of the EU on the membership issue – like the denial of the access for any CIS country – 
could provoke further instability inside those countries. In Moldova, in example, the 
hypothesis of re-unification of (at least) the western regions with Romania could find 
new support, as the only way to circumvent the European rejection. 
 
On the other hand, if European Union and Russia will succeed in defining common 
European policy spaces, harmonizing their respective technical and legal systems in 
fields like trade, infrastructures, people circulation, then the countries in the middle 
should be necessarily involved in a similar fashion. This could provide even the smaller 
of new neighbours with a sort of veto power, or at least the ability to obtain relevant fee 
for the implementation of such common policies. 
 
 
2. Suggestions for a European science & technology policy 
 
To improve the EU’s security and the stability over the whole Continent, it seems useful 
to actively operate for the strengthening of those positive trends that do exist, inside civil 
societies, economic circles and some political elites, while not providing any ground to 
the hegemonic and illiberal factions. 
 
For the positive development of civil societies, it seems useful to improve the level of 
information and political consciousness among the public opinion. The diffusion of 
satellite televisions, internet, wireless communications, while improving the general 
awareness of the public opinion, could act as destabilizing factor when the flux of 
information become unidirectional, from the West toward the less advanced realities of 
the eastern Europe. Thus, it could be more effective to promote and support the local 
exploitation of new technologies, providing affordable means for the active participation 
of local societies in the world of global media. 
 
For the reduction of dependency from external sources of energy, it seems useful to 
promote the exploitation of local resources (hydro electric; solar plants etc.), and to invest 
in the construction of efficient power plants, while improving also the efficiency of the 
whole electric grids and electrical supplies.  
 
For improving the local government ability to fight organised crime, the whole spectrum 
of technologies for police investigation, personal identification, remote control of borders 
and traffic choke – points seem extremely useful. 
 
Clearly, all these technologies are very useful for EU countries as well; the improvement 
efforts should be devoted to the reduction in the costs of both acquisition and 
maintenance. Without such improved affordability, hi-tech means of communication 
would remain under the control of few peoples. If the new power plants would be too 
expensive to maintain, the dependence from external support would simply shift from the 
providers of energy resources to those of logistic support. As for the technologically 
advanced systems for law-enforcement, there is a long record of supplies of advanced 
weapons to second-world countries that proved to be too costly to maintain, with the 
subsequent unavailability of very complex and expensive systems due to the lack of 
relatively minor spare parts. 
 
3. Recommendations for decisions taken today for FP 2007 – 2013 
 
3.1 Threats 
In the examined area, the direct and conventional military threats are relatively low. The 
majority of neighbouring countries have obsolescent military structures, unable to mount 
large offensive action, or to sustain prolonged military confrontations. Most of the 
equipment has been produced before the collapse of the Soviet Union, thus the present 
panoply of weapon systems is old and difficult to maintain. Most of the ammunition 
stock has now exceeded its service life and is becoming unreliable or dangerous. In this 
general pattern, Russia still possess a conventional military capability able to mount local 
operation and medium scale military offensive, although very likely the lack of proper 
training would prevent any operation above the Brigade – level. Both the Russian Air 
Force and Navy, while preserving some advanced systems, have an average training level 
too low for any major theatre operation. In conclusion, the use of WMD by Russian 
Federation is the only feasible direct military threat in the short term. Organised crime 
and terrorism, on the contrary, is a present danger, also because of the failing ability of 
European neighbours to enforce the law and control their frontiers. As a consequence, 
quasi-military threats, like the hijacking of civilian planes, suicide bombers or potentially 
large-scale terrorist attacks against civilian infrastructures, will remain a major concern 
for Europe. 
 
3.2 Challenges 
While not being a military threat under the conventional definition, the examined region 
presents several challenges for European armed forces. The possibility a further 
deterioration of civilian control over national territories, due to the collapse of legal 
systems or the outbreak of civil wars, would require a European intervention with 
military assets. In such a case, very likely the first requirement for a successful 
intervention would be to suppress or incapacitate the anti-access capabilities still present 
in most of the examined countries. This preliminary phase would encompass complex 
military operations, like SEAD/DEAD, precision strikes against key targets and 
personalities, mine clearing and river crossing under hostile reaction etc. Note that all 
these actions had been performed in 1995 in Bosnia and in 1999 in Yugoslavia, exactly 
for the actual enforcement of a stabilisation plan. Obviously, after the initiation of a 
military projection inside the eastern regions, although finalised at the enforcement of 
peace and stability, the hostile reaction of local entities – legal or non-state actors – 
would imply a direct threat to the European intervention forces. Hence, while being now 
mainly a challenging context for European militaries, the residual military capabilities of 
eastern neighbours would become a threat in case of a European-led military 
intervention. As for the presence of well-armed organised criminal and terrorist networks, 
after the forcible entry into the conflict area, these entities would pose a far greater 
danger to any European stabilisation force than the residual conventional military 
opposition-force. As a consequence, the examined area is a challenging environment for 
any military projection, both in terms of anti-access capabilities and prolonged low-
intensity, mostly asymmetric insurgency. 
 
3.3 Opportunities (research priorities) 
At the present stage, it seems preferable to improve and develop those conflict-prevention 
and crisis management tools able to contain local or regional conflicts. In case of further 
deterioration of the security environment, with the outbreak of war, those same tools 
could also be useful for the battlefield and strategic intelligence, providing the ability to 
control the escalation of the confrontation, or retaliate in a proportionate manner. Signal 
Intelligence is paramount for the planning and the execution of any comprehensive 
conflict-prevention and crisis management action, especially when coupled with adequate 
resources in Imagery Intelligence. These two branches of Intelligence, when provided to 
military Commanders in quasi-real time are also the precondition for the suppression of 
time-critical targets that offer the best opportunities for the termination of the conflict 
with the lowest level of attrition. Obviously, the Intelligence action encompass both 
technical tools and the cultural understanding of the reality, thus the research in the social 
field (anthropology, sociology, linguistic skills) should be developed. Such knowledge 
could also offer further opportunities for the execution of non-violent operations (i.e. Psy 
Ops), both during the conflict-prevention, crisis management or post-conflict 
reconstruction phases. 
 
3.4 Risks 
In the region, the risk of proliferation of WMD is relatively low, although the actual 
control or Russian stockpile is a matter of concern. On the contrary, there is a growing 
risk of diffusion of political violence, associated with organised crime. In this framework, 
the over-stretching of local law-enforcement resources could facilitate the proselytism of 
terrorist groups. Also, in the region there is a growing risk of contagious diseases, due to 
the failing health systems. 
 
3.5 Scenarios 
The recent developments in Ukraine offer a perfect example of the threats, challenges and 
opportunities for any European security policy aimed at the improvement of the security 
in the eastern neighbouring regions. That scenario could be replicated in several other sub 
regions, like Belarus, Moldova, the whole Caucasus. 
 
 
4. Recommendations for DG Research based on trends to 2010 
 
4.1 Threats 
In case of ethnic or civil wars inside some eastern neighbours, there is the potential of 
further increase of organised crime or terrorism. This, in turn, would increase the non-
conventional threats to Europe. 
 
4.2 Challenges 
While the conventional military capabilities will decrease in the long term, some local 
entities could acquire advanced systems (GPS jammers; rudimentary UCAVs etc.) that 
would improve their ability to prevent a foreign military intervention. Criminals and 
terrorists could also improve their performances in asymmetric attacks, due to the 
availability of advanced weapons. 
 
4.3 Opportunities (research priorities) 
In the long run, the aim of a European research plan for improved security responses 
should be to dominate the information flow in the conflict area. Thus, all the technologies 
(Intelligence gathering systems) and cultural capabilities (Analysis) useful for 
understanding the events should be developed. At the same time, Europe should be able 
to negate the opponents the exploitation of networked systems (media; C3 systems; 
dispersed weapon systems). In brief, while these resources will be enabling capabilities in 
the short term, in the longer term they will represent the centrepiece of European security. 
  
4.4 Risks 
The risks will be the same also in the longer term, but the danger of some of them, like 
contagious diseases, would obviously increase at exponential pace, if not addressed in the 
short term. 
 
4.5 Scenarios 
Potentially, the crisis area could expand to the whole Russian federation, due to the 
inability of local authorities to address economic, health and political problems. Also, 
Russia could become the main arena of confrontation between radical Islam, nationalistic 
and xenophobic extremists, warlords and ethnic factions. Thus, in a worst-case scenario, 
threats, challenges and risks for Europe could increase both in number and intensity. 
2. Major Policy Issues in the Southern Neighbouring 
Countries until 2015 
 
Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP, Senior Researcher, Royal Institute for International Relations 
(IRRI-KIIB), Brussels, Professor of European security, University of Gent  
 
 
For the purpose of this paper, the Southern neighbourhood of the EU is defined as 
comprising the members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) – Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and 
Turkey – and Libya, which has been invited to join on the condition of accepting the 
EMP acquis.  
 
 
1. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
 
The Southern Mediterranean region is still troubled by a number of ‘hard’ security or 
politico-military concerns. In the first place, the ongoing armed conflict between Israelis 
and Palestinians has been clouding the region for decades. Although it does not pose a 
direct security threat to the EU, the conflict has important negative consequences for EU 
interests: it is an important cause of the stagnation of cooperation in the EMP, in all 
fields, it serves to radicalize public opinion and thus creates a breeding ground for 
extremism. At the current level of violence, and with the parties maintaining the rhetoric 
of the peace process, the conflict can rage on for many years, as long as the parties 
(including third parties such as Syria and the Hezbollah) do not cross certain red lines, 
e.g. expulsion from Jerusalem, civilian casualties on a massive scale, or the use of 
weapons of mass destruction. This would provoke radical retaliation and/or widening of 
the conflict to other States in the region and would thus lead to the intensification of the 
conflict and the destabilization of the region.  
 
In the current political constellation, the parties are unable to reach a settlement by 
themselves. On the Palestinian side, a change in leadership is required, which can be 
expected in the short term, but the succession by an effective and legitimate government 
is far from certain; factional strife, possibly evolving into armed conflict, is a real risk. 
On the Israeli side, the political will to accept a reasonable compromise must be found, 
which is greatly hindered by a volatile and splintered political landscape, a situation 
which can be expected to persist over the next years.  
 
Outside mediation therefore is a necessity. A joint effort by the EU and the US is the only 
feasible option, as each enjoys legitimacy with just one of the parties. Political will on the 
part of the US is thus also required, on which the influence of Iraq can work both ways: 
either it will be judged that involvement in Iraq precludes an additional initiative, or an 
initiative in the peace process can be seen as a way of addressing the causes of extremism 
in inter alia Iraq.  
 
 
2. Militarization and Proliferation  
 
A history of conflict has led to excessive militarization of States in the region, which is 
likely to continue along with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. States have built large 
military apparatus, absorbing large shares of national revenue and often playing a 
determining role in politics and society. This militarization has seen proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, with several States not being 
party to the basic arms control agreements; this specific characteristic of militarization 
too is closely related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the ambition on the part of 
certain Arab States to balance Israeli conventional and reputed nuclear forces.  
 
Again, no direct threat to the EU emerges. Likewise, apart from the worst-case scenario 
of nothing short of an all-out escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (for in spite of 
rhetoric, nothing less would lead to Arab intervention), the risk of inter-State conflict is 
limited: existing differences between States, e.g. on water, or on the issue of the Western 
Sahara, though possibly leading to disputes, do not seem to have the potential to lead to 
armed conflict. The limited efficacy of armed forces (for lack of training, under-
equipment or lack of familiarity with equipment) is a prohibitive factor in this regard. 
Rather the armed forces are primarily an instrument of domestic politics, serving to 
safeguard existing regimes from internal opposition, complemented by nationalist 
rhetoric to turn attention away from domestic issues.  
 
Arms control and disarmament in the fields of weapons of mass destruction and major 
conventional platforms would be possible though in the framework of a settlement of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, if it were not for the interference of factors from outside the 
region. As States’ security concerns are also determined by developments outside the 
EMP, notably in Iraq and Iran, initiatives that remain limited to EMP members can never 
be successful.  
 
 
3. Authoritarianism, the Wealth Gap, Extremism and Terrorism 
 
As the armed forces are an instrument of domestic politics, basically militarization is not 
likely to diminish. Authoritarian regimes lacking legitimacy have to rely on the armed 
forces/security forces and on nationalist rhetoric to control the opposition and muster 
popular support. This lack of legitimacy is a consequence of the inability to provide for 
the basic public goods to which every human being is entitled: physical security, an 
enforceable legal order, an inclusive economy, wellbeing in all of its aspects (access to 
education, health services, a clean environment etc.). This is exacerbated by the 
repression of political opposition, which from the perspective of the regimes and 
associated elite is inevitable, for because of their poor performance democratisation 
would undoubtedly lead to their removal from power and thus the loss of the wealth 
which they acquire by running the state.  
 
The result has been a radicalization of the opposition, leading mostly to the growth of 
Islamist movements, including extreme factions that support the use of violence. The 
strength of Islamism is closely linked to a dense network of mosques and associated 
organizations, which often provide certain social services that the State is unable or 
unwilling to organize. Several regimes haves thus created their own extremists, which 
primarily have a domestic agenda: overthrowing the current regime.  
 
In order to divert attention away from domestic problems, regimes often revert to fierce 
nationalist rhetoric, often of an anti-Israeli nature, a theme which strikes a chord with 
public opinion. At the same time however regimes thus confirm the views of Islamist 
factions, to whom this theme comes natural, which also makes it easier for the latter to 
spread the more general anti-American or anti-Western views that often complement 
their opposition to the domestic regimes. A number of regimes haves thus engaged in a 
game they cannot win: going along with anti-Israeli and anti-American/anti-Western 
views might temporarily sooth public opinion, but in the end serves only to reinforce the 
legitimacy of the Islamists, as these regimes can never live up to their rhetoric, being as 
they are dependent on American and European economic – and often military – support. 
The invasion of Iraq has certainly reinforced the legitimacy of the extremist Islamist 
view.  
 
A side effect of nationalist foreign policies and competition for scarce resources is the 
very low level of regional integration among the Southern Mediterranean States. Existing 
regional organizations, such as the League of Arab States, have very limited impact or 
have been paralyzed by internal differences, such as the Arab Maghreb Union. In the 
framework of the EMP, the Southern partners therefore do not act as a group and have 
shown very little enthusiasm for multilateral programmes and activities. This lack of 
political integration reflects the limited nature of economic relations between the 
Southern States: intra-Southern trade accounts for just 10% of their trade, while more 
than half of their trade is with the EU.  
 
 
4. A Diffuse but Growing Security Threat  
 
In the medium to long term, the huge – and widening – gap between haves and have-nots 
in terms of access to basic public goods between the Northern and Southern shores of the 
Mediterranean constitutes the primary security threat for the EU. It is an indirect and 
diffuse threat, which is however of a systemic nature, i.e. it results from, and impacts on, 
the functioning of the global and regional order itself. For unless mechanisms of 
governance are created or rendered more effective that can alleviate this situation, at a 
certain level of inequality, the resulting political instability, extremism and violence, 
economic unpredictability and massive migration flows will become uncontrollable. 
Destabilization of the region might be the ultimate consequence.  
 
Symptoms of this can already be discerned, e.g. increasing migration across the 
Mediterranean, which is ever more difficult to control. Occasional terrorist violence is 
another symptom, including in Algeria, where unrest continues to fester ever since the 
first wave of violence in the mid 1990s. Terrorism is usually aimed against domestic 
regimes, because of the internal agenda of extremists, but Western targets have been 
attacked and will probably continue to be, as in the wake of ‘9/11’ and the invasion of 
Iraq popular support and media coverage for such acts are easily forthcoming and thus 
strengthen the extremist cause. With the al-Qaeda network having been decapitated 
following the intervention in Afghanistan, there does not seem to be any organized 
network left (terrorist movements have a history of factionalism rather than cooperation), 
nor is terrorism ‘exported’ to the EU from the Mediterranean (or elsewhere). Rather 
independent groups based in the South or in the EU pursue their own course while 
referring to the same agenda or al-Qaeda ‘trademark’ that is certain to attract massive 
media attention. Attacks against Western targets often seem to be linked to involvement 
in Iraq, so the more balanced policies of the EU, regarding notably the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and the fight against terrorism, might be expected to have a positive impact on 
the likelihood of further terrorist attacks. On the other hand the involvement of irrational 
actors without a clear structure or agenda has certainly increased rather than decreased 
the threat, and has rendered it more difficult to combat and predict.  
 
In the next years, developments with regard to the public goods-related root causes of this 
systemic security threat do not look promising. In spite of long-standing cooperation with 
the EU, which has been intensified with the creation of the EMP in 1995, the economic 
situation in the South has not substantially improved; economic developments have 
certainly not been able to keep pace with the steady growth of the population. It has even 
been argued by a number of observers that EU policies in the framework of the second, 
economic basket of the EMP, have actually led to a worsening of socio-economic 
conditions in the partner States, who have had to suffer the hardships entailed by 
economic reform without receiving truly substantial benefits in return from the part of the 
EU, notably in the sectors of agriculture and textiles. The predominant feeling in the 
South therefore seems to be one of resentment, against an EU that imposes difficult 
reforms but is perceived as not living up to its side of the bargain. It should not be 
forgotten though that bad management by local authorities, including excessive defence 
expenditure, and obstacles posed by traditional structures equally contribute to the 
worsening of the economic situation, as was forcibly demonstrated by the Arab Human 
Development Report. As to democratization and the rule of law, existing regimes are not 
very forthcoming; the quasi non-application of human rights clauses in the framework of 
the EMP has certainly not contributed in a positive way. As a result, the EU is often 
perceived as favouring stability over democratization.  
 
Non-extremist reforming forces are weak, but do exist – the authors of the Arab Human 
Development Report are the obvious example. Perhaps the radicalization, especially since 
Iraq, and the almost complete association in the eyes of Western public opinion of 
terrorism with Muslims, could lead to a reaction by reformists, including moderate 
Islamists, which could set in motion a gradual process of change, which the EU could 
support.  
 
 
5. Limited Security Cooperation with the EU 
 
One result of the combination of the trends related supra is a very limited degree of 
security cooperation between the EU and the Southern partners. This holds true 
especially in the field of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), in spite of 
the fact that the EU has offered extensive involvement, including regular dialogue, 
appointment of liaison officers to the EU Military Staff and, eventually, participation in 
ESDP manoeuvres and operations:  
 
- Partners are unwilling to engage in far-reaching security cooperation when they 
are divided by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that dominates the entire region and 
when, moreover, several of them reproach the EU for maintaining too passive an 
attitude towards the conflict;  
- The EU is often felt to overemphasize the security dimension of the EMP, to the 
detriment of the economic basket;  
- There exists a general lack of knowledge about the objectives of ESDP, which can 
easily lead to unrealistic expectations, e.g. with regard to a potential EU role in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or to distrust, mirroring fears of Western 
‘interventionism’ that were voiced in the 1990s;  
- Partners are less familiar with notions such as cooperative security, confidence 
and security-building measures etc.;  
- For a number of regimes, open cooperation with ‘the West’, particularly in the 
military field, would further alienate public opinion;  
- Partners have limited interest in the Mediterranean as an organizing concept of 
foreign policy; the EMP is mostly seen as a framework to organize bilateral 
relations with the EU rather than as a platform for multilateral cooperation;  
- In the field of terrorism, cooperation has been handicapped by the classic 
differences regarding the distinction between terrorists and legitimate freedom 
fighters.  
 
The security basket of the EMP has thus remained limited to a political dialogue and a 
number of largely declaratory and/or ‘soft security’ initiatives. This is likely to remain the 
case until significant steps have been taken towards a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.  
 
 
6. Policy Options  
 
In response to the trends outlined supra, a number of policy options for the EU could be 
suggested.  
 
The settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the major imperative if anything 
substantial is to be achieved in the region. Even significant steps towards a settlement 
would probably already have a decisive impact on dynamics in the region (the creation of 
the EMP itself was only possible because of the good climate in the early years of the 
Oslo Process) and would deprive actors of a pretext that is all too often abused to justify 
their policies. The EU has a major role to play:  
 
- The EU can contribute to building a strong Palestinian authority as a necessary 
condition for the peace process to be reactivated, making use of its financial 
leverage if required;  
- EU involvement is a prerequisite for the commitment of the Palestinians to any 
peace initiative, which to succeed demands a joint EU-US effort, and the will on 
the part of both to equally pressurize both parties;   
- In the framework of a settlement, the first steps towards arms control and 
disarmament could be made, which can then be pursued by enlarging the debate 
to include the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Yemen, Iran and Iraq, 
i.e. the States addressed by the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East adopted by the European Council in June 2004.  
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) offers an opportunity to revitalize the EMP 
and deal with the root causes of insecurity in the region in a comprehensive way:  
 
- The notion of ‘positive conditionality’ requires the agreement of detailed 
benchmarks for reform in the bilateral actions plans, and the will on the part of the 
EU to allocate effective benefits;  
- In that framework, the promotion of democratization requires the identification of 
reliable local actors that can initiate an internally driven, gradual process of 
reform;  
- In order to be fully comprehensive, cooperation on CFSP/ESDP could be included 
in the action plans, so as to promote an effective security partnership, i.e. joint 
mechanisms for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, based 
on a common strategic assessment; this will firstly demand a comprehensive 
communications policy on the scope and objectives of CFSP/ESDP;  
- In the context of the promotion of democracy and the rule of law and cooperation 
on ESDP, security sector reform is likely to become an important topic;  
- The promotion of multilateral cooperation and intra-Southern regional integration 
could also be included in the action plans;  
- Finally, as on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, close coordination of efforts with the 
US, on an equal basis, can only enhance the effectiveness of both European and 
American policies.  
 
 
7. Implications for Research Policy  
 
On the basis of the above recommendations, a number of fields of interest for research 
policy can be identified:  
 
- the conditions for success of a process of institution-building in a weak and/or 
undemocratic State;  
- the combination of accountability and benchmarking with a sense of ownership in 
the framework of ‘positive conditionality’;  
- the interaction between local State and non-State actors and external partners in 
the framework of ‘positive conditionality’;  
- security sector reform in authoritarian States;  
- communications policy and the perception of the EU.  
 
3. Major policy issues in transatlantic relations  
 
Eric Remacle, Université libre de Bruxelles, Institut d’Etudes européennes 
 
 
1. America’s new approach to Europe and the world 
 
The long-lasting emphasis of the United States on the transatlantic alliance as a 
cornerstone of U.S. foreign and security policy has been given up by the Bush Jr. 
Administration while, after the end of the Cold War, the Bush Sr. and Clinton approaches 
were still characterized by such an emphasis (support to German unification and 
partnership in leadership offered to Germany, signing of the Transatlantic Declaration 
and New Transatlantic Agenda, joint action for crisis management in the Balkans, 
partnership with President Yeltsin, NATO reforms and preparation of EU/NATO 
enlargements, establishment of the PfP, CJTF and ESDI as ways to associate as many 
European states as possible to the Alliance). 
 
Before September 11, unilateralism about some diplomatic questions (Kyoto protocol, 
ABM treaty, International Criminal Court) was raising some concerns among Europeans 
and other allies, but the bi-partisan dimension of most of these decisions and their 
political content allowed to consider that this could be a conjunctural “unilateralist 
moment” like others in the long-term history of US foreign policy. This unilateralism was 
addressed mainly as a divergence about values and world order rather than as a strategic 
rift. Nevertheless, at that time, some signals were showing more than that, especially the 
rise of military expenditures, the attitude towards talks with North Korea and the very 
unbalanced position regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 
After September 11, the US has spurned NATO’s Council offer to implement the 
reference to article 5 in order to retaliate against the Taliban and Al Qaida and the 
security discourse in Washington became distrustful towards European allies. Defence 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s joke about old and new Europes revealed the willingness to play 
openly with divisions among Europeans and weaken the European Union’s emerging 
global actorness. A neo-darwinian discourse opposing American self-assertive power and 
European post-modernist dreams was spread all over the world by active neo-
conservative essayists (Kagan, Kristol).  
 
The new threat assessment has been transformed into a very aggressive “permanent total 
war” discourse based on nationalism rather than multilateralism. This attitude was 
reinforced by the publication of the US National Security Strategy in September 2002, 
which has replaced deterrence by threat of pre-emptive war, not only against non-state 
terrorist groups but also against some states. At that time, the Iraqi target had been 
already mentioned and the State of the Union speech referring to the “axis of evil” has 
been written according to a “Schmittian” vision of friends and enemies (“those who are 
not with me are against me”). This readiness for a military offensive posture, confirmed 
by the war on Iraq, has involved plans for the selective use of mini-nukes against both 
non-nuclear (deep strikes) and nuclear (counter-proliferation) targets. Furthermore, the 
war on Iraq has been prepared in secret with Britain, without any involvement of NATO 
(the 1991 Gulf War had been prepared in a very co-operative way), the United Nations 
and NATO have been considered only according to instrumentalist views and alternative 
options than war were ignored and rejected, including by the use of massive deception of 
the public. 
 
Even after the official end of the war and despite some diplomatic attempts to improve 
transatlantic relations, the attitude towards anti-war European states (France, Belgium, 
Germany, Russia) remained arrogant and humiliating, reconstruction contracts in Iraq 
were reserved to companies from those states who had supported the military 
intervention. The comments by US leaders about the results of the Spanish election after 
the Madrid attacks and their critics of the Spanish withdrawal from Iraq as an act of 
cowardice illustrate typically this long-term absence of understanding of any critical 
opinion. 
 
 
2. Europe’s new approach to America and the world 
 
Even if Europeans are much divided in case of crisis like the war on Iraq, there has been 
a tremendous effort to build a joint global actorness both by establishing a whole range of 
institutions (HighRep, PSC, MilCom, EUMS, EDA, Joint Diplomatic Service) and by 
identifying fields and area’s for joint actions (conflict prevention and crisis management 
policies, both civilian and military, neighbourhood policy, definition of Petersberg 
missions and their scope, strategy about WMD, and all other elements referred to in the 
European Security Strategy). 
 
Within this context, Europeans have shown a lot of interest for a reinforced partnership 
with the USA, especially in the field of crisis management. There existed a readiness 
from the three European largest states, and the other EU member-states, to rely on the 
military operations performed jointly with the US in the Balkans through NATO in order 
to establish a mutually beneficial pattern of co-operation between NATO and EU (on the 
basis of the Berlin plus agreement). The Saint-Malo compromise had confirmed this 
option that boosted a NATO-compatible ESDP, first EU-led military operations and the 
designing of a European security strategy. The EU enlargement perspective and elections 
of pro-US cabinets in the majority of member-states of this enlarged EU gave many 
guarantees to the US that its “hyperpower” would not be threatened by a “global peer 
competitor” called Europe (China remains likely the main candidate for such a role). By 
contrast, a division of labor between Americans and Europeans on the world stage was 
possible, by allocating regional responsibilities to the EU and keeping strategic 
responsibilities for the US, and by limiting Europe’s role to peacekeeping and “nation-
building” under the more powerful aegis of the US and NATO. 
 
Of course, Europeans were also trying within this process to get more strategic autonomy 
(through Galileo or the A-400M project) but this was not preventing an overall division 
of labor with the United States and the building of an “Europe-puissance” strongly allied 
with North America and Japan (see e.g. the role of the G-8 during the Kosovo crisis). 
Common interests within the Milennium and Doha rounds of the WTO, feeling to share 
common democratic values (despite disputes about death penalty, cultural diversity, or 
biodiversity), were dominating in the European discourse. 
 
Solidarity towards the attacked United States after 9.11 was clearly illustrating this 
atmosphere but Europeans did not understand the US refusal to use NATO for the 
reaction to the attacks and had many difficulties to accept a discourse about “total war” 
even after the assassination of 3,000 people. 
 
Despite this misunderstanding, Europeans have supported the US actions in Afghanistan 
(though retaliation is not legitimate defence and is forbidden by international law), and 
did take part themselves into post-intervention efforts to build ISAF and stabilize Hamid 
Karzai’s government. The use of NATO for this purpose and intensive participation of 
countries like Germany, France, Belgium, Turkey into stabilization efforts have proved 
that transatlantic co-operation does work concretely in anti-terrorist policies. 
 
Under Javier Solana’s impulse, the EU has chosen to stick very close to the US 
initiatives, by developing its own strategy on WMD (despite disagreements about threat 
assessment in the case of Iraq and difference in methods regarding Iran and North 
Korea), by writing together the roadmap for peace in the Middle East (despite skepticism 
about George W. Bush’s pro-Sharon bias), by promoting the increase of European 
military expenditures (the cornerstone for ESDP credibility in the Pentagon) and by using 
a very similar style of vocabulary and structure in the ESS than was used by Conleeza 
Rice in the USNSS. 
 
Though differentiating itself from the US in its discourse (civilian power, multilateralism, 
promotion of open regionalism, etc.), the EU remains very close to the US in its concrete 
policies and pleas for complementarity and co-operation.  
 
 
3. It takes two to tango…. 
 
Structurally, Europe and North America keep many reasons to strengthen their co-
operation for reasons of domestic politics, international politics, trade politics, security 
perceptions. Therefore existing framework like the Transatlantic Agenda and NATO still 
play their role. Key area’s of joint interest and action have been identified in crisis 
management, attitude towards Balkans, Russia and the Former Soviet republics, fight 
against terrorism and WMD. 
 
But, on the short/medium-term, the ideological shift in the White House will likely 
reinvigorate a differentiated bilateralist approach of the United States towards European 
states rather than a more symmetric US-EU partnership. It will also keep a level of 
budgetary and commercial deficit that Europeans will pay (like the rest of the world) 
through interest rates’ policy of the Federal Reserve and the high level of the euro. 
Therefore, on short/medium-term, the transatlantic ‘malaise’ will remain. 
 
Nevertheless, on long-term, because of converging structural interests and because the 
US Administration will face difficult consequences of its policy (step-by-step withdrawal 
of allies from Iraq starting in March 2005, likely failure of its Middle Eastern policy), 
there is room of manoeuvre for a transatlantic rapprochement. 
 
This will be needed by Europeans because they will face key challenges in their 
neighbourhood in 2005 and the following years: interlinkage between all Western Balkan 
issues (future of the Union Serbia & Montenegro, final status of Kosovo, FYRoM 
political uncertainty, maintenance of nationalist parties’ predominance in BiH); 
likelihood of political problems in Belarus and Ukraine; potential explosive debates about 
Turkish accession and the Cyprus issue; plus the question marks about the ratification of 
the Constitution. 
 
European initiatives for bringing the US back into these dossiers, like into a new roadmap 
for the Middle East, can be rewarded by US positive answers on other issues (support to 
the installation of ITER experimental nuclear fusion reactor in France, support to the 
German claim for a seat in the UNSC). 
 
More widely, the question of NATO’s next enlargement, distribution of commands 
within NATO and ESDP, relaunching of a new bilateral EU-US framework succeeding to 
the New Transatlantic Agenda, will be likely put on the transatlantic agenda. 
The balance between competition and co-operation will remain a complex policy mix 
rather than a permanent drifting apart. 
 
 
4. Links to European science and technology policy 
 
In order to prevent its own science and technology policy from transatlantic disputes, 
Europe could  
a) Maintain the efforts to reinforce strategic autonomy in key civilian technological 
fields and large scientific investments (like ITER, ESA, space programs). It has to 
be ready both to work with the US and without the US in such programs (double 
track strategy). 
b) Diversify co-operation in science & technology with other strategic partners (at 
least those quoted as strategic in the ESS: Canada, Japan and Russia, but likely 
also emerging powers like Brazil, India, China, South Africa). 
c) Promote regional frameworks in the field of scientific and technological co-
operation in other parts of the world (for example among Mercosur or ASEAN 
countries). 
d) Encourage research in social sciences about political and strategic cultures in 
order to contribute to mutual understanding between peoples and discourage 
logics of clashes between nations and civilizations. This should be part of a wider 
agenda for conflict prevention worldwide. 
e) Promote science and research priorities corresponding to European interests in 
transatlantic frameworks like NATO and the NTA/JAP, and identify the sectors of 
transatlantic scientific co-operation which might be undermined by transatlantic 
tensions, and long-term strategies for protecting these sectors from tensions. 
f) Promote and institutionalize multilateralism in the field of scientific and 
technological co-operation. 
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4. ‘Other’ Strategic Major Geo-strategic issues 
(China, East Asia, South Asia) 
 
Dr Owen Greene, Director, Centre for International Co-operation and Security 
(CICS), University of Bradford, UK 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In accordance with our brief, this paper aims to identify and discuss the major security, 
and geo-strategic, issues and trends relating to East and South Asia over the next decade, 
and to highlight a number of key policy issues for the EU.  
 
The next section briefly reviews the overall major security issues and trends relating to 
these regions to 2015, and discusses the relevance of geo-strategy and conflict prevention 
for the EU and others outside the region. Section 3 then highlights and discussed a 
number of specific security issues and trends of importance in East and South Asia. 
Section four discusses some major security policy issues that arise for the EU. In doing 
this, I have not particularly focussed on implications for EU research and technology 
development priorities, but remain open to doing so in the next draft.  
 
 
2. Security issues and trends: geo-strategy and conflict prevention in 
East and South Asia 
 
East and South Asia are manifestly important for the EU in virtually all policy spheres, 
including security. They account for a large and increasing proportion of global wealth, 
production and trade. Some two-thirds of the people experiencing extreme poverty in the 
world live in these two regions, so that the achievement of Millennium Development 
Goals depends critically on economic growth and poverty reduction in them.  
 
These regions include several major powers, including China, India, and Japan, and other 
major powers including the USA and Russia are directly engaged. There are major and 
on-going shifts in ‘balances of power’, for example associated with the growing wealth 
and power of China, which raise inevitable security concerns. There are manifest and 
intense inter-state disputes and tensions: risks of inter-state war and conflict tend to pre-
occupy Asian states more than in most other regions. Moreover, these are regions where 
war between major powers, including nuclear powers is all-too possible. US military 
power also looms large for virtually every state in the region, either as a potential threat, 
ally or welcome outside ‘balancer’. Many states in the region have been able to invest 
heavily in accumulating major conventional arms. 
 
There are several weak or failing states, raising associated concerns about transnational 
crime, terrorism, piracy, and complex internal or transnational violence. Numerous 
conflicts are ongoing, including in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Irian Jaya, and Aceh.  
India and Pakistan are both developing significant nuclear arsenals, and North Korea 
poses direct challenges both to the NPT and to its North East Asian neighbours. Major 
human rights concerns in several countries of South and East Asia. Democratisation 
processes are powerful across much of these regions, including enormous but fragile 
states like Indonesia, which is welcome but with attendant tension and unpredictability.  
 
Regional co-operative and security organisations and mechanisms are relatively weak in 
East and South Asia, for complex reasons that are hard to overcome, resulting in weak 
capacity for multilateral conflict management or resolution. In East Asia, some key 
countries did not even establish bilateral diplomatic relations until after 1990. Since the 
late 1980s, there has been a determined attempt by some concerned countries to establish 
and develop regional organisations, and with some success. For example, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) has been established as a significant process to enable inter-state 
multilateral security dialogues and limited confidence building. But it remains fragile, 
and limited particularly by China’s reluctance to allow it to address particular sources of 
dispute.  
 
In South Asia, SAARC exists but it is largely paralysed by India-Pakistan disputes over 
Kashmir. ASEAN emerged as a relatively important sub-regional organisation in South 
East Asia for some decades, building on principles of non-interference, but it has 
struggled to cope with the combined effects of expansion of membership, democratic 
transition in some member states, and the aftermath of the financial crises of 1997/8. The 
relative importance of the region and weakness of regional organisations has meant that 
global institutions and regimes have enhanced significance for conflict and security in 
East and South Asia.   
 
In this context, a concern with geo-strategic patterns and trends is appropriate. There are 
wide literatures and policy debates about the implications of the rise of China, and 
possible clashes with the USA, Japan, or its neighbours. The complex rivalries and 
alliances of India, Pakistan and China; the possible implications of Korean unification; 
the future of Japan and its relationship with the USA; and the dynamics of internal 
change in Indonesia, are just a few examples of major issues that intrigue geo-strategists. 
 
However, to identify key issues and trends in terms of sweeping geo-strategic 
uncertainties and trends can also be superficial and over-narrow. All stakeholders, 
including the emergent powers themselves, are already concerned about risks of tension 
and war. Fortunately, all of the major powers, and almost all medium and small countries, 
in the region have powerful interests in avoiding war and maintaining stability through 
the inevitably complex transitions up to 2015 and beyond. Thus, for example, many of 
the major geo-strategic issues associated with the rise of China and insecurity of Japan 
identified in the early 1990s continue to exist today. But it is important to take full 
account of the relatively successful history of managing transition and risk over the last 
10 – 15 years. In practice, the major security risks in East and South Asia relate to risks 
of unintended or unmanageable escalation of disputes or un-intended crises. This briefing 
thus also focuses particularly on challenges of conflict prevention.  
  
 
3. Major security issues in South and East Asia 
 
This section aims to highlight a number of key geo-strategic or conflict prevention 
challenges and trends in South and East Asia. 
 
The rise of China. China continues to achieve high rates of economic growth, managing 
some 10% annual GDP growth in recent years, and apparently set to continue at 7% or 
more for some time. The state continues to focus on economic and development 
concerns, leading to a strong desire for regional stability and predictable relations with 
the USA and others. At the same time China’s leaderships consistently tends to consider 
that all reverses from its maximum imperial territorial control and influence in history to 
be the result of unfair treaties stemming from discreditable weakness, possibly to be 
reversed as China’s power grows. Nationalism is strong. Since 1989, China has focussed 
on military reform and modernisation, concerned particularly with increasing its military 
capacity to fight wars in its neighbourhood, particularly across the Taiwan Straits and the 
South China Seas.  
 
Over the last 15 years, China has increasingly exerted itself internationally. However, this 
has been largely conducted through existing international regimes, towards which China 
appears to have become increasingly positive and committed. Thus there is a credible 
benign scenario for the next decade in relation to the rise of China’s power: gradual but 
manageable strengthening of its role and influence, while avoiding major clashes with the 
USA and other regional and local powers. In this scenario, human rights abuses and 
dictatorial excesses will remain a concern. The main risks to this benign scenario arise 
from the possibility of escalation of disputes over Taiwan and the South China Seas, 
badly managed international responses to a crisis in the Korean Peninsula; or the 
undesirable consequences of major internal political crisis within China.  
 
The risk of internal political crisis in China. Chinese economic growth and 
transformation has been associated with dramatic internal social and economic tensions 
and change. There are widely noted tensions between regional and national authorities on 
tax and financial issues; and major and growing disparities of wealth between different 
sectors of society and between coastal and interior regions. As an authoritarian 
dictatorship, China can suppress many social disputes, but it lacks the more sophisticated 
mechanisms of democracies in resolving and managing internal disputes and conferring 
legitimacy on the leadership. There appears to be a major risk of unexpected internal 
political crisis within China by 2015, unless the leadership systematically begins to 
engage in political as well as economic reform.  
 
The Taiwan Straits. Tensions and the risks of violent conflict between mainland China 
and Taiwan are long-standing. Moreover, they will continue unless the political 
authorities of China and Taiwan come to a more stable provisional understanding. 
Without such an understanding, the risks of war across the Taiwan Straits remain high, 
and now pose perhaps the greatest risk of leading to major power confrontation between 
China, USA and Japan. The main elements of a possible stable understanding are 
obvious: postpone the resolution of Taiwan’s status; China agrees to accept that Taiwan 
has de-facto provisional political autonomy and may be represented at regional and 
international meetings and institutions with a status that does not imply sovereignty; and 
Taiwan agree to suspend attempts to achieve sovereign recognition as a State. This 
implies concessions on both sides. As by far the stronger party to the dispute, China has 
the main responsibility to accept such an arrangement, but will not do so without 
sustained international pressure. It is quite unrealistic to expect a well-educated, wealthy, 
democratic Taiwan to accept the present situation of continuing marginalisation in 
regional and international issues. Until an understanding it achieved, Taiwan is bound to 
continue to irritate and implicitly or explicitly provoke China, leading to a context in 
which crises could escalate uncontrollably.   
 
South China Seas. The territorial disputes over the Spratly and Paracel Islands continue, 
and remain a source of tension. ASEAN States have made gradual progress in resolving 
these issues, but disputes with China remain a source of friction. It seem unlikely that 
these disputes will lead to war by 2015, but unless mechanisms of dispute resolution and 
co-operative economic management are developed, there is a real risk that the issue could 
lead to polarisation and balancing alliances.  
 
DPRK. North Korea is perhaps the most obvious and urgent major strategic concern in 
East Asia. The development of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities is a direct 
challenge to global non-proliferation regimes, and a major source of insecurity, above all 
for Japan and South Korea. One positive achievement over the last decade has been the 
development of better understanding and co-operation amongst all of the other North East 
Asian states and USA on DPRK issues. This means that the collapse of the North Korean 
regime or DPRK provocations, are now relatively unlikely to result in wider conflict. 
Nevertheless, DPRK nuclear weapons programmes remain deeply destabilising, and of 
urgent concern. The prospects of an early agreement involving the verified abandonment 
of these programmes seem remote under the present DPRK regime. But if the issue is not 
addressed, it could have major implications, particularly for Japanese security policies 
(including the development of BMD programmes and enhanced nuclear ‘guarantees’) 
 
Korean Unification. South Korea’s ‘sunshine policy’ can be seen as a confidence 
building measure to secure détente with DPRK rather than unification. The policies of the 
DPRK are all intimately related to concerns about the survival of its current regime. The 
fact that the regime has remained stable during the last difficult decade has led to a 
situation where many policy-makers appear to assume (and even hope for) its continued 
survival for the indefinite future. In fact, it is probably wise to assume that the regime 
will undergo crisis and probably collapse before 2015. This implies that preparations to 
manage and respond to such a collapse are a priority for the neighbouring states, USA 
and the whole of the international community. 
 
Myanmar. Myanmar/Burma is a weak state whose government is an affront to the 
international community rather than a military threat. However, ASEAN countries’ 
attempts to exert influence and forestall growing Chinese presence in Burma have failed. 
China is now a key ally of Burma, leading to a military and political presence that raises 
concerns for other states in the region, particularly India. Unless and until the political 
transformation is achieved in Burma, this situation is set to continue.  
 
Indonesia. The future of Indonesia is one of the greatest uncertainties in East Asia. It is a 
vast country, and by far the biggest and most strategically important in South East Asia. 
Multiple secessionist (Aceh and Papua) and sectarian (Maluku, Poso and Kalamantan) 
conflicts threaten to undermine the country’s fragile political stability. State security 
institutions are themselves often involved in fomenting conflict. Wide support for radical 
Islamic populism remains possible, fuelled by poverty and corruption as well as in 
response to international developments. The democratisation process remains very 
fragile, and armed conflict over control of the Indonesian state itself cannot be ruled out.  
 
However, there are reasons for optimism. The democratisation process has been 
strikingly successful so far, in view of the many risks and obstacles that have not so far 
lead to disaster. The recent elections were peaceful, and demonstrated little popular 
support for radical Islamic populism. The newly elected President has declared support 
for negotiations to provide special autonomy arrangement for Aceh and Irian Jaya, which 
may provide a framework for peaceful management of the disputes. Some civilian control 
is gradually being exerted over the military. However, the process will probably remain 
extremely fragile for the next decade. 
 
ASEAN and ARF. As noted above regional organisations are weak in East Asia, 
particularly in relation to co-operative security. The prospects for developing ASEAN co-
operation depend particularly on the resumption of a benign leadership role for Indonesia, 
and a change of ASEAN norms and practices to enable institution building and co-
operation on complex internal and transnational conflicts. This will at best emerge slowly 
over the next decade. Similarly, the ARF remains a useful body capable of substantial 
further development. But without substantial changes of policy from China and certain 
ASEAN states, this potential will only be slowly realised. This implies a continuing 
strong role for bilateralism, and particularly for USA influence. 
 
India and Pakistan. Recent improvements in relations between India and Pakistan are 
welcome signs that the long-standing tensions between these countries may gradually be 
overcome. However, the process remains extremely fragile, and the issue of Kashmir 
remains relatively intractable. The most likely ‘good’ scenario for the next decade is 
gradual achievement of confidence building and détente between India and Pakistan, and 
a reduction of violence and improvement of human rights in Kashmir. However, if this is 
achieved, it will probably be in the context of continued rivalry and suspicion, and 
continued development of nuclear and missile forces and doctrines. The alarming 
scenario of renewed crises and conflicts remain fully credible, with a real risk of major, 
even nuclear, war.  
 
Moreover, there are likely to be continuing internal security challenges within India and 
Pakistan. Pakistan in particular is in continuing crisis. Although it is very unlikely to 
disintegrate, the situation remains extremely uncertain. A single assassination could have 
profound repercussions. The possibility of a radical Islamic coup exists. Even if this is 
avoided, international engagement to promote reform and better government, gradual 
democratisation, as well as security sector reform will remain very important. In India, 
secularism remains at some risk, and insecurity in parts North East India as well as 
Kashmir will probably remain endemic.  
 
Weak Asian States 
Many of the security problems of South and East Asia arise from weak states and bad 
governance. The conflicts in Nepal and Sri Lanka, for example, are not of traditional 
strategic significance, but nevertheless are important. While there are reasonable 
prospects for improvement over the next decade, such countries will remain conflict 
prone for at least another decade. 
 
Transnational Terrorism The Bali bombing and subsequent outrages are a clear 
indicator that transnational terrorist networks are a cause for concern in East and South 
Asia, as well as localised terrorist campaigns associated with local grievances. Recent 
developments, particularly the results of recent elections in several S.E. Asian state imply 
that the risks of militant Islamist movements gaining wide support in South East Asia are 
lower than many feared. However, this remains dependent on continued progress in 
democratisation and improved governance and policing. In South Asia, the picture is 
worse. Militant Islamic groups command substantial popular support in South West Asia, 
and Hindu extremism is powerful in India. .  
 
 
4. Some Key issues for EU Policy 
 
External actors have an important contribution to make to conflict prevention and 
reduction efforts in Asia. Indeed, in view of the limits on the roles that regional 
organisations and bilateral co-operation amongst neighbours are likely to play in most 
cases, appropriate wider international assistance from international organisations, the EU 
and ‘donor’ states such as the UK, France, USA, Canada and Australia is vital.  
 
In many ways, the EU has an active policy in East and South Asia. It has major economic 
and trade relations, and has established important social, cultural and scientific co-
operation and exchanges (including for example the ASEM process). 
 
Nevertheless, overall the EU is not influential in political or security issues in South and 
East Asia, certainly compared with the USA or even Japan. It is widely perceived in the 
region to be primarily concerned with investment and trade, and have little real 
engagement on political and military issues. This perception has real substance. The EU 
generally lacks well-developed policies and engagements on political and security affairs. 
 
One key dimension of this is the EU’s generally weak engagement with China on key 
political and security issues. China sees little reason to take EU concerns seriously into 
account, because they are rarely followed up with real or sustained pressure. Other states 
in East Asia, all of which have real security concerns about China, believe that the EU is 
unlikely to be a major actor on security issues of concern to them. This undesirable 
situation should change, with the EU playing a more substantial role. 
 
Some issues that would need to be addressed in this context include: 
• Intensified EU engagement and co-operation with USA, Japan and South Korea 
on East Asian security issues. 
• Maintenance of the EU arms embargo on China, not least to signify a concern 
about the risks of conflict in the Taiwan Straits. 
• Sustained diplomatic pressure on China to come to a stable provisional 
understanding with Taiwan along the lines discussed above 
• Raising of EU engagement with challenges posed by the DPRK, particularly 
active development of co-operation on such issues with Japan and South Korea.  
• Development of more co-ordinated and coherent conflict prevention strategies 
towards weak and unstable states in South and East Asia, and active engagement 
with India-Pakistan issues.  
5. Trends in internal warfare, particularly in Africa  
 
Michael Brzoska, Formerly Director Research, Bonn International Centre for 
Conversion (BICC), Bonn, Germany – now Director of Institute for Peace 
Research and Security Studies (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg, Germany  
 
1. Diagnosis 
 
Military analysts, such as the Israeli military historian Martin van Crefeld (1990), and 
social scientists, such as British political scientist Mary Kaldor (1999), identified patterns 
of warfare in the 1990s, particularly in the Balkans and in Africa, that purportedly made 
them distinct from earlier patterns of fighting. They represent a particularly nasty form of 
civil war. 
 
The following are often identified characteristics of such “new wars”: 
 
a) Mode of warfare. New wars are marked by what has been called „asymmetric 
warfare“. Similar to guerrilla fighters of earlier days, forces are small and often 
operate autonomous. Different from guerilla forces, operations predominantly target 
civilian populations. Fighting against opposing military formations is avoided.  
b) Technology. Fighting is mostly done with small arms and light weapons, in some 
cases machetes and the like are used against civilian populations.  
c) Funding. Fighting is often is self-funding, through sales of natural resources, 
hijacking, quasi-taxing of humanitarian organisations etc. Another important source 
of funding are, in many cases, diaspora communities. 
d) Identity. Fighters are predominantly young males, often under-age 18 (“child 
soldiers”). In most cases, there allegiance is with local commanders who provide 
them with weapons, food and pay („warlords“). Fighters generally are recruited along 
ethnic lines, however, several, even bitterly fighting, forces can come from one ethnic 
group. Political causes of groups beyond gaining control over a territory are often 
imprecise, if identifiable at all. 
e) International networks. Forces typically are well connected internationally, through 
funding, supply with arms and ammunition and with diasporas. They often also have 
regional networks of allied forces, sometimes sending arms or fighters to support 
similar groups in other countries. Many fighting groups are also using modern means 
of communication to manipulate international response to particular conflicts. 
f) Regional dimension. New wars seldom cover the territory of a nation state. Typically 
they are confined to only parts of the territory of a nation-state, but have regional 
extensions, either because of ethnic alliances, trade relations or common political 
interests. 
 
New wars are messy, protracted and costly in terms of loss of – predominantly civilian – 
life and economics. They are therefore a problem both from a humanitarian and 
development point of view. In a human security perspective, which is promoted by a 
number of member countries of the European Union, and has also been recommended as 
a policy for the European Union itself (Kaldor et al, 2004), the massive threat to life of 
individuals in war situations is a trigger of actions.  
 
Civil wars, and particularly new wars, are often seen as threats to other countries, 
including the European Union, even in a more traditional security perspective. One 
important issue are refugee flows. In addition, the phenomenon of new wars is closely 
linked to that of “failing states”, which is identified, both in the US National Security 
Strategy of 2002 and the European Security Strategy of 2003 as one of the major security 
threats. „Failed states“ are seen as „black holes“ of international policing, providing safe 
havens, as well as breeding grounds for international terrorism.  
 
Several links between new wars and failing states have been identified, the most 
important being: 
a) A crucial dimension of state failure is the loss of, first, legitimacy and, second, 
control of parts of a country’s population, either through bad policies or a lack of state 
capacity for good government. Low or zero government capacity invites alternative 
local power arrangements and allows warlords to dominate local economies.  
b) Fighting of the type characteristic for new wars is particularly disruptive for 
economic development. Governments are generally increasing their military 
spending, often without much effect and at the same time are deprived of income. 
c) New wars fighters and their commanders can develop an interest in the continuation 
of insecurity as a source of income and power. Fighting may be sparse, but territorial 
control dispersed among many local warlords. 
 
2. Prognosis 
 
Protagonists of the new war thesis claim that the number and intensity of new wars has 
increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War (Münkler, 2002). Critics point out, 
that this claim is not consistent with available data (Mack, 2004; Kalyvas, 2001). The 
statistics of civil wars is marked by a significant decline both in the number and the 
intensity since the mid-1990s (Uppsala/PRIO, 2004; AKUF, 2004). No separate 
information is available for those wars among civil wars which bear the mentioned 
characteristics of new wars. 
 
There is no unanimous view on the causes of the high incidence of new wars in the late 
20th century, and thus no single basis for predicting their future incidence. Two lines of 
explanation are particularly important:  
- One emphasises low income and income growth. The recent boom in economic 
analysis of civil wars has again demonstrated the importance of poverty as cause of 
weak government institutions and low thresholds for recruitment of fighters. Since 
civil wars are also a cause of poverty, a group of researchers connected to the World 
Bank has identified a “conflict trap” (Collier et al, 2003): Prior civil wars are, in 
empirical analysis, identified as a major cause of civil wars. In addition, in at least the 
majority of the literature, dependence on the export of natural resources is also seen 
as a major cause of civil wars.  
While major international efforts are underway to achieve the Millennium Goals of 
halving the share of absolute poor among mankind by 2015, predictions are dire for 
countries marked by protracted conflict. Development policy has focused, since the 
1990s, on the “good performers”, countries where investment in the form of 
development aid has a high chance of bearing fruit. Such a focus, however, carriers 
the danger of perpetuating poverty and internal conflict in countries already marked 
by weak economies and political instability. 
- The second explanation emphasis various facets of globalization (Duffield, 2001). 
Globalization has put strong pressure on governments to reform and rationalize, to 
privatize economic activity and reduce elite privileges. This has led to façade states, 
propped up by cold war politics and international development aid to lose power, 
funding and legitimacy. At the same time, more open borders and financial systems 
have made it easier to trade in natural resources, including in illegal goods, and arms 
and ammunition. In addition, globalization is marked by improved communication 
facilities, which make it easier for fighting forces to organise international support, 
including by diasporas.  
 
Both explanations lead to similar predictions with respect to future incidence of civil war, 
particularly of the type characterised as new wars. States with growing economies and 
strong political institutions are likely to gain from globalization and grow further. 
Territories lacking legitimate and powerful institutions and marked by low economic 
growth are likely to lose through further globalization. 
 
Geographically, it is possible that civil war largely becomes a phenomenon found in 
Africa south of the Sahara. Africa south of the Sahara is in particular danger of not 
escaping the conflict trap. Political institutions are weak in most countries in Africa and 
economies weak. GDP per head is the lowest among major world regions, economic 
growth is slack, economic diversification limited, population growth high, despite the 
HIV/AIDS crisis. In fact, HIV/AIDS dramatically worsens the situation dramatically, 
because it predominantly disables and kills people in their most productive years and 
burdens social systems. 
 
One important aspect of civil wars since the 1990s has been the growing unwillingness of 
neighbouring states and the international community of states to tolerate it. The number 
of international interventions has grown considerably (Mack, 2004). Military 
interventions are increasingly expanded in scope and mission. Most international 
interventions of late are peace support missions, where the objective is to keep a territory 
under control until the political situation is stabilized and security can be safely 
transferred to local forces. However, it has proven very difficult to establish a safe, secure 
and stable post-conflict order, particularly to rebuilt devastated economies. It is therefore 
difficult to predict whether the international community will have the patience to 
continue the current path of increasing the number of depth of international interventions, 
or revert to earlier reluctance to commit resources and soldiers. 
 
 
3. Links to European science and technology policy 
 
The very brief analysis of new wars emphasises the political dimensions of the issue. 
Major choices include approaches to development, the willingness to strengthen 
governments in failing states and the preparedness to invest in peace support operations.  
Still, a number of priority areas for science and research can be identified: 
 
a) Social sciences. Despite a recent surge in analysis, there remains a great need for 
further study of the causes and consequences of civil wars. As mentioned, 
explanation of civil wars, including new wars, remains contentious. Knowledge of 
particular cases is often limited. A particularly difficult, but important, field of 
research are the conditions for re-establishing safe, secure and stable post-conflict 
environments, including topics such as security sector reform, turning war 
economies into peace economies and restarting devastated economies. 
b) Technologies for economic development. As mentioned, low economic activity 
and growth is generally seen as major cause of civil wars. The challenge is to find 
and promote technologies that support income generation in situations marked by 
political instability. 
c) Technologies for controlling illegal trade. Two types of technology seem 
particularly relevant: 
• Tagging. Small arms, ammunition, but also equipment used in illegal 
exploitation of natural resources, is currently often imported with impunity for 
the supplier. Tagging such equipment, with electronic, chemical or other types 
of tags would make it easier to disrupt illegal trade routes. 
• Surveillance. Sensors on various platforms, including satellites, are needed for 
better control over the flow of many types of goods traded illegally. 
d) Technologies for peace support operations. This includes classical military 
technology, as well as technology: 
• Transport capacity. Cheaper airlift capacity would lower costs of military 
intervention. 
• Command, communication, computing and intelligence. Peace support 
operations have not been a particular focus of attention in military research. 
The equipment used is non-specific. However, there are particular demands on 
information, information processing and instruments for dealing with 
challenges. It seems likely that at least some specific equipment would result 
from a dedicated research effort.   
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 6. Identify international terrorism trends until 2015 
 
Dr Stephen Pullinger, Executive Director, ISIS Europe 
 
 
1. The changing nature of terrorism  
 
Europe’s experience of terrorist activity over the past decades has invariably involved 
groups with clear and limited political objectives. Today, these groups have largely been 
supplanted by a more radical, fundamentalist terrorism, exemplified by Al Q’aida. If we 
are to combat this new terrorism effectively we first need to understand our adversary.  
 
(i) Who exactly are they and how do they work: Today, terrorism is increasingly 
characterised by a move towards ad hoc constellations and networks, away from 
hierarchical structures, national contexts and traditional modes of state-sponsorship. They 
legitimise their struggles through ethnic and religious extremist ideology, flourishing in 
zones of chaos and anarchy in near or already failed states. Al Q’aida is the prime 
example of this new terrorist group. It is a loosely knit network of extremist Islamic 
groups.1  Its general objectives are far-reaching and extreme. 
 
(ii) What motivates them, what are their objectives: Seeking to comprehend the causes of 
terrorism does not mean condoning their actions. But we need to understand the historic 
changes underway in the Muslim world and tailor our policies accordingly. It is unwise to 
talk of a 'clash of civilisations' and to seek to polarise between the West and the Islamic 
world. This does not describe an empirically observed reality; but describes and 
exaggerates something feared and imagined.2  This language shapes the Islamic 
perception of what the West is doing. It affects the course of Islamic reform, tending to 
discredit forces of moderate, secular and progressive theological change as ineffectual.  
 
Muslims have felt under attack for centuries, but what is new is the immediacy of the 
challenge posed to traditional values and structures by the dominance of America and of 
'Western' culture in general, whose media broadcasts directly into homes throughout the 
Islamic world. This has raised aspirations throughout the Islamic world. People question 
the right of autocratic regimes to rule. Some feel marginalized, scared and angry in the 
new world and turn to force to hold on to what is passing. Many Muslims now fear that 
what is going on in Gaza and in Iraq is what, ultimately, may be in store for them. This 
already has had a damaging effect on the movement of ideas and political reform between 
Western and Islamic societies.  
 
                                                 
1 Alexander, Y., and Swetnam, S., Usama bin Laden’s al Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network, New York, 
Transnational Publishers, 2001, p. vii 
2 William Pfaff, ‘This futile fundamentalism, Champions of Islamic revolution are fooling themselves; they 
have nothing to offer contemporary Muslims’, 17 October 2004, Observer. 
But as Gilles Kepel, the French authority on Islamic society, has already said, the Islamist 
movement is moribund in moral terms, although its military and political energy is not 
yet exhausted. There is no way in which it seriously threatens the Western industrial 
nations, other than through sporadic acts of terrorism. Islamic fundamentalism has 
nothing to offer contemporary Islam. You cannot function in the 21st Century on the 
basis of a primitive interpretation of Islamic law. That already is evident in Iran. 
 
(iii) How they want us to respond in the near-term: The terrorists need to radicalise their 
own potential support base. The primary objective is “to bring down upon the community 
in general a reprisal for his wrongs, in the hope that fury and resentment roused by 
punishment meted out to the innocent will gradually swell the ranks of those from whom 
he will draw further recruits.”3 This also appears to be true of Al Q’aida, although with an 
important rider that this does not preclude the taking of the lives of ‘complicit’ Muslims 
in the course of perpetrating terrorist acts.  
 
(iv) How are they likely to pursue those objectives: Al Q’aida is focusing on a patient 
strategy, carrying out coordinated attacks that are intended to foment turmoil and instil 
popular uprising against so-called 'godless' regimes. It also focuses on perpetrating 
numerous and intense atrocities against the West. Any future use of WMD is likely to 
seek to invoke psychological and societal mass disruption rather than destruction. The 
use of suicide attacks is an integral part of this strategy because it shows that the bombers 
possess the weapon that will, ensure their eventual victory i.e. faith.4 The example of the 
young 'martyrs' supposedly shames those who do not have the courage to act.  
 
(v) What weapons will they use:  For groups seeking to inflict mass casualties, to 
maximise terror amongst the target population and polity, and to heighten still further 
media interest in their actions, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) 
weapons appear attractive. Exposing themselves to the dangers associated with handling 
the deadly materials required is unlikely to worry those prepared to launch suicide 
missions.  We already know that some terrorist groups, including Al Q’aida, are seeking 
to acquire such materials and expertise on the international black market. 
 
There is a concerted move towards greater lethality in suicide missions using 
conventional explosives; for example, the fuel truck explosion at the Tel Aviv fuel depot 
or the gas tanker mission against the synagogue on Djerba. These mobile human 
guidance systems are very difficult to defend against. There are numerous other 
possibilities, ranging from, for example, the use of portable SAM-missile systems at 
major airports to the deployment of a liquefied natural gas tanker in any Western port. 
 
                                                 
3 Lawrence Durrell, Bitter Lemons, (New York, 1957) – a classic account of the 1950s Eoka insurgency in 
Cyprus. 
4 As outlined by Dr Ayman Zawahiri in his book, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, 
(London, 2001), the method of suicide attack has been adopted as the ultimate strategic 
weapon.  
 
2. Response strategies and techniques 
 
(i) Build domestic support: A strategic response rather than a series of knee-jerk reactions 
is required. We should not play up this ‘clash of civilisations’ as it polarises in just the 
way the terrorists want and elevates their importance. It is most important to prevent 
them from draining our political will and opening up and then exploiting divisions 
between governments and people. Hence, it is crucial to build the widest possible 
domestic consensus for our responses to terrorism. We must win over our electorates by 
being more transparent, clearly setting out the costs and benefits of our counter strategy, 
placing the problem into proper perspective (warning of the nature and magnitude of the 
threat without exaggerating it).  
 
(ii) Direct confrontation: We will need to allow for immediate and direct confrontation 
when the threat manifests itself e.g. Afghanistan. But more often it will be through the 
pursuit of disrupting their key ‘enablers’ i.e. international reach, resources and 
communications.  If these elements can be disrupted then the ‘new’ element of terrorism 
becomes no more than a traditional group that must be understood in its local capacity. 
When the main concentrations of Al Q’aida and the Taliban were routed, only small cells 
remained. Subsequently, we have entered a different phase, one where military power 
usually will not be the most important factor in our success. It is paramount that we focus 
vengeance solely upon the guilty. Israel and Russia, for example, have adopted repressive 
policies that are counter-productive.  
 
(iii) Catching the culprits: The difficulty for all governments in addressing terrorism is 
that this is best done by undramatic, even invisible means: intelligence, politics, 
diplomacy, special forces operations. Disrupting operations and preventing attacks 
requires policing, intelligence gathering, closing accounts, tracking people, lots of 
legwork, the use of new technologies to identify and track suspects, better security, 
reduced vulnerability of key strategic targets. But precisely because these efforts are 
unglamorous and too often unnoticed, support for them can slip. Furthermore, there is a 
natural tendency for things to gravitate back toward business as usual. Too often in the 
past, after the shock of a major terrorist attack wore off, attention and political will has 
wavered. 
  
(iv) The importance of differentiation: We should avoid viewing a complex, variegated 
phenomenon as a monolith – and, therefore, fail to tailor policies to fit individual cases. 
Each terrorist group is unique in its way. And these groups are dynamic and evolving. 
The danger is that we respond to those with legitimate grievances – but who are using 
illegitimate means – by brutalising the innocent and exacerbating the grievance. The only 
questions that should matter are whether the grievances represented by a given movement 
receive a political as well as a military response, or whether governments persist with 
exclusively military policies.  
 
(v) Political/diplomatic strategy: EU Member States in Council working groups such as 
COTER (Counter Terrorism) have already drawn up lists of terrorists, terror financiers, 
etc. who are to be excluded from entry into the Schengen zone. Other measures include 
collaboration on terrorist financing, harmonisation of information on NGO activities, 
Muslim preachers etc. More could be achieved through collaboration between 
intelligence agencies and, in particular, the office of the European Counter-Terrorism 
Adviser. 
 
We continue our efforts to name, shame, and sanction state sponsors of terror, and have 
seen progress on this front in recent positive steps by Sudan and Libya. Likewise, the 
benefits of improved training and cooperation helped Greek authorities break open ‘17 
November’ in the past year. We need to continue to strengthen and tighten export control 
measures and to ensure the effective implementation of arms control treaties. In order 
particularly to avoid the nexus of WMD, terrorists and rogue states we must address 
illegal and threatening state WMD programmes. Before verification technologies can be 
applied, however, treaties have to enter into force (such as the CTBT) or have to have 
verification requirements developed (as in the BTWC). 
 
(vi) Media strategy: Public diplomacy is not propaganda; we have a good story that 
stands on its merits. Getting our message out to the world played a critical role in our 
long-term success in the Cold War. We must develop innovative ways of using new 
media – such as the Internet and satellite television – to reach new audiences. The media 
will play a critical role in allaying the broader psychological effects for the public. 
Western media also must recognise their responsibility in responsible reporting, as they 
become too easily convenient outlets for sowing the psychology of fear, amplifying the 
violence and extremist messages by Al Q’aida. The role of al-Jazeera is a case in hand 
where it has become an uncensored vehicle for distributing ideological and even indirect 
operational directives.  
 
(vii) Education and cultural: The value of cross-cultural understanding and 
communication should be harnessed, promoting dialogues among and within civilisations 
that are politically, culturally and socially relevant especially relevant to young people. 
The educational systems in Saudi Arabia and parts of Pakistan are largely in the hands of 
extremists who preach a message of religious hatred and jihad against the West. This has 
created a generation without any transferable skills. Encouraging a reorganisation of 
Islamic education towards moderation and tolerance and away from extremism is a 
necessity. As observed by RAND's Bruce Hoffman, it is critical to address the issue of 
suicide bombings, not merely on the individual or psychological level but rather on the 
organisational and societal level.5 It is critical to address through education and institute a 
reversal of what has become 'normal.'  
 
(viii) Protecting ourselves: We will continue to enhance the means of protecting our 
critical infrastructure and ourselves. But, as Secretary of State Powell said: “We can not, 
we will not, let the need to fight this war make us that different a society. We have to 
protect ourselves. But… we must not become gated America or they will have won”.6   
 
                                                 
5 Bruce Hoffman, The Implications of a Post-9/11 World, Foresight, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2002. 
6 Testimony before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, July 2002. 
3. Future Trends 
 
Terrorists will continue to confront us through various methods of asymmetric warfare. 
We can expect them to become more sophisticated at manipulating the world’s media; 
the aim being to influence western electorates who then demand changes to their 
governments’ foreign policies in directions welcome to the terrorists. They will wage a 
psychological as well as physical conflict. Seeking to create a climate of fear that will 
engender a repressive response against the terrorists’ potential recruiting pool. They will 
seek to polarise the clash between the west and Muslims in order to radicalise their ‘side’.  
They will continue to use suicide tactics to demonstrate the moral superiority of their 
faith. They will attempt to portray themselves as being a larger, internationalised and 
more significant force than they actually are, representing the entire Muslim world.  
 
They will perpetrate ‘spectacular’ acts that will strike symbolic, strategic and critical 
targets to instil a sense that nobody and no place is safe and to strike economically 
crippling blows against western capitalism. They will also continue to carry on with 
pinprick, yet highly visible, attacks (such as hostage taking) particularly against 
westerners in Muslim countries in an effort to deter western investment and involvement 
in those countries.  They want to raise the price of western military, cultural and 
economic intervention in Muslim countries. They will exploit regions of instability where 
government authority is diminished. 
 
4. Role of Science and Technology in Counter-Terrorism 
 
(i) Limits of Technology in Counter-terrorism: By its very nature, defence against 
terrorism means we must be prepared for anything. Consequently, it is virtually 
impossible to deploy technological countermeasures to meet every conceivable threat 
scenario. Of course, for example, we should continue to screen for bombs at airports and 
to position devices that detect chemical and biological agents on the underground. But it 
is unrealistic to deploy these and similar defensive technologies in every public building 
and on every highway.  
 
It is far more effective to concentrate our efforts on trying to mitigate the generic threat. 
Technologies that improve intelligence gathering and analysis are a crucial example: ones 
that could help the authorities more rapidly to uncover terrorist plots, whatever the target. 
Similarly, technologies that, by facilitating better communication, coordination and 
emergency response, could reduce the effects of a terrorist attack. It is important to 
recognise the strengths and limitations of technology and not to divert scarce resources 
into wasteful and ineffectual technological ‘ fixes’ that could render us more vulnerable 
to other threats.  
 
It is the quantity, quality and analysis of information that will make us more secure rather 
than technology per se. Technology serves to generate, intercept, and translate 
intelligence. For example, when confronting terrorists who rely on minimal technological 
support and who are linked through familial or tribal bonds, technology is useless - as we 
have seen with aspects of the War on Terror.  
 
(ii) Countering Identity Theft: Because terrorists rely heavily on identity theft, credit card 
and bank fraud, there is an urgent need to provide more effective mechanisms to monitor 
and establish the authenticity of identity documents. Achieving technological 
improvements in our ability to make these documents more difficult to forge and easier to 
verify, should be a priority. Only if we can identify those planning attacks do we have a 
chance of stopping them. Developments in biometrics technology - the statistical analysis 
of biological observations and phenomena – offer us a very new way to identify potential 
terrorists by their fingerprints, face, and iris. This will greatly assist us in successfully 
preventing identity theft and identity forgery.  
 
(iii) Countering Terrorist Finance: Terrorist finances currently flow far quicker in the 
international financial system than any law enforcement agency can react to. 
Operationally linking funds in one country with a terrorist crime in another is extremely 
difficult to prove, let alone tracking the money in today's international financial system. 
We need to invest in financial tracking technologies.  
 
(iv) Appropriate intelligence gathering: There is further scope for states to improve 
intelligence gathering, sharing and analysis, specifically enhancing their individual 
human intelligence capabilities, including, for example, better cultural understanding. 
Here, technology has a role to play in enhancing the ‘real-time’ picture of the movements 
of known suspects. The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is relevant here. 
Developing computer capacities to assimilate vast quantities of pieces of intelligence into 
a robust analysis of what may be a rapidly evolving threat is critical.  
 
(v) Disseminating existing technology: It is also important to ensure that basic 
technologies with counter-terrorist applications are provided to our allies around the 
world. For example, equipping border guards with binoculars and better communications 
equipment, and training teams of bomb-disposal specialists.  
 
(vi) Countering WMD: The application of enhanced technologies to verify non-
proliferation of WMD is important in relation to terrorists as well as to states. The lack of 
any verification provision makes it all the more important that states parties to the BTWC 
undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological 
information for the use of biological agents and toxins. It is especially important that 
states keep abreast of developments in biotechnology and their possible applications for 
nefarious purposes.  
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 7. Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation trends 
to 2015  
 
Ian Anthony, SIPRI 
 
 
1. Diagnosis 
Proliferation challenges in the period out to 2015 can be summarized as follows: 
Challenges presented by states 
• States developing NBC weapons 
• States holding open the option to develop NBC weapons by developing the 
relevant technological base.  
 
Challenges presented by non-state actors 
• Terrorist access to NBC weapons 
• Terrorist use of nuclear explosive device 
• Use of dangerous materials and new techniques that are not weapons 
Governmental and international officials as well as non-governmental analysts have 
recently identified an increased risk that weapons of mass destruction, and in particular 
nuclear weapons, will proliferate. A changing understanding and usage of the terms 
‘proliferation’ and ‘weapons of mass destruction’ accompany this perception of increased 
risk of proliferation. During the 1990s the primary focus of both policy and analysis was 
placed on state weapon programmes, where the tendencies appeared relatively benign. At 
that time the number of state weapon programmes was relatively small, the growth in the 
number of programmes that had been widely predicted in earlier periods had not occurred 
and a number of programmes were either terminated or ‘rolled back’ through peaceful 
means.  
 
Since the late 1990s the following proliferation characteristics have appeared: 
g) State programmes. Two previously known but “recessed” nuclear weapon 
programmes have been declared in India and Pakistan, where weapon tests have been 
carried out. Two suspected but unconfirmed weapon programmes have been 
uncovered in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea).  
h) Non-state programmes. Evidence uncovered in Afghanistan and through the activities 
of national agencies has indicated that sophisticated terrorist groups and their 
associates seek to acquire a nuclear explosive device as well as radiological weapons.  
i) Non-weapon programmes. Evidence also suggests that nuclear terrorism might take 
forms other than weapon use, either by means of attacks carried out with dangerous 
materials that are not in themselves weapons or by attacks on nuclear facilities. 
j) Technology acquisition and development. The fissile materials that are used to make 
nuclear weapons can be acquired from industrial processes that also have legitimate 
peaceful uses. A number of countries, including some of current or recent 
proliferation concern, are investing in the development of nuclear industrial capacities 
that are particularly sensitive from a proliferation perspective. There has been a 
particular interest in uranium enrichment processes and, to a lesser extent, in 
processes to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.  
k) International networks. Information provided to governments by Libya and the 
investigations carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency have confirmed 
that an international network of suppliers has worked actively to provide countries 
and programmes of proliferation concern with items relevant to nuclear weapon 
development. 
l) Legal dimension. In a number of cases the activities associated with nuclear 
proliferation have been in violation of the international agreements and national laws 
of states. The international agreements have not provided any “traction” on the 
proliferation problem. The effective implementation of national laws in this area has 
been difficult and the quality of national efforts has been uneven.  
m) Information dimension. The recent developments have underlined the inadequate 
nature of the information and data base on which both governmental and non-
governmental actors are basing their analyses and conclusions. Nuclear proliferation 
is an activity that is carried out in a secret, often clandestine manner and concealing 
information about both technical capabilities and intentions is routine. 
 
The characteristics of the state and non-state patterns of proliferation appear to be very 
different from one another.  The main motivations for state programmes underway to 
acquire nuclear weapons appear to be: 
• to deter either the use of nuclear weapons by other possessor states or to deter the 
use of force by an adversary with superior conventional military power,  
• to obtain the international prestige and associated political benefits that their 
possession brings,  
• the result of a technological momentum that develops within the scientific 
community of the state following the initiation of nuclear research and 
development programmes. 
  
Given these objectives states that have already developed nuclear weapons or that are on 
the threshold of doing so (India, Pakistan and North Korea) are likely to want to build 
relatively large arsenals of weapons to achieve a degree of security in the face of the risk 
of a preventive “first strike”.  
 
The progressive efforts by the international community to restrict and deny useful 
technologies to countries and programmes of nuclear proliferation concern mean that 
states are likely to seek the full development and production cycle associated with 
nuclear weapon research, development, design, production, storage, handling and 
delivery.  
 
The risk that a small arsenal will be vulnerable to pre-emption as well as the efforts by 
other states to develop more effective active and passive defences make it likely that 
these states will pursue a range of missile and/or combat aircraft delivery systems. The 
need for dispersal and concealment of arsenals are likely to lead to the pursuit of robust 
(i.e. incorporating  redundancy) command and control systems.  
 
The main motivation for sophisticated terrorists to acquire a nuclear explosive device 
appears to be the catastrophic use of that device against civilians. Advanced societies 
recover from terrorist attacks and adjust to a new threat environment. Consequently, to 
maintain their effectiveness and achieve their objectives sophisticated terrorists are likely 
to be driven to ever more spectacular and destructive attacks.  
 
In contrast to the relatively large “footprint” of state programmes, sophisticated terrorists 
are likely to operate in small numbers and in unknown locations. Moreover, to 
accomplish their objectives they require only one or at most a handful of devices. The 
need to conceal their activities and the nature of their requirement means that such groups 
are likely to be seeking to procure only the equipment necessary for the shaping of fissile 
material into a crude (probably “gun-type”) device and necessary for handling the device 
prior to delivery. Delivery itself could not be via sophisticated means such as an 
advanced combat aircraft or a missile. Covert delivery using improvised means would be 
more likely.  
 
2. Prognosis 
 
The prognosis for state based and non-state actor based proliferation to the year 2015 is 
different, in line with the different characteristics of their programme requirements. 
India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea—are likely to continue to take steps to develop 
their stockpiles, command and control systems and delivery systems. In conditions where 
all of these states must see their existing arsenals as vulnerable, greater transparency 
about inventories, capabilities and nuclear doctrine are unlikely in the next decade. 
States likely to hold open the option to develop nuclear weapons by developing the 
relevant technological base are likely to be those with an existing nuclear research and 
technology base on which they can build combined with a security environment that 
requires a high level of deterrence. This security environment is certain to be strongly 
influenced by local and regional factors but might also be heavily conditioned by the 
policies of the United States. 
 
A number of recent books and articles have examined the characteristics and environment 
that appear to influence nuclear weapon decision-making. The group of states that 
combine these characteristics include Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and South Korea. A number of 
states that have been identified as having a potential requirement for nuclear weapons 
(such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Syria) lack the technological basis 
for a weapons programme. A number of states that have a technological base that would 
allow the development of nuclear weapons—including Japan and Brazil—currently lack 
the rationale to develop nuclear weapons.  
 
An important aspect of proliferation by states has been the willingness of the 
international community of states to accommodate it. Few states that have developed 
nuclear weapons have faced sustained sanctions. Modification of international 
agreements (most notably the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to clarify the 
obligations of states and what constitutes non-compliance with those obligations or to 
strengthen implementation appears to be impossible. Violations of international 
agreements (including bilateral safeguards agreements with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency) have not attracted sanctions when discovered. At the same time, the 
international community has not consciously adapted itself to creating stability in a world 
system containing multiple nuclear weapon states. 
 
By contrast there has been a clear signal that states are not willing to contemplate the 
access of non-state actors to nuclear explosive devices. A number of legal processes at 
the global, regional and national level have been initiated to give effect to this 
determination to keep such destructive devices from terrorists. Moreover, a wide and 
comprehensive range of measures (including military interventions) are likely in cases 
where terrorist groups might establish a foothold in countries with emerging nuclear 
capacities. In this regard the nuclear weapon programme of Pakistan probably represents 
the main and most difficult non-proliferation challenge of the next decade in that it is not 
possible to either accommodate.  
 
Most international interventions of late are peace support missions, where the objective is 
to keep a territory under control until the political situation is stabilized and security can 
be safely transferred to local forces. However, it has proven very difficult to establish a 
safe, secure and stable post-conflict order, particularly to rebuilt devastated economies. It 
is therefore difficult to predict whether the international community will have the 
patience to continue the current path of increasing the number of depth of international 
interventions, or revert to earlier reluctance to commit resources and soldiers. 
 
3. Links to European science and technology policy 
 
The very brief analysis of nuclear proliferation trends emphasises the inter-woven 
political, strategic, economic and technological dimensions of the issue. Major choices 
include approaches to development, the willingness to strengthen governments in failing 
states and the preparedness to invest in peace support operations.  
 
In relation to nuclear weapons studies that might enhance the current understanding and 
help to formulate effective policies include: 
e) A study exploring the respective role of and relationship between verification, 
transparency and safeguards as instruments to help achieve the objectives of 
multilateral nuclear arms control; 
f) A study of how states have prepared to implement the Additional Protocol to their 
Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
g) An analysis of the implications for international security of an emerging “second 
nuclear age” in which nuclear weapon possessor states are greater in number and 
have different strategic relationships from those of the cold war. 
h) An analysis of the potential role of regional mechanisms, as opposed to global 
approaches, to ensuring stability and security. 
i) A study of the nuclear research establishment of countries in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the wider Middle East of nuclear proliferation concern 
including the identification of facilities (such as institutes and research reactors) 
where knowledge and materials are located. 
j) A technical study of the means of nuclear weapon delivery available in the 
countries of proliferation concern with a view to establishing their provenance.   
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 8. Key Policy Issues for the Security of the EU until 
2015: Trends in Poverty Reduction  
 
Owen Greene, Chris Cushing, Sally Holt, Centre for International Co-operation and 
Security (CICS), University of Bradford 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In accordance with our brief, this paper seeks to identify trends in poverty reduction until 
2015 as a key policy issue for the security of the EU. Following an initial explanation of 
the relevance of poverty reduction for security and vice versa, the current state of play in 
terms of efforts towards poverty reduction is presented. Drawing on this data, future 
trends are identified, with particular attention to those regions of strategic importance to 
the EU. Finally, in drawing out some priority issues for the EU we have selected not only 
those with direct relevance for EU science and technology policy, but others with 
implications for wider EU strategy and policy in terms of poverty reduction and security.  
 
1.1. The poverty reduction framework 
Poverty reduction is firmly on the global agenda.  The internationally agreed set of 
targets, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), place human development and 
poverty reduction at the heart of global development objectives and provide the 
international development community with a common framework of time-limited, 
quantifiable objectives to guide its policies and programmes and to evaluate effectiveness 
of action taken in the multiple aspects of poverty reduction until 2015.  Since 2000, the 
eradication of poverty has also been the declared principal aim of the European 
Community’s development policy and its associated external assistance. Most recently, 
the new EU Commissioner for development and Humanitarian Affairs has promised to 
make the MDGs central to all the European Commission’s policies and, furthermore, has 
committed to reviewing and updating Community development policy as it relates to the 
MDGs laid down in 2000 in the light of subsequent developments.7   
 
1.2. Linking poverty, conflict, and security 
The EU recognizes that security and development go hand in hand.  Not only is security a 
precondition of development, but a lack of development, inequality and poverty are often 
a source of instability, trapping many countries and in a cycle of conflict, poverty and 
insecurity. Underscoring the relationship between conflict and poverty, human 
development within conflict-ridden countries is generally lower in areas that suffer 
directly from conflict. 
 
                                                 
7 Stefania, Bianchi, EU Promises Action Over MDGs, Global Policy Forum Press Release, 22 September 
2004. 
Lack of security (national or regional) destroys physical and social infrastructure, 
undermines government capacity and leads to a host of problems including lawlessness 
and a breakdown of public service provision.  Conflict also undermines the economy, 
deters investment and creates obstacles that impede delivery of aid targeted at poverty 
reduction.  Poverty, lack of development prospects, inequality across groups and regions, 
marginalization and exclusion create a climate of instability and lie at the root of many 
conflicts.  Competition for natural resources – especially water – likely to be aggravated 
by climate change over the next few decades can also contribute to tensions.   
 
These conditions provide fertile ground for extremism and terrorism so endangering 
national, regional – even global – stability. Poverty also fuels voluntary migration, which 
not only robs developing countries of dynamic and valuable human resources, but in turn 
can cause problems in host societies including alienation particularly of young people 
which can contribute to extremism.  
 
Poor governance often lies at the heart of these problems. Corruption, inefficiency and a 
lack of commitment to undertake policy and institutional reforms are inimical to reducing 
poverty. The post Cold War period has additionally seen State failure characterized by 
weak (and in some cases collapsed) State institutions, abuse of power, corruption and 
lack of accountability. This situation compounds regional instability, while providing 
opportunities for organized crime, which thrives on the opportunities for illicit profits 
presented by conflict.   
 
Transnational crime (including trafficking in drugs, small arms and light weapons, illegal 
migrants, women and girls etc.) and is especially associated with failing States and 
regional clusters of unstable states.  State failure and organized crime can rapidly expand 
and be consolidated if neglected. This highlights the need for preventative action before a 
crisis occurs.   
 
Tensions and violent conflict, weak States and organized crime, as well as exploding 
population growth on Europe’s borders all pose problems.  It is particularly in the EU’s 
interest that countries on the borders are well governed and violent or frozen conflicts 
(such as that in Moldova) are resolved. Combating poverty, inequality and 
marginalization outside of the immediate region is also relevant for European security. 
As the European Security Strategy recognizes: “With the new threats the first line of 
defence will often be abroad”.8   
 
In this connection, commentators have drawn attention to divisions in the international 
community on how to ensure effective security and they have emphasised the danger of 
responses to terrorism overshadowing the poverty reduction agenda.  The concern is that 
development should not become an objective only in a security context, but should 
remain a goal in its own right.  Of particular concern is the balance of EU resources 
between development and external action under the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy.   
 
                                                 
8 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, at p.7. 
2. Trends in poverty reduction 
 
2.1.   Overview of current trends in reaching the MDGs  
A number of caveats regarding the reliability of data upon which projections are based 
should be noted.   
• Most goals data is not available beyond 2002 and most projections for possible 
outcomes in 2015 start from the base year of 1990. This makes them heavily 
weighted by results achieved before the MDGs, possible generating an unduly 
pessimistic outlook for future outcomes.   
• The common use of averages to measure MDG progress, while providing an 
overall sense of trends can also be misleading.  Failure to disaggregate by gender, 
for example, may bring a result far from the reality experiences by many women. 
• The use of national performance indicators hides national disparities, reflecting 
neither regional differences, nor the gaps along economic, social, cultural, gender 
and ethnic cleavages, which can destabilize human development as a result of 
social unrest, political disputes, violence and conflict.  This is the case particularly 
in some Middle Income countries, where increase in national indicators does not 
necessarily mean that all groups benefit at the same rate.  
• The long-term impacts of trends in climate change as well as HIV/AIDs and other 
communicable diseases are yet to be fully felt and present something of an 
unknown. The affects on the goal of poverty reduction are, however, potentially 
catastrophic.9       
 
Overall, there have been notable advances and cause for hope in some areas. While some 
significant progress is being made towards meeting some of the targets in some of the 
affected countries, progress is, however, uneven across and within regions and even 
countries. In many cases progress is patchy, too slow or non-existent, with the poorest 
nations (landlocked and least developed) and those in sub-Saharan Africa seeing little 
significant progress and, in some cases, regression in achieving MDG targets.  
  
Poverty and hunger  
On the positive side, global income poverty rates continue to fall.  After an increase in the 
late 1990’s poverty rates have declined in many regions,10 which would suggest the 2015 
target to reduce poverty by half will be met. Whether this can be regarded as an overall 
trend is, however, debatable, especially given that much of the global progress has been 
due to a rapid decline in Asia – particularly China where poverty estimates show large 
discrepancies.11  There is still massive poverty in South Asia, which has 25% of the 
world’s population and where increases in agricultural production have not translated into 
poverty reduction and equitable distribution of wealth is inhibiting human development. 
In sub-Saharan Africa many countries are caught in a poverty trap, with over 40% of the 
population still living below the poverty line of $1 per day.   
                                                 
9 See, the October 2004 report Up in Smoke, published by a coalition of aid and development agencies, 
according to which global warming threatens to make the MDGs unobtainable and even reverse human 
development achievements.   
10 N.B. Differentiation of data and trends by region generally follows World Bank categorization. 
11 Jan Vandemoortele, Are the MDGs Feasible?, UNDP, New York 2002. 
 
There has been little or no progress in Latin America and the Caribbean and in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia poverty has actually increased, returning to pre-transition levels. 
Since the fall of communism, the region has seen rapid socio-economic change as well as 
increasing population mobility. In addition to an increase in absolute and relative poverty 
levels in the past decade, income inequalities have also grown in many countries, 
increasing regional vulnerability to violent conflict, and providing fertile ground for 
extremism and terrorism.  In North Africa and the Middle East unresolved conflict as a 
well as unemployment and economic underdevelopment and stagnation – contrary to the 
high expectations of a predominantly young population and potentially leading to social 
unrest – are of major concern.  
 
Education 
In those countries that have laid a good foundation for growth, indicators of social 
development are also improving.  Education is crucial for achievement of the MDGs and 
progress towards universal primary education is generally steady if lagging in some 
areas.  Targets have been met in 37 of 155 developing countries.  Three regions – East 
Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia (despite a decline in universal primary 
education in European CIS countries), and Latin America and the Caribbean – are on 
track to achieve the goal.  Based on trends in the 1990s, another 32 are likely to achieve 
that goal, but 70 countries risk not reaching the goal unless progress is accelerated, 
meaning if current trends persist, children in more than half of developing countries will 
not complete a full course of primary education in 2015.12   
 
Sub-Saharan Africa lags farthest behind, despite some progress. South Asia has 
chronically low enrolment and completion rates and completion rates in the Middle East 
and North Africa stagnated in the 1990s, reflecting key deficiencies in education and 
knowledge due to structural institutional barriers.13  In particular, the relative lack of 
well-funded and attended science education had a direct impact on technological 
achievement. The “brain drain” of well-qualified Arab professionals to the West because 
of a lack of opportunities and stifling political environment is also undermining economic 
development in the region. Although progress in achieving equal access for girls to 
primary and secondary education have been met or are on track elsewhere, gender 
discrimination in enrolment also remains a concern in several countries in these regions: 
more than half of Arab women are estimated to be illiterate.  
 
Gender equality, women’s empowerment and maternal health 
Advances in gender equity remain a serious challenge, with advances in women’s 
representation in national parliaments – as well as at regional level – being slow or non-
existent across the board.  In South Asia, women have limited access to decision-making 
forums. Female poverty is also major problem with South Asian women forming the 
majority of the poor, illiterate and unemployed. Wage-employment rates of women have 
changed little in any region since 1990 and are far below those for men in all regions 
                                                 
12 World Bank projection, at; http://www.developmentgoals.org/Education.htm. 
13 See further, UNDP regional reports: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations, Arab Human 
Development Report, 2002; and Building a Knowledge Society, Arab Human Development Report, 2003.  
except Latin America and the Caribbean. Monitoring of maternal mortality rates caused 
by poor reproductive health and complications in labour and pregnancy, is notoriously 
difficult and so does not allow any definite assessment of trends, but recent estimates 
indicate continuing high rates in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Data on the 
proportion of births attended by skilled medical personnel – accepted as being closely 
correlated with maternal mortality – saw improvements in North Africa, East and South 
Asia, with moderate change in Latin America and the Caribbean and little or no change in 
sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. To meet the MDG experts say that by 2015 
skilled attendants will need to be present at 90% of births; recent data for Africa indicates 
a rate of 46.2%. 
 
Child mortality 
Overall, with the exception of Northern Africa, Latin American and the Caribbean, and 
South Asia progress on child survival is disappointing.  At current trends no region, 
except possibly Latin America and the Caribbean, is on track to achieve the target of 
reducing under-five mortality rates by two thirds of their 1990 levels by 2015.  Progress 
has been particularly slow in Sub-Saharan Africa, where civil disturbances and 
HIV/AIDS have driven up rates of infant and child mortality in several countries 
 
Environmental sustainability 
Significant improvements have been made in rural access to drinking water in almost all 
regions, but only a few countries have achieved improvement at a rate sufficient to meet 
the target.  Urban access is almost universal except in sub-Saharan Africa where it has 
declined.  Even in regions such as East Asia that have made significant progress in 
reaching many of the other goals, efforts to ensure environmental sustainability are far 
too slow.   
 
Communicable diseases 
The major communicable diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, are 
disproportionately rife among the poor in developing countries and present a serious 
threat to economic growth and sustainable development in the worst affected areas.  
While poverty facilitates the spread of disease, the illness (and death) that follows pushes 
those affected and their households into poverty and makes it harder for them to escape 
from it.  Aside from the implications for the socio-economic status of those directly 
affected by disease, at premature adult mortality and morbidity rates have significant 
demographic implications, resulting in unfavourable dependency ratios and proportions 
of workers relative to social protection recipients.  Analysis in relation to HIV/AIDS, in 
particular, suggests that the destruction of human capital and impediment of its 
transmission to subsequent generations can have a negative impact on annual economic 
growth rates, which can significantly reduce GDP levels over time.14   
 
In sub-Saharan Africa the HIV/AIDS pandemic continues unabated in the majority of 
countries with the exception of Uganda, which has had some success in reversing the 
trends having reached crisis proportions – showing that with the will, commitment and 
                                                 
14 See further, Reversing the Epidemic - Facts and Policy Options, HIV and Human Development in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, UNDP Regional Report, 2004.   
right policies, change can be affected.  This region is also the worst affected by malaria 
which shows no signs of diminishing and TB rates are also on the increase.  In addition, 
parts of Asia have recently seen a dramatic increase in the spread of HIV/AIDS with 
South Asia having the second largest prevalence in the world, despite relatively low 
percentage rates, due to its large population base.  While the epidemic is relatively recent 
the trend is for growing rates with women becoming increasingly infected.  There is a 
chance to arrest the epidemic at the present stage rather than allowing it to become 
generalized, but in order to do so it will be necessary to address structural factors 
associated with prevailing socio-economic conditions including high levels of poverty 
and inequalities that have intensified with economic liberalization, as well as social 
stigma and discrimination that can enhance vulnerability to infection. Low levels of 
public expenditure on basic services, poor quality of care, the high proportion of informal 
sector economic activity and lack of adequate social security which all add to 
vulnerability of the poor require urgent attention.   
 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia have also been subject to a rapid growth in HIV/AIDS, 
with intravenous drug use the most common form of transmission.  The potential for a 
generalized epidemic is undeniable, with Western CIS countries and Northern Baltics, 
which lie along the main narcotics trafficking routes having the region’s worst 
epidemiological trends.  These countries also have the most unfavourable demographic 
trends characterized by aging populations and declining birth rates, shrinking labour 
forces and unfavourable dependency ratios.  Countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus 
are also the region’s poorest and have limited health care capacity. While the disease has 
spread too far to permit rapid reductions in prevalence today, further rapid growth can be 
prevented.  Best available projections of likely trajectory in Russia see dramatic increases 
in HIV prevalence rates among the labour force until 2025, particularly as the disease is 
concentrated in the under-25 age cohort.  HIV/AIDS is also projected to dramatically 
accelerate Russia’s ongoing population decline, with average life expectancy dropping 
rapidly.  The epidemic could also have important sectoral impacts in countries such as 
Russia where it could affect the critical extractive industries (e.g. non-ferrous metals) 
many of which make use of migrant labour (which is generally associated with a 
relatively high HIV/AIDS risk).   
 
As the UNAIDS fourth Global Report demonstrates there is no region where HIV is not a 
potential serious threat to the population, including the EU neighbourhood – and even the 
EU itself.  A generalized epidemic would raise issues e.g. for the Baltic States that are 
introducing high HIV prevalence rates into EU.  Theoretically, this could raise tensions 
with neighbouring countries that may wish to tighten border controls or engage in other 
“unfriendly” activity. 
 
It is not clear altogether how trends in HIV/AIDS will develop, especially in regions 
where it is a relatively new but spreading phenomenon.  Moreover, new diseases can 
spread rapidly and become global threats.  Achievement of all the MDGs will depend in 
part in turning around current trends in communicable diseases – which in itself relies on 
achievement in reaching the other MDGs.  In the meantime, their prevalence continues to 
place additional resource burdens on developing countries and increase their needs for 
ODA and other assistance.  
 
Developing a global partnership 
While success in meeting the MDGs depends on the developing countries themselves, the 
inclusion of Goal 8 recognizes that success will come only with the cooperation and 
support of richer nations, including through a re-energized commitment to expanding 
access to trade and technology for poor countries, increasing aid, and delivering more 
meaningful debt relief.    
  
Sluggish growth in the world economy may account in part for the slow pace towards the 
MDGs, but insufficient progress has been made in restructuring the global trade system – 
particularly in agriculture – including through increased access to markets, the 
dismantling of subsidies, lowering tariffs etc. In the meantime, the long-term downward 
trend and volatility in non-fuel commodity prices pose a major challenge to exporting 
countries. Countries being left behind rely heavily on exports of primary commodities 
and find it difficult to diversify where there is low human development.  Failure to 
produce favourable results at the WTO’s Ministerial in Cancun regarding the Doha round 
of trade talks highlighted the still insufficient voice of developing countries when it 
comes to global trade rules.  More positively, recognition that little progress will be made 
on meeting the MDGs without additional funds has led to a positive trend in ODA in 
terms of both quantity and quality.  Much of the increase, however, simply represents a 
catch-up after a long period of decline and the resources fall far short of that needed to 
achieve the goals.  
 
Although attainment of the MDGs is still technically feasible, at the current pace many 
countries and regions will not be able to meet them.  According to the UN Secretary 
General “the window of opportunity is narrowing and the political will remains largely 
absent”.  A lot depends on the five-year review in 2005 if positive trends are to be 
accelerated and the negative turned around, but “a major breakthrough is needed if the 
2015 targets are to be met”.15  
 
3. Priority Issues for EU Strategy and Policy 
 
Trends in poverty reduction and the key impediments thereto, as identified above all have 
important implications for EU strategy, including, but not exclusively, in terms of science 
and technology policy.  While progress towards the MDGS rests on the combination of a 
large number of factors, the EU, with the Community and it member States has a vital 
role to play – especially given that it provides some 55% of global ODA, is the world’s 
largest multilateral grant provider (at 63%), the world’s largest single market and the 
main trading partner of most developing countries.  The following 8 areas have been 
selected as those where EU intervention can add particular value in spurring progress 
towards poverty reduction, stability and security.   
 
                                                 
15 United Nations General Assembly, Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, 
Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc. A/59/282, 27 August 2004, para. 42. 
3.1 Trade policy  
 
While developed countries are committed under the MDGs to expanding access to trade 
for developing countries – and despite some significant recent initiatives – trade policies 
in rich countries remain highly discriminatory against the products produced in the 
poorest countries, especially in agriculture, textiles and clothing. EU steps granting trade 
preferences to developing countries, providing quota and duty free access for LDCs to 
European markets and the opening of negotiations with all ACP regions for Economic 
Partnership Agreements are so far limited. With regard to the latter, WTO membership 
rules need to change if fragile ACP economies, heavily dependent on commodities, are to 
survive, grow and develop. In order to promote a more open and balanced trade system 
the EU should, therefore: 
• Commit to specific targets and deadlines at the 2005 Doha Round, particularly in 
terms of increased access to markets by removing tariffs on poor country exports as 
well as the removal of agricultural subsidies.  
• Ensure that non-tariff barriers such as the increasing number of health and 
environmental standards do not wipe out potential gains from increased market access 
and raise this as an issue on the Doha Development Agenda.  
• Undertake a more systematic and far-reaching review of existing and future EU 
trade policies to improve coherence and increase the Union’s credibility in the 
international debate on reform of the international financial architecture.  
• Use its weight to influence global institutions such as the UN (post-enlargement 
the EU comprises 15% of UN membership), World Bank and the WTO to further the 
trade interests of developing countries 
 
3.2 Promoting foreign direct investment 
 
Foreign private investment is one of the largest sources of external funds for developing 
countries as a whole.  Experience shows that high FDI generally generates progress in 
economic growth, employment and integration, so contributing to political stability and 
development. However, it generally demands a favourable investment climate, macro-
economic stability, trade openings and sound financial and legal institutions.  
 
FDI therefore tends to be heavily concentrated in a few countries and largely bypasses the 
poorest. Less stable situations present a higher risk for investors and tend to attract those 
seeking high returns in the short-term and is unlikely to contribute to sustainable 
development for those trapped in poverty.  Stagnating economies, lack of opportunity and 
of hope is a major stimulus for migration, which in turn deprives countries of valuable 
human capital.  The EU should, therefore: 
• Do more to encourage long-term investment that will benefit the poorest and most 
marginalized in countries where instability and/or other factors present a less than 
favourable investment climate e.g. by underwriting initial investments. 
• Provide more – and more effective – assistance to governments to improve their 
investment climates, particularly through the technical assistance on the design and 
implementation of policy improvements. 
 
 
3.3 Investing in, and sharing, technology for poverty reduction 
 
Investments in technological innovations deserve high priority as they have the capacity 
to overcome the constraints of low incomes and weak institutions, so accelerating 
progress towards the MDGs. The harnessing of developments in technology for poverty 
reduction is currently insufficient, despite the commitments made by rich countries to 
transfer technology in the agreement on Trade-Related Issues for Implementation 
Property Rights (TRIPs). The EU should, therefore:  
• Invest in research to address enduring problems relating to sustainable 
development with special attention to areas important for developing countries and/or 
neglected by private research e.g. on medicines for tropical diseases, cheap 
communication tools and clean and efficient technologies. Where the market does not 
function to promote investment because the recipients cannot pay public-private 
partnerships should be explored.   
• Extend EU action on communicable diseases, including by supporting access to 
a tiered pricing of medicines and by supporting prevention through education. In line 
with recommendations of the WTO and others, shift EU actions on this disease from 
prevention to ensuring access to antiretroviral and other treatment and support this 
with further sustained resources.  
• Invest in those technologies particularly usable among the poorest groups e.g. 
high-yielding drought and pest-resistant strains of food crops; access to water, 
sanitation and clean energy for rural populations; low cost wire-less battery-operated 
computers, etc. 
 
3.4 Aid policy delivery 
 
While the EU has declared its aim to put poverty reduction at the heart of external 
assistance, much of its focus still remains on associate countries and strategic partners, 
rather than on the reaching the world’s poorest. Top priority and high priority countries 
need large injections of donor aid to invest in the core foundations for economic growth 
(health education, agriculture, water and key infrastructure etc.). The EU should 
therefore: 
• Come forward at the 2005 MDG review with a renewed pledge for increased 
resources for development, setting new targets for the medium and long term, given 
that they are already on track to meet the “Barcelona Targets” for increase in 
European ODA.   
• Focus a higher proportion of aid on Low Income Countries, building on the 
limited progress so far (over 43% of resources were allocated to low income and 
LDCs by the EU in 2003 compared to 34% in 1999).  
• Do more to address the needs of Middle Income Countries, especially those in 
acute crisis. Policy interventions should be targeted at the impediments to 
development – especially the inequalities between regions and groups that result in 
uneven progress towards poverty reduction – in order to benefit the most vulnerable 
and marginalized (whether due to gender, ethnicity or geography). 
 
3.5 Conflict prevention  
 
A stable and peaceful environment is critical for poverty reduction, for attracting external 
funding (investment, tourism etc.) and ensuring that economies are not undermined by 
conflict. The EU has a conflict prevention strategy and purports to deliver conflict-
sensitive programming, but this is not always the case in practice.  Understanding the root 
causes of conflicts is key to preventing violence and an inaccurate diagnosis of the 
political and socio-economic context of a development intervention can mean that 
interventions exacerbate latent tensions. The EU should therefore:  
• Build on existing Country Conflict Assessments and undertake further research 
into what can trigger conflicts and options for preventing and mitigate them to ensure 
that any intervention including aid delivery does not exacerbate underlying structural 
causes. 
• Be more vigilant and dynamic in ensuring coherence in all policies – aid, trade, 
agricultural, political, environmental, migration etc. – to ensure that they are in line 
with conflict impact assessments and that one does not serve to undermine the 
benefits of another. Poverty reduction, conflict prevention and good governance 
should all take precedence over trade interests. 
• Ensure strong multilateral cooperation with other actors including the UN, 
regional organisations etc.  
 
3.6 Engaging in conflict and post-conflict situations  
 
Support for countries undergoing or emerging from crises is crucial, but raises thorny 
issues for aid deliverance in terms of avoiding improper use and ensuring that it reaches 
those most in need i.e. the poor. The transition from short-term service delivery to long-
term development assistance also raises particular problems. The EU should improve its 
performance by:  
• Implementing its 2001 commitment to the policy of linking relief, rehabilitation 
and development (LRRD), and further develop of a system whereby humanitarian, 
rehabilitation, development and sometimes peace-keeping operations can interact at 
the same time.  
• Develop its capacity to carry out peace-building and rehabilitation, especially in 
terms of promoting good governance, access to justice, land reform etc. as early as 
possible.    
 
3.7 Promoting good governance  
 
The root causes of conflicts are very often linked with failures of governance whereby the 
poor and vulnerable find themselves excluded in terms of political access, economic 
opportunities etc. Good governance and the promotion of democracy is crucial for 
stability and poverty reduction and the EC has increasingly focused its attention on 
promoting good governance and the rule of law especially in conflict-ridden or prone 
countries. Development aid provides an important tool in addressing governance issues, 
but also raises qualitative challenges arise in terms of the interaction of aid delivery, 
human rights and governance issues.  The EU should, therefore: 
• Properly integrate its existing good governance and human rights policies into 
security sector policy.  
• Develop a more clear methodology, strategy and policy for conflict-prone and 
failed states and find alternative approaches to the strict application of conditionality 
and embargoes in order to deliver the resources in a way that gives the right 
incentives and accountability.  
• Coordinate with UN and regional organisations in these endeavours. 
   
 
3.8 Improving cooperation partnerships  
 
Coordination and cooperation is crucial, not only within the Union itself but with other 
partners whether it be other donors or partner countries receiving aid. The EU currently 
has a reputation as an inflexible partner. In order to improve performance capacity the 
EU should, therefore: 
• Ensure that bilateral and multilateral policies within the Union are consistent 
and, in particular that bilateral aid of all states, including new members, is focused on 
poverty reduction 
• Develop better complementarity of policies and programmes not only within 
the Union, but with other donors – especially in the context of country-by-country 
strategies. Lack of donor cooperation can undermine recipient priorities (dues to the 
reception of numerous donor missions, preparation of multiple reports etc.) The Feb 
2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonization reflects a strong commitment to action 
which should now be realized. 
• Develop better cooperation with partner countries ensuring that they can set 
their own priorities and take responsibility for their own development strategies. 
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 9. Organised Crime and the European Union (EU): 
Priorities and Challenges 
 
Chris Smith (Dr), Senior Research Fellow, International Policy Institute, King’s 
College, London 
 
In December 2003 the EU published its most recent policy document on security 
concerns.  Included in the five ‘key threats’ was a clearly identified concern over 
organised crime: 
 
Europe is a prime target for organised crime.  This internal threat to our 
security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, 
women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities 
of criminal gangs.  It can have links with terrorism. 
 
Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states.  
Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several 
drug-producing countries.  Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small 
arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world.  All these activities undermine 
both the rule of law and social order itself.  In extreme cases, organised crime 
can come to dominate the state.  90% of the heroin in Europe comes from 
poppies grown in Afghanistan – where the drug trade pays for private armies.  
Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also 
responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 victims of the sex trade world 
wide.  A new dimension of organised crime which will merit further attention is 
the growth in maritime piracy.  
 
1. Organised crime: The Scale and Nature of the Problem 
 
The problem of Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) in Europe is far from new.  
However, global trends coupled with the expansion of the EU have combined to create 
new opportunities for TOC groups, new markets and new sources of finance and income.  
Up until the 1980s, however, the notion of threat from organised crime was seen to be an 
external one to the EU and mainly from drug cartels. 
 
Since then, change has been rapid.  The exploitation and existence of extant opportunities 
(demand) coupled with an increase in the availability of ‘commodities’ for trafficking, 
ranging from drugs, to people, to bushmeat (supply) has encouraged organised crime 
groups to identify EU countries as lucrative locations for their operations.  Opportunities 
for organised criminal activity within and amongst EU member states have never been 
greater. 
 
Drugs 
 
¾ Patterns of consumption of hard, soft and designer drugs differ significantly 
amongst member states, as do governmental responses and legislation. 
 
¾ Opiates originate overwhelmingly in Afghanistan (95% of heroin entering the UK 
is from Afghanistan).   
 
¾ Cannabis remains the most widely used drug within the EU. 
 
¾ Pakistan organised crime groups are increasingly linked to similar organisations 
in Turkey and the Balkans. 
 
¾ Cocaine from Colombia and Bolivia is entering via Spain – 5% of Bolivia’s 
cocaine production is sold in member countries. 
 
¾ There is no consensus upon whether law enforcement or public heath should lead 
on tackling drugs and related issues. 
 
¾ There are 7-9,000 deaths in the EU each year from drug abuse. 
 
 
Illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) 
 
¾ Overall, effective policing by member states has especially reduced demand for 
weapons of war that are difficult to conceal, e.g. assault rifles.  The demand for 
concealable weapons, pistols and sub-machine guns is generally much higher and 
will probably increase as gun cultures develop.16 
 
¾ Accession states have weaker controls and are geographically closer to regions 
where proliferation is a major concern – the Balkans and Former Soviet Union, 
especially. 
 
¾ Available data sets from member states are generally poor, especially the security 
forces are decentralised. 
 
¾ The total estimated stockpile in pre-enlargement in EU member states exceeds 67 
million, 17.4 guns for every 100 people [Small Arms Survey 2003, 64]. 
 
¾ The growth in organised crime is increasing the supply and demand for illegal 
SALW. 
 
                                                 
16  A SALW study on Albania in the late-1990s concluded that whilst there despite the active existence of trafficking routes from 
Albania to Italy and Greece, the demand for illegal weapons was remarkably low [Smith and Sagramosa]. 
 
 
¾ Gun violence associated with organised crime ‘turf wars’ is increasing. 
 
¾ The proliferation of illegal SALW is especially pronounced in the immediate 
aftermath of conflicts – for example, Balkans, Northern Ireland - and the activities 
of organised crime groups also tend to increase to take advantage of opportunities 
provided by policing vacuums.   
 
¾ Internet selling an increasing problem. 
 
 
Smuggling/Trafficking 
 
The main concerns relate to, 
 
 Prostitution 
 Forced labour and enslavement 
 Adoption 
 Paedophilia 
 Human Organs 
 Bushmeat 
 
¾ It is important to differentiate between trafficking and smuggling of human 
beings.  Smuggling is usually illegal migration to escape underdevelopment and 
entitlement deficits – a search for a better life.  Trafficking implies that individuals 
are being moved against their will and sold into various forms of slavery.  Trafficking 
is more likely to start off as smuggling, exploiting victim willingness or desperation.  
Trafficking and smuggling are used interchangeably in relation to commodities. 
 
¾ There is a link between smuggling/trafficking and insurgency that is poorly 
understood – not all organised crime groups are driven by financial gain alone.   
 
¾ The links with terrorist groups should also be considered, which may increase 
in the future. 
 
¾ Many smuggling/trafficking operations rely on the acquisition of false 
documentation – passports and associated breeder documents (driving licence, birth 
certificate etc.).  The quality of false documentation from passport factories is 
extremely high. 
 
¾ Organised crime will always be sensitive to market forces, demand in 
particular.  For example, some ‘new communities’, which now have a critical mass in 
member countries have collectively created a demand for ‘bushmeat’, which is 
currently of great concern from both wildlife protection and public health 
perspectives (bushmeat can carry the HIV and other viruses).  London is a major 
destination, via containers importing cut flowers. 
 
¾ In general, smuggling and trafficking operations will target ‘commodities’ that 
are lo-density/hi-value and easily marketable, narcotics being the most rewarding 
according to this formula. 
 
Money 
 
¾ Credit card fraud in the UK has risen 85% over the past year, to Eur85.4 million 
and total credit card fraud for UK card holders current stands at Eur700 million 
per annum.  The costs are borne by the banks.  Organised credit card fraud is 
mainly run by Romanian organised crime groups. 
 
¾ ‘Chip and Pin’ measures have reduced fraud considerably – 80% in France since 
its introduction in France ten years ago. 
 
¾ The outsourcing of call centres to developing countries is now seen as a major 
opportunity for indigenous organised crime groups, e.g. India. 
 
¾ Organised crime groups are placing members in finance firms to gain access to 
computer stored financial information that is stolen using i-pods and mobile 
phones to transmit data.  There is a growing demand for ‘illegal wealth creators’ 
within organised crime groups. 
 
¾ Laundering the proceeds of organised crime operations is a major endeavour, 
through ‘fronts’ such as small businesses. 
 
¾ The ‘hawala’ system continues to operate and is especially relevant to countries 
with soft currencies, e.g. South Asia. 
 
¾ At least one insurgency group from outside Europe is running credit card and load 
fraud to finance its operations, including illegal arms procurement worldwide. 
 
Other significant but less consequential areas of organised crime activity include large 
scale smuggling to avoid excise, cigarettes in particular, and the export of stolen cars – in 
the mid-1990s some 80% of the cars in Albania are though to be stolen from within the 
EU. 
 
 
2. Organised Crime: The EU Response 
 
The European Council met in October 1999 to discuss exclusively Justice and Home 
Affairs for the first time, notably the Vienna Action Plan designed to build an integrated 
approach to crime.  The current framework for TOC-related organised crime brings 
together the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, Europol, 
Eurojust, the European Judicial Network and relevant agencies, departments and 
ministries of the member states.  Europol looks set to take on a more expansive role. 
 
With the relevant policies and instruments in place, the EU can now move forward on 
addressing the spiralling problem of organised crime, at the borders of the EU at least. 
Whether or not the Council can move beyond current progress and co-ordinate with root 
cause areas such as development and conflict remains to be seen. 
 
There are obvious concerns and problems over the horizon.  Already, commentators have 
alluded to the lack of transparency amongst EU political elites in framing responses to 
organised crime.  This is not a good start.  Inevitably, the EU will have to grapple with 
some fundamental problems along the way to combating organised crime and it is 
important that, in the search for a more secure European Union, the principles of freedom 
and justice remain at the forefront; civil liberties and human rights can often fall victim to 
measures intended to underpin security. 
 
The role of science and technology is already important.  The debate on the virtue and 
efficacy of biometric passports and associated identification is relatively new.  There are 
thought to be serious constraints on whether biometric passports can work in the 
environment or a busy port or airport – certainly the biometric ‘technical fix’ is viewed 
with great suspicion, even disdain, in some security quarters.  The majority of developing 
countries will certainly take many years longer to introduce their biometric equivalents, 
which will always be offset by the ability to forge the less complicated breeder 
documents that provide access to passports. 
 
Any effective response to organised crime raises the inevitable, recurring issues of 
partnership in a rapidly expanding union, diversity of national capabilities and 
commitments and the harmonisation of legislation.  The combination of political 
constraints and institutional barriers will ensure that the security forces will always be 
combating organised crime with one hand tied behind its collective back. 
 
The emerging trends will make responses more urgent on the one hand and more 
complex on the other.  The enormous financial gains available to organised crime groups 
and the widening gyre that separates the EU rich and developing country/ weak-/failed 
state poor will continue to attract new actors.  Over the past few decades analysis and 
understanding of organised crime dynamics has been largely ethnographic.  Ethnic 
distinctions that define most organised crime groups are beginning to erode.  A more 
ethnologically pragmatic, network-based approach to organised crime makes sound 
business sense in a globalised world and amongst actors unfettered by political 
constraints such as sovereignty.  It will, however, make the roots and dynamics of 
organised crime more difficult to analyse, comprehend and counter.  One positive 
outcome of the dynamic, however, will be the fading opportunity for ‘alien conspiracy’ 
based analysis. 
 
The links between global terrorist networks and transnational organised crime are in their 
infancy.  As financial empowerment proceeds apace, other issues will gain in prominence 
for organised crime groups, such as religion and identity.  Obversely, terrorist groups 
may emerge that need to make common cause with criminal organisations to either 
facilitate or bankroll their operations.  Contemporary links most certainly exist, but they 
could yet become much stronger, mutually enforcing and more difficult to control. 
 
Literature 
 
Cockayne, A., Is the European Union’s response to trafficking in human beings 
appropriate to the realities of supply and demand?, (Department of Politics, University of 
Exeter, mimeo, April 2002), 42pp.  
 
Anderson, M., et al, Policing the European Union: Theory, Law and Practice, 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), 331pp. 
 
Edwards, A. and P. Gill, (eds), Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global 
Security, (Routledge, London, 2003), 290pp. 
 
Small Arms Survey 2003; Development Denied, (Small Arms Survey/Oxford University 
Press, Geneva, 2003), 329pp. 
 
Smith, C. and D. Sagramoso, ‘Arms-trafficking may export Albanian anarchy’, Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, Vol 11, No 1, (January 1999), pp.24-28.
 10. Trends in Space Technology 
 
Tomas Valasek, Director, CDI Brussels 
 
 
1. Definitions 
 
For the purposes of this paper, space includes launch vehicles, satellites, services 
(imagery, bandwidth, navigation signals).  This integrated approach is inevitable because 
the various elements are essentially inseparable: the demand for services if fueling 
technological innovation in launch vehicle and satellite technology.  Demand also 
channels further technological development - the higher the commercial or governmental 
demand for a particular service, the more R&D funds will flow into technology 
supporting that service.  The reverse is also true. Where demand dries up, existing 
technology can be rendered irrelevant, often at great cost to the investor as was the case 
with the Iridium system. Furthermore, technology itself often creates new types of 
services, generating its own demand, as is the case with new precise satellite navigation 
signals and their potential application on air traffic control 
 
This paper will therefore first address trends in the types of services provided by space 
assets.  Second, it will list some of the technologies that are in the development pipeline. 
Thirdly, it will link the two and discuss how technology could alter, expand or shrink the 
envelope of services currently provided by space technology.  And lastly, it will briefly 
discuss one “wild card” issue: the trend toward increasing militarization of space, which 
creates a set of specific problems and opportunities for civilian and military users alike.  
 
 
2. Trends in types of services provided by space 
 
Without a doubt, trend lines point to increasingly more widespread use of space 
technology in everyday life.  The number of artificial satellites in space has gone from 
several hundred in 1998 to 4,000 today by one estimate.17 Space technology services are 
used by more and more users on Earth.  Whereas satellite navigation was accessible to 
only militaries and the most demanding of civilian users five years ago, today they are a 
nearly standard part of automobile equipment.   One manufacturer of GPS devices, US 
company Garmin, has gone from obscurity in the mid 1990s to a market capitalization of 
nearly $6 billion today.  
 
As the quality of services provided by space technology improves, new possible 
applications open up, which in turn fuel demand for more space assets.  Satellite 
navigation is a prime example – the increase in the precision of the GPS signal in 2000 
led to an explosion of new applications; and the introduction of Galileo only promises to 
                                                 
17 Glenn Elert [Ed.], Number of Artificial Satellites, The Physics Factbook, 2004. 
<http://hypertextbook.com/facts/2004/VadimBlikshteyn.shtml>. 
improve further the quality of the signal, and to new, previously unthinkable applications 
in areas such as air traffic control.  
 
While an increasing number of individuals use space assets, governments and specifically 
militaries remain very significant customers.  The demand by the U.S. military for 
satellite communication capacity has increased tenfold between the first and second Gulf 
Wars (1991 and 2004).18 Satellite navigation and imagery highly sought after.  And while 
satellite navigation remains a government domain, an increasing portion of imagery and 
navigational capacity is being provided to the military by civilian users.  In fact, one of 
the first acts of the U.S. Congress after Sept. 11 was to approve funds for purchase of 
commercial imagery in preparation for the wars in Afghanistan and later Iraq. One 
company alone – Space Imaging – was granted a contract worth up to half a billion 
dollars.19 One of the main drivers for commercial providers of space technology will 
hence be the potential to supply military need for bandwidth and imagery. 
 
However, the demand for space services can also turn downward, as was the case with 
some of the early space-based services that were replaced by terrestrial alternatives.  
Optical fiber cables are rapidly replacing satellites as the main means of transatlantic 
communication.  The share of fiber has gone from 2 percent in 1998 to 80 percent in 
2000, reducing satellite communication to a mere 3-5 percent of the market.20 Similarly, 
the commercial demise of Iridium due in part to proliferation of cellular phone 
technology should be a warning lesson to investors in space technology.  Also, there is a 
possibility that if photocell technology and new materials technology advances, networks 
of unmanned aerial vehicles could replace satellites in relaying communication signals or 
some forms of imagery currently provided by satellites.  The important point is that 
technological developments in terrestrial technologies can have a disruptive effect on 
space applications, in particular their commercial viability. It will be essential for private 
and public investor to keep their eyes to keep a watchful eye on promising terrestrial 
technologies that could provide a more commercially viable alternative to satellites 
 
 
3. What are some of the key new technologies? 
 
The technologies described below are based on a survey of available literature.  The list 
contains ideas at different stages in the development pipeline.  Some are already being 
used commercially; others are further away from widespread application.  What they 
have in common, however, is that they represent areas of significant investment and 
focused attention by either governments or laboratories worldwide.  There is a reasonably 
high expectation that they will mature to the point where they find broad use in day-to-
                                                 
18 Lt. Col. Peter Hays, Civil, Commercial and National Security Space Policy Drivers.  Presentation to the 
Center for Defense Information – Brussels, March 30, 2004.  
19 Space Imaging Receives Multi-Million Dollar Pentagon Contract for Commercial Satellite Imagery, 
press release, Space Imaging, Jan. 17, 2003. 
<http://www.spaceimaging.com/newsroom/2003_clearview.htm>. 
20  
day applications.  They also promise to have potentially revolutionary impact on how 
space technology is being built or used 
 
Nanotechnology refers to production of materials engineered at the atomic or molecular 
level.  Nano-engineering allows for the production of devices and materials built literally 
one atom or molecule at a time. This has two important implications:  
1) Increased relative surface area: as a particle decreases in size, a greater proportion of 
atoms are found at the surface compared to those inside. For example, a particle of 
size 30 nm has 5% of its atoms on its surface, at 10 nm 20% of its atoms, and at 3 nm 
50% of its atoms. Thus nanoparticles have a much greater surface area per unit mass 
compared with larger particles. As growth and catalytic chemical reactions occur at 
surfaces, this means that a given mass of material in nanoparticulate form will be 
much more reactive than the same mass of material made up of larger particles.21  
2) Quantum effects: in materials reduced to nanoscale, quantum effects begin to 
dominate their behavior. This affects their optical, electrical and magnetic properties. 
For example, some compounds like titanium dioxide reduced to nanoscale become 
transparent yet they absorb ultraviolet radiation – not surprisingly, they are being 
used in sunscreens.22 
 
Information technology (IT) is another area of continuing research with obvious 
relevance to space.  As one report noted, “amazingly, the progress of computer 
technology has not slowed down since the 50s.  Indeed it shows signs of continuing at a 
more furious pace.  The digitization and virtualization of the world has extended our 
ability to communicate, visualize and control beyond any natural human ability.”23 IT 
revolution comes in several dimensions: 
1) Hardware: processing speed is continuously increasing.  So-called Moore’s law 
postulates that researchers will double processor speed every 18 months.  Amazingly, 
this has held true since 1995, although by 2010 – barring dramatic changes the 
architecture of modern chips – their physical properties will slow down the pace of 
speed increase 
2) Software: ongoing improvements allow for greater quantities of data to be processed 
at greater speeds.   
3) Networks: networking drives further increases in computing power. Some of the 
fastest supercomputers today consist of little more than skillfully networked PCs.   
 
Propulsion and materials technology: a number of exotic propulsion concepts are being 
researched (the use of antimatter, magnetic sails, solar sails) but in the near- to medium-
term timeframe, the most promising advance lies arguably in scramjet technology. The 
main advantage of scramjet lies in that they use of atmospheric oxygen (instead of liquid 
oxygen), mixed with fuel, to produce thrust.  This removes the need to carry oxygen 
                                                 
21 Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties, The Royal Academy of Engineering 
and The Royal Society (United Kingdom), 2003.  <http://www.nanotec.org.uk/report/chapter3.pdf>. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Drachma Denarius, Technology Trends – Preliminary Report, Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, SG/AU/SPA(2004)2, May 7, 2004. 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/34/31825107.pdf>. 
tanks, thus reducing the overall weight of the vehicle, increasing its speed and range. An 
X-43 experimental vehicle built by NASA has been tested twice successfully.   
 
 
4. What is the impact on new technologies on space? 
 
In Transit 
Paradoxically, while demand for space-based technology increases, number of launches 
steadily dropping. Reasons primarily having to do with supply glut but also other, more 
intractable problems such as export controls, launch controls, insurance difficulties. That 
is not a permanent state of affairs, however, and in the long-term launch capacity is 
expected to remain in demand as new services using space assets continue to be 
introduced 
 
When it comes to transit, the main concern remains price – it is still very costly to put 
assets into space, making many possible new applications of space technologies cost-
prohibitive. The current average cost $10,000 per pound on a space shuttle, a little less on 
an unmanned rocket such as the Ariane.  This is not much when it comes to large space 
probes such as Cassidy, which cost on the order of hundreds of millions of Euros to build 
and an extra €30 million or so for launch represents a relatively small part of the budget. 
Launch costs, however, do have a crippling effect on the feasibility of smaller, cheaper 
space technologies such as microsatellites.   They form a choke point, keeping the price 
of deployment of a space asset high in absolute terms irrespective on how little it cost to 
actually build the asset that is to be deployed  
 
Scientists are striving to reduce the launch cost to about $1,000 per pound in the medium 
term, and there are several technologies under research that could change the launch 
picture radically.  Space elevator is another possibility under consideration.  The term 
refers to a physical connection between the Earth and orbit.  It is impossible to build such 
connection with current technologies, particularly if it is to reach into the higher, geo-
stationary orbit.  A more modest version, linking the top of the Earth’s atmosphere with 
the lower orbit may be within reach.   
 
Its main advantage would lie in reducing the minimum speed of the launch vehicle, thus 
possibly drastically reducing launch cost. In other words, to reach the lower end of the 
elevator, one would not need a vertical take-off vehicle such as a rocket or the shuttle, a 
horizontal take-off plane with much lower maximum speed would also be capable of 
reaching the bottom of the cable, whence the cargo would further travel by elevator.24 
 
The above concepts are made all the more feasible by advances in materials science 
(whether through nanotechnology or other means), which allow for reduction in payload 
weight.  The lighter the cargo to be carried in space, the more diverse the range of 
vehicles capable of delivering it into space.   
 
                                                 
24 Space Elevators An Advanced Earth-Space Infrastructure for the New Millennium, 
<http://www.affordablespaceflight.com/spaceelevator.html>. 
In Space 
Nanotechnology in particular promises to revolutionize the way in which satellites are 
built and used.  New materials are reducing the weight of assets, driving down launch 
cost.  Nanotechnology may lead to creating of significantly more efficient batteries, 
expanding the average lifespan of a satellite.  It may also improve our ability to convert 
solar energy to electrical – crucial for space assets, which rely primarily on solar power to 
run their systems.   
 
Continued pace of development in information technology has an essentially twofold 
impact on space: it is constantly improving the performance of space assets in all areas – 
lifespan, weight reduction, performance in key areas: imaging, data communication, 
satellite navigation.   
 
Continued IT revolution also continues to fuel demand for space services.  As ever more 
data is being generated it also needs to be transferred at ever more higher speed to ever 
more farther distances.  Space is often the most logical avenue. 
 
 
5. Militarization of space 
 
Government interest in use of space for military purposes is continually increasing. 
Warfare is becoming technologically ever more complex with increasingly larger 
proportion of systems dependent on space. Imagery, navigation signals, bandwidth – all 
are absolutely crucial to modern warfare. For example, in the first Gulf War, only 8% of 
ammunitions dropped on Iraq were precision-guided whereas 12 years later, in 2003, 
68% were – and most of these were bombs using satellite navigation, technology only 
enabled through use of space assets (GPS satellites).  
 
The trend lines are clearly pointing in the direction of more use of space in warfare. In 
particular, military demand for satellite communication is booming, for obvious reasons – 
while fiber cables have better carrying capacity, only satellite communication offers the 
ability to deliver data to rapidly moving troops.  The militaries – particularly the U.S. 
military – also increasingly relies on commercial providers of satellite communications 
(although this may change with the planned introduction of a dedicated GIG system 
 
Space is not yet being used directly as a weapons platform but this may not last. 
Programs are under way in the US for Space-based Laser (SBL) and other methods of 
delivering offensive strikes from space at targets on the ground.  The increasing 
proliferation of ballistic missile technology in particular is driving the militarization of 
space – faced with the challenge of shooting down a missile in flight, governments look 
to space as a logical launch point for anti-missile munitions. 
 
In response, many militaries in the world are developing own weapons designed to attack 
space assets.  Their main intended purpose is to deny enemy the use of GPS, satellite 
communication, and to deny the potential ability to disable one’s own weapons; missiles 
in particular.  Not surprisingly, the counter-response consists of increasing drive to 
protect space assets – to make them more impervious to enemy attack.  The U.S. National 
Security Strategy speaks specifically of the need to “harden” space assets, whether it is 
by making them more maneuverable or by ‘thickening their skin.’ 
 
All this raises significant questions and challenge for commercial providers.  Are civilian 
assets in danger?  The answer is: in case of a strike against a military satellite, significant 
damage to unintended targets is quite possible. Either the primary strike (through EMP, 
radiation) or its secondary effects (fragments) can severely damage or destroy 
commercial assets.  This leaves private and non-military public users with a difficult 
choice whether to protect their assets. Serious costs are involved – the cost of hardening 
satellites is estimated at 2-3% of program costs.25 The question of space asset protection 
is moving from the realm of hypothetical to practical.  The more military establishments 
worldwide turn to space as a battleground, the more vulnerable civilian space assets 
become.   
                                                 
25 Hays, Civil, Commercial and National Security Space Policy Drivers. 
 11. Trends in nanotechnology  
 
Jürgen Altmann, BICC/Universität Dortmund 
 
 
1. Diagnosis 
 
Nanotechnology (NT) is about investigation and manipulation of matter at the scale from 
0.1 to 100 nanometres (1 nm = 10-9 m, atoms measure several 0.1 nm). With the potential 
for much more powerful computers, stronger but lighter materials, new ways of 
interacting with and modifying life processes, NT is a broad area of technologies that will 
be revolutionary and disruptive, even if the predictions of some about self-replicating 
nanorobots, superhuman artificial intelligence etc. will not materialise (so-called 
molecular or advanced NT, Drexler, 1986; Chemical, 2003).  
 
Already in the civilian sector, NT applications will pose risks that will need regulation. In 
the short term, the problem is with nanoparticles; later broader questions will come up, 
from jobs via surveillance to modifications of the human condition. Since at the nm scale 
all matter is subject to the same laws of nature, various sciences and technologies meet 
and overlap at that scale; increasingly, the notion of converging technologies is used, 
comprising NT, biotechnology, information technology, cognitive science and more 
(Roco/Bainbridge 2003; Roco/Montemagno 2004; HLEG 2004). 
 
NT can also be used in the military sector (Altmann, 2004; Altmann, i.p.). As usual in 
military research and development (R&D), the USA is in the lead, with annual spending 
around $250 million (1/4 to 1/3 of the total funds of the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative). Of this, about one half is for basic research, the other half for applied research 
and advanced technology development. The rest of the world combined is probably 
spending 1/10, however this could increase markedly if partners or potential opponents 
will decide to follow the U.S. example. 
 
In the USA, military NT R&D is fully integrated with the general goals of global military 
superiority using high technology, with central keywords: Dominant Maneuver, Precision 
Engagement, Focused Logistics, Full-Dimensional Protection (Chairman, 2000). 
 
 
2. Prognosis 
 
NT could be applied in nearly all military areas. Several applications would be close to 
parallel civilian developments (computers, materials, some types of sensors, medical 
applications, robotics). Such areas have a high dual-use potential. Others would be rather 
military-specific (such as variable camouflage, improved explosives, miniature guidance 
systems, miniature precision missiles). A first survey found several categories of military 
uses that would cause particular dangers to international peace or civilian society and 
should be limited preventively (Altmann, 2004):  
- distributed small sensors, 
- metal-free firearms, 
- small missiles, 
- implants and other body manipulation, 
- autonomous fighting systems, 
- small robots, 
- small satellites and launchers,  
- new chemical and biological weapons. 
The limits should be specific, preventing military uses while not overly restricting 
legitimate civilian applications.  
 
If such limits will not be in place, many new threats also for Europe have to be expected. 
An NT arms race is likely - even between partners -, instability in crisis regions may rise, 
and terrorists would have new, potent tools at their disposal. Intrusions into privacy by 
state and non-state actors would be much easier. Implants and other body manipulation 
applied to soldiers could undermine existing barriers in society and pre-empt a societal 
debate about rules for such manipulation. 
 
Molecular NT is not imminent. Should self-replicating nanobots for cheap autonomous 
production of goods arrive, they could lead to an exponentially growing production of 
weapons, giving an advantage to early start and creating strong pressures for preventive 
attack (Gubrud 1997). 
 
 
3. Links to European security and defence policy 
 
In the general utilisation of NT, armed forces of European countries will take part 
anyway, and special EU measures to support that do not seem required. The European 
specificity could rather be expressed in a quest to keep and promote stability. European 
values call for a multilateral approach to security problems, a preference of arms control 
over arms races, a broader view of international security that does not focus narrowly on 
the own military strength.  
 
For EU crisis-prevention and intervention forces, the particularly dangerous military NT 
applications listed above, do not seem urgently needed. In realistic scenarios, EU forces 
will rather face low-technology opponents. Military application of NT in many other 
areas – from computers via materials to sensors – will likely occur in parallel to NT 
utilisation in civilian society and economy. 
 
Consequently, the EU should act for preventive arms control in the areas listed. 
Internally, the EU should work for co-ordinated restraint among the EU member states 
active in military high technology. On the international stage, the EU should further 
discussions on various levels with a view to agreed limitations, preferably by global 
treaties, alternatively by export-control measures. Politically, one of the most important 
tasks should be to engage the USA as well as its potential opponents in talks about 
preventive limits. 
 
 
4. Links to European science and technology policy 
 
In NT R&D, aspects of dual use should be kept in mind. In the problematic areas, 
restraint should govern. Ethical rules for dealing with dual-use R&D should be 
developed. These can build on the ones in force already now, e.g. in the areas of human 
experimentation, however need to be much more differentiated, and more grey areas will 
remain. Questions of knowledge proliferation should be looked at, and contradicting 
goals - expansion of knowledge, international co-operation, prevention of threatening 
new technologies - will not always be reconcilable. Adherence to ethical and specific 
procedural rules should be demanded from the R&D contractors. 
 
The EU should support R&D in the areas of better protection against terrorist attacks 
using chemical or biological agents. This concerns mainly sensors as well as 
neutralisation and decontamination substances and devices. 
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12. The Threat from Biological and Toxin Weapons 
 
Dr Jean Pascal Zanders, BWPP 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Biological warfare is the intentional application of disease-causing micro-organisms or 
other entities that can replicate themselves—such as viruses, infectious nucleic acids and 
prions—against humans, animals or plants for hostile purposes. It may also involve the 
use of toxins, which are poisonous substances produced by living organisms, including 
microorganisms (e.g., botulinum toxin), plants (e.g., ricin derived from castor beans) and 
animals (e.g., snake venom). Their synthetically manufactured counterparts are also 
biological weapons (BW) if they are used for warfare purposes. 
 
Biological agents have the potential to cause mass casualties: on any given day over two 
billion people are estimated to be seriously ill. One-quarter of all deaths worldwide and 
about 50 per cent of all deaths in developing countries are attributed to infectious 
diseases. The World Health Organization estimated in 1999 that each year more than 13 
million people die from infectious disease alone.26  Biological weapons may thus cause 
casualties of the order of magnitude of a nuclear weapon. Today, the principal tool 
against biological warfare is the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, BTWC). Since its entry 
into force in 1975 there have been some confirmed cases of material breaches and several 
other allegations of biological warfare and BW armament programmes. This has 
increased the calls to equip the convention with instruments to verify and enforce 
compliance. To date efforts to strengthen the BTWC by means of a supplementary 
legally-binding protocol have failed. The BTWC regulates behaviour between states. 
 
The apparent interest of some terrorist and criminal entities in biological agents has 
added a new dimension to the threat, which states can address primarily through national 
measures implementing the BTWC, and measures to prevent such incidents from 
occurring or, should they take place, to manage the consequences. Besides its intrinsic 
weakness, the BTWC is also being challenged by rapid developments in biotechnology 
and genetic engineering. The convention contains a comprehensive ban on the 
development, production and possession of BW. States parties reaffirm the prohibition in 
the light of the technological developments during the periodic review conferences of the 
convention. However, as a consequence of the failure of the 5th Review 
Conference in 2001–02 the norm has not been updated since the 4th Review Conference 
in 1996. Failure of the 6th Review Conference in 2006 would severely challenge the 
relevance of the BTWC. Biotechnology and genetic engineering hold out many promises 
to improve the quality of life. At the same time, much of the knowledge can easily be 
                                                 
26  World Health Organization, Removing Obstacles to Healthy Development, WHO document WHO/CDS/99.1 
(WHO: Geneva, 1999), URL <http://www.who.int/infectious-disease-report/pages/ch1text.html#TopAnchor>. 
converted for hostile purposes in order to improve the stability and virulence of existing 
warfare agents or even to create new agents based only on some components of an 
organism. 
 
2. The nature of the threat 
 
The threat posed by the hostile use of disease-causing mechanisms manifests itself on 
three levels. First, state programmes remain a serious cause of concern. Second, non-state 
entities appear to have a growing interest in non-conventional weapons, including 
biological agents. Third a significant segment of the BW threat lies in the future as 
developments in science and technology may enable states, organizations or even 
individuals to develop stable and controllable agents to cause indiscriminate harm. 
 
2.1 State-level threats 
 
After World War 2 the Soviet Union and the United States (and to a lesser extent the 
United Kingdom) were the principal states continuing research, development and 
production of offensive BW. The USA formally halted its programme in 1969 and 
proceeded to destroy existing BW stockpiles. This unilateral gesture helped to pave the 
way for the BTWC. The Soviet Union, however, did not reciprocate and even accelerated 
its BW armament despite the fact that it was one of the three co-depositories of the 
BTWC (the other two being the UK and the USA). The programme survived the 1991 
breakup of the Soviet Union essentially intact, and, despite assurances by the Russian 
leadership, there remain considerable doubts as to whether Russia has terminated all of 
the activities prohibited under the BTWC. At the heart of the concern about Russia’s 
compliance with the convention is that there is no verification or monitoring of activities 
in the former BW facilities. After having confronted Russia with detailed evidence of its 
prohibited BW programmes the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia agreed in 
September 1992 to reciprocal visits to certain facilities.27  The trilateral verification and 
transparency exercises soon faltered and the lack of any access to some key facilities has 
increased international suspicion of Russian non-compliance. Meanwhile the Russians 
closed some key facilities to foreign researchers, and in August and September 2002 a 
US Congressional delegation was refused access to one of the former Soviet BW 
facilities, despite the fact that the United States is providing Russia with millions of 
dollars to increase security and retrain the Soviet scientists.28 
 
The mix of countries with a chemical or biological warfare programme changes 
continuously and it is difficult to make firm statements about which countries possess 
such weapons. Claims of proliferation may refer to a past programme or an allegation of 
use made decades ago. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 there has been a 
narrowing of the focus on a few countries that are considered to be of extreme 
proliferation concern, support terrorism, and are generally hostile to Western interests. 
                                                 
27  Joint Statement on Biological Weapons by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and 
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28  Warrick, J., ‘Russia denies US access on bioweapons’, Washington Post, 8 September 2002, p. 25 
The attempts to isolate them from the rest of the international community is reflected by 
the use of terms such as ‘rogue states’ or ‘axis of evil’. There is nevertheless uncertainty 
about whether the programmes are offensive or defensive or about their level of 
sophistication. It is also unclear at what point a country should be considered a BW 
proliferator. The criteria to be considered include: if it has the scientific, technological 
and industrial base to support a BW programme; if it has an R&D programme, if it 
produces BW; if it stockpiles them, if it deploys BW with the armed forces; or if there is 
clear evidence that BW have been assimilated into military doctrine. The criteria by 
which a state is judged may differ from country to country. Moreover, a country which 
has an antagonistic relationship with the state making the intelligence assessment is at 
greater risk of being deemed a proliferator than one which enjoys a friendly relationship. 
The perceived intent of a state is a major subjective component in the threat assessment. 
The willingness of some states, including the United states and the United Kingdom, to 
use military force based on the mere assumption of the presence of unconventional 
weapons is a highly destabilizing development, more so, as demonstrated by the situation 
in Iraq, the leadership chose not to believe the (correct) evidence produced by 
international on-site inspections. 
 
2.2 Threats posed by non-state actors 
 
In 1994 and 1995 the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo carried out two attacks with 
the nerve agent sarin. Police investigations into the cult’s activities showed that it had 
also been investigating pathogens and toxins and had attempted several times to release 
them, apparently with no effect. 
 
Letters containing anthrax spores were delivered to members of the US Congress and the 
US media in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, killing five 
people and infecting a further 17. The fine quality of the spores suggests that a military 
laboratory—most likely located inside the USA—was used in their preparation, but until 
today the perpetrator or perpetrators have not been found. The incidents demonstrated 
how people who were not normally considered as being at risk from a biological terrorist 
attack (postal workers, secretaries and members of the public) became the first victims 
and how such types of attack may close down facilities despite the low number of 
casualties. The extensive and costly clean-up operations were also hampered by the lack 
of consensus about what constitutes a safe environment following decontamination. 
Military standards to ensure the continuation of operations on the battlefield cannot be 
applied in a civilian setting.29 
 
The mail-delivered anthrax spores also demonstrated the potential of such attacks for 
widespread social and economic disruption. Earlier preoccupation with terrorism 
involving BW focussed on the potential to cause large numbers of casualties. The 
probability of such events occurring remains low, because of the technological challenges 
involved in the development, manufacture and dissemination of biological agents, and the 
demands these challenges place on the organizational structure of the terrorist entity. 
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However, beyond causing human casualties, acts of terrorism can be directed at 
generating economic sabotage or disruption. Agricultural terrorism comes easily within 
reach of single-issue groups, criminals and less-structured organizations. Biological 
agents arguably offer the prospect of large-scale economic disruption as they can be used 
to infect livestock or destroy crops. Given the time needed for an animal or plant disease 
to develop the attack will invariably stretch over a prolonged period of time and the 
demand for containment, remediation and compensation will draw in authorities ranging 
from the local to the national levels of governance. The economic damage will not be 
limited to the destruction of produce, but will also affect other enterprises that depend on 
agricultural activities and international trade. Countries, regions or communities that 
depend on monocultures for their livelihood are particularly at risk. 
 
Governments face a multitude of biological terrorism threats, but the most catastrophic 
scenarios involving mass casualties, though possible, are not likely to occur. 
(Catastrophic scenarios involving non-conventional weapons, which feature in many 
policy debates, are often made plausible by insistence on the existence of a threat posed 
by state-sponsored terrorism.) Nevertheless, because of the potential consequences for the 
targeted society of a terrorist attack with BW, governments must be prepared for such an 
attack. The key issue is thus to devise and execute balanced policies. Overreaction can 
lead to countrywide anxiety and paranoia. In such an atmosphere, hoaxes may become as 
efficient—especially in terms of economic terrorism—as actual attacks with BW. 
 
3. Scientific and technology developments 
 
Biological warfare is closely correlated to the knowledge of diseases. The opportunities 
for the weaponization of disease began with the scientific breakthroughs in the early 
1970s. In 1973 the first gene was cloned; three years later the first company to exploit 
technology based on rDNA was founded in the USA. The revolution has continued along 
two main lines: genomics and proteomics. Together, they represent powerful 
experimental and modelling techniques that enable the modification of living organisms 
and their products in precise and predictable ways. They also enable small molecules to 
be designed to interact in specific ways with proteins in order to predictably alter their 
functioning.30  The core of the future biological warfare threat will probably not consist of 
large weapon stockpiles. It will more likely be made up of the capability to produce 
warfare agents (and their antidotes or prophylaxis) on a large scale in a short time frame 
in a crisis. 
 
Biotechnology may improve biological warfare capabilities through product and process 
improvements. Product improvements may involve the genetic modification of pathogens 
or the creation of novel agents, as well as the development of new equipment for analysis 
and production. Process improvements relate to the way in which the agents are 
manufactured. Optimization of production processes, for instance, can lead larger 
production batches in shorter time frames or to the use of smaller, less conspicuous 
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equipment (such as fermentors), which would make it easier to hide the BW programme 
in legitimate activities and installations. R&D in biotechnology leads to many ‘enabling 
technologies’, which lay the foundation for future product and process improvements. Of 
particular importance today are the automation of sequencing in genome projects; 
bioinformatics, which contributes greatly to the storage and analysis of research data; and 
the advances in combinational chemistry and high throughput screening of compounds. 
 
4. The dual-use question 
 
Many of these products and processes are being researched and developed for civilian 
application in medicine, pharmaceuticals, and agriculture, as well as for purposes that are 
legitimate under the BTWC, such as defence, detection, protection and prophylaxis. 
However, their investigation also generates considerable knowledge about the potential 
offensive use of certain substances to interfere with the biological processes in humans, 
animals and plants. In certain cases, the offensive properties of known or potential 
biological warfare agents are being actively investigated in order to develop adequate 
defensive technologies and procedures. Such activities raise the question whether they are 
permissible under the BTWC. The question may be difficult to answer, because it 
ultimately depends on the intentions of the state conduction such research and 
development programmes. Transparency may be the key as greater secrecy will make the 
international community less inclined to accept the benign purpose of these programmes. 
 
5. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
 
At the heart of the current regime against BW is the BTWC. It was opened for signature 
on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975. As of October 2004, 151 
states have ratified or acceded to the BTWC and another 17 have signed, but not ratified 
the convention. It encompasses a comprehensive prohibition of preparation for biological 
warfare. According to Article I, states parties cannot acquire or retain BW under any 
circumstances. The Fourth Review Conference of States Parties, held in 1996, formally 
expanded the interpretation of this article to cover BW use. The prohibition is reinforced 
by the requirement in Article II to destroy or divert all BW to peaceful uses and by the 
nonproliferation provision of Article III. 
 
By current standards the BTWC is a weak treaty because it lacks verification and 
enforcement mechanisms. Despite its intrinsic weaknesses the convention has been able 
to retain its relevance through the periodic review conferences, during which the parties 
interpret the treaty provisions in the light of political and technological developments or 
try to devise mechanisms to enhance confidence in the treaty regime. In particular, the 
review process has reaffirmed the applicability of the core prohibition of Article I to the 
rapid developments and discoveries in the field of biotechnology. The review conferences 
have also attempted to increase the transparency of activities relevant to the convention 
on a voluntary basis. During the Second Review Conference in 1986 the states parties 
agreed on annual data exchanges to serve as confidence-building measures (CBMs).  
 
However, participation in these confidence and transparency-building measures has been 
limited and is not systematic in most cases. In addition, the parties are only required to 
provide their declarations in one of the six UN languages and no organization has been 
designated to administrate, translate, distribute or analyse the submissions. As noted 
earlier, the failure of the 5th Review Conference cast a shadow over the convention’s 
future relevance. The question of verification and compliance enforcement has still not 
been resolved. A weak proposal for a monitoring regime, which was being negotiated by 
an Ad Hoc Group of states parties to the BTWC,31 was rejected by the United States in 
the summer of 2001 because it would negatively affect its national interests. The 5th 
Review Conference, which had originally been scheduled between 19 November-7 
December 2001, was hastily adjourned until November 2002 following a last minute 
surprise move by the United States to terminate the negotiation mandate of the Ad Hoc 
Group.32  In 2002, the 5th Review Conference did not finalize its review of the operation 
of the BTWC, but instead adopted a proposal calling for a 6th Review Conference to be 
held no later than in 2006 and meanwhile to hold three annual meetings, which will be 
preceded by expert group meetings. The mandate of the groups is limited and all 
decisions are to be taken by consensus.33  At present, the efforts to strengthen the BTWC 
through a supplementary legally-binding document have stalled. 
 
6. Addressing proliferation concerns: transparency 
 
Proliferation studies principally focus on the transfer patterns of tangible objects, such as 
agents and equipment, and the threat of the immediate realization of the dual-use 
potential of these objects, whereby the recipient countries (or sub-state actors) of concern 
acquire technology developed for civilian use and apply it instantly for the purpose of 
acquiring BW. Yet, at the core of the biotechnological revolution is information: data 
collection and processing, knowledge, techniques and skills. This information core 
permeates the society in which the development takes place.  
 
However, with today’s globalization and growing interdependence it inevitably diffuses 
across national borders. While lateral proliferation processes are undeniably taking place, 
the greatest challenge to the future BTWC regime may actually come from a sudden 
massive application of civilian biotechnology for the purpose of acquiring a biological 
warfare capability by a state party facing a security threat. If a future verification regime 
of the BTWC is to remain relevant for many decades, it will require mechanisms to deal 
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with the possibility of instant realization of the dual-use potential of biotechnology. In 
addition to the traditional verification and monitoring of the destruction and non-
production of BW in states parties, it will have to incorporate an understanding of 
biotechnology and technology transfer processes that goes beyond mere products (agents, 
production equipment, etc.).  
 
The aim of this new set of tools is to render transparent technology transfers between 
economic units (e.g. individuals, laboratories, companies, etc.) within a state party and 
between economic units across national boundaries (including states and transnational 
companies and organizations). All economic units involved in a transaction will share the 
responsibility of ensuring that the dual-use potential of the technologies is not realized.  
 
The explicit commitment by the economic unit, whether a supplier or a recipient, to 
uphold this responsibility will then become a key component for granting the transfer 
license. The principle also applies to scientific and student exchanges as in-depth 
background knowledge will enhance the transparency about the institute’s and the 
individual’s activities. The national authorities and the international organization to be set 
up under a future legally-binding instrument will monitor the transparency of all relevant 
technology transfers. This mechanism of shared responsibilities between suppliers and 
recipients can facilitate assistance to countries such as Russia as confidence in the 
compliance with the BTWC will grow, while making it much harder for a future Iraq or 
representatives of terrorist organizations to acquire the BW-relevant technologies.  
 
This set of tools will nonetheless have to be supplemented with extensive positive 
security guarantees in order to reduce the disproportionate military advantage a state 
party might gain from defecting from the treaty. These guarantees do not solely entail the 
right of access to assistance and protection (subject to the transparency conditions 
mentioned above), but also involve dynamic decision-making procedures in order to be 
able to respond swiftly and decisively in the case of a rapidly developing crisis. If 
adequately implemented, the mechanisms to enhance the transparency of technology 
transfers may be able to provide sufficient advance warning of an impending massive 
transfer of civilian technology for prohibited purposes. 
 
7. Prevention and preparing for the aftermath: generic measures 
 
Given the uncertainties and the wide range of plausible scenarios of terrorism with 
biological agents, it may be opportune to identify generic and cost-effective 
countermeasures, which can also contribute to a society’s overall health and safety 
standards. Among such measures are investments in the health infrastructure so that there 
is a good regional distribution of emergency wards and a spare capacity of beds. It may 
be sound policy to fund the establishment of an adequate number of specialized 
laboratories in geographically distributed hospitals for rapid identification of rare 
pathogens in order to be able to rapidly give first responders and other emergency 
personnel information about the nature of the infection. Annual refresher and training 
courses for doctors and other medical staff can be used to familiarize them with unusual 
diseases in order to improve their ability for rapid and accurate diagnoses.  
 
Other important investments are in areas of compatible communications technologies for 
the different emergency services and adequate field detection and diagnostic equipment 
for the civil emergency units, and the creation of sufficient supplies of medication and 
equipment. Recurring realistic exercises must be conducted in order to test and improve 
procedures and equipment. Legal and political instruments developed and implemented 
before an act of biological terrorism takes place make up a second group of generic, cost-
effective measures. In particular, anti-terrorism provisions in national criminal law ought 
to be based on the general purpose criterion (GPC) of the BTWC and the CWC (with 
regard to toxins, but also with regard to any other toxic substance). The GPC basically 
holds that any manipulation or possession of pathogens, toxins and poisonous substances 
for purposes that are not explicitly permitted by either convention is prohibited. The 
incorporation of the GPC in national legislation (whether as part of laws to make the 
prohibitions in the international conventions applicable to natural and legal persons on 
the territory or under the jurisdiction of a state party or as part of criminal law) enables 
law enforcement authorities to apprehend terrorists or criminals before they have 
committed their act on the grounds that their possession of agents or equipment cannot be 
justified under the terms of the BTWC and the CWC. Ideally states coordinate their 
legislation with each other, especially in the framework of political, economic or security 
regional arrangements, so that terrorists cannot exploit the legal weaknesses of one 
country to prepare their attacks against targets in another country.  
 
Through international cooperation under the BTWC and the CWC programmes can be set 
up to assist parties to the conventions in drafting adequate national legislation if they 
request so. For the civilian authorities it is equally important to realize that the military 
standards for chemical and biological decontamination differ fundamentally from those 
required in a civilian setting. Military standards for decontamination are governed by 
operational necessity on the battlefield and under certain circumstances military 
commanders have to accept chemical or biological casualties. There is no such tolerance 
for casualties in civil society. However, if the civilian standards are set at unnecessarily 
low levels or, worse, no commonly accepted levels have been adopted, then the 
normalization of activities will be considerably delayed and cause more social disruption 
and economic losses than the actual terrorist attack. It is possible for governments and 
public authorities to take wide-ranging preventive measures against biological terrorism 
without resorting to mass mobilization of national resources as if the country is waging 
total war. Such measures are generic and cost-effective. Moreover, they are no dead 
investments. Society as a whole will benefit greatly from the improvements in the health 
and emergency infrastructure and emergency procedures. 
 
These can all be applied in the event of natural disasters or major industrial accidents 
(although certain aspects will necessarily be specific to biological terrorism). However, it 
is important for the governments and public authorities to realize that counter- and 
preventive measures must be taken before a biological terrorist incident occurs and that 
such preparations take several years before achieving maximal effectiveness. Here is a 
clear and present responsibility of parliaments and governments. 
 
 
13. Trends in cognitive science and information 
technology 
 
Jürgen Altmann, BICC/Universität Dortmund 
 
 
1. Diagnosis 
 
Cognitive science investigates human intelligence, cognition, emotions, consciousness 
etc. Some part is devoted to artificial cognition. It has connections to psychology, 
neurophysiology, brain research and computer science. Despite significant progress, 
many fundamental questions are still unanswered (Foresight 2004). Research is using 
new techniques for non-invasive real-time imaging of brain activity, as well as multi-
electrodes recording the parallel activity of hundreds of neurones in animal experiments 
and with human patients. 
 
Information technology (IT) provides means for storage, retrieval, transmission, reception 
and processing of information. Electronic systems and digitalisation have enabled the 
phenomenal quantitative and qualitative growth of IT. Miniaturisation is still progressing, 
Moores law (doubling of integrated-circuit components every 1.5 years) is still describing 
actual development (however, soon fundamentally different principles will be needed for 
its continuation). Computers have pervaded all parts of society, and the still expanding 
internet creates worldwide instant communication. Even though software has become 
much more flexible and adaptive, there is still the software bottleneck hardware 
capabilities increase much faster than software ones. 
 
Goals of artificial intelligence - reproducing abilities that seem effortless for humans, 
such as face recognition or moving in the natural environment -  have proved to be much 
harder than expected. Decades of work were needed to arrive at first commercial 
programs for artificial vision or speech recognition. First robots for simple tasks such as 
lawn mowing or vacuum cleaning have just appeared on the market. While a computer 
has defeated a human chess champion a few years ago, advance in emulating human 
intelligence is still very slow. One can speculate that a revolution in the understanding of 
how the human brain works would immensely accelerate the pace of artificial intelligence 
R&D. However, there are not many indications that such a revolution is pending. 
Extrapolations by some that a PC would in about 20 years transcend the raw processing 
power of a human brain (Kurzweil 1999) do not convincingly show that real intelligence 
would come alongside. 
 
The military, in particular in the USA with its 2/3 share in the global military research 
and development (R&D) expenditures, have supported computer R&D from the 
beginning and were the most important customer for a long time. Recently, the U.S. 
armed forces have made IT the backbone of the so-called revolution in military affairs 
(RMA), characterised by keywords such as "system of systems", "dominant battlespace 
knowledge", "net-centric warfare". While precision weapons exist already, the RMA 
concept sets a long-term framework for on-going R&D.  
 
In the hardware sector, U.S. military R&D in IT is pursuing miniaturisation towards 
nanometre structures, including new paradigms such as nanotubes and molecules as 
memory elements or switches. In software, military R&D has far-reaching goals, aiming 
at artificial-intelligence systems that would interact like a human or perceive and 
understand the world and at robots that decide autonomously without a remote human 
operator (DARPA 2003). A considerable part of the military IT R&D is basic research 
and advanced technology development, similar to civilian work. Thus, there is a high 
potential for dual use. 
 
With growing importance of IT for the military as well as for the economy, IT systems 
and IT infrastructure are becoming central military targets. Information warfare 
comprises attacks of the more traditional kind, against command and control systems, 
electronic warfare, psychological operations; new possibilities arise with net war or cyber 
war - information-based attacks against civilian or military computers and 
communication nodes. 
 
 
2. Prognosis 
 
Cognitive science will probably proceed at about the present pace for the next 5 or rather 
10 years. In IT, the trend to ever more powerful, smaller computers will likely continue 
for at least two decades according to Moore's law. Software, including artificial 
intelligence, will probably advance much more slowly, as in the past. With further 
increasing dependence on IT in societies, the vulnerability of the infrastructure to 
criminal or even military attack will remain a strong concern.  
 
In the areas of software agents and robots, significant advance will likely occur over the 
next decade. Cognitive science and IT may converge in artificial cognitive systems that 
would have increasing levels of capabilities. Connected with sensors and actuators, some 
with own mobility, such systems might at some stage have human-like intelligence and 
consciousness (and might later even transcend human capabilities). Predicting whether 
and when this can occur is practically impossible today. 
 
In the military, similar developments will take place. On command levels, decision-
support systems will play an increasing role. If unchecked by preventive limitations, 
autonomous systems will increasingly be used on the battlefield. Building on surveillance 
drones, first uninhabited combat air vehicles are already being tested at present; robotic 
systems for land and sea warfare could arrive later. They could lead to destabilisation of 
the military situation between potential opponents, arms races, and proliferation, and 
would endanger the international law of warfare. Depending on cost and availability, 
robots could also be used for crimes, including invasion into privacy and terrorist attacks. 
 
 
3. Links to European security and defence policy 
 
Following its prerogative in strenghening international stability, agreed arms limitation 
and multilateral, peaceful solutions to conflicts, the EU should work for preventive limits 
in the most urgent areas of military uses of cognitive science and IT, and should show 
own restraint. The most important present tasks are:  
- Containing information warfare (a very difficult subject) and  
- Banning or at least limiting autonomous military systems, in particular those for 
combat. 
Based on well-founded investigations, concepts for preventive limitation should be 
developed and then debates on various international levels should be started. 
 
 
4. Links to European science and technology policy 
 
Since generally, for achieving civilian technological progress military R&D is rather a 
detour, the EU should not actively support military R&D in cognitive science or IT. The 
armed forces of the member states will likely care for their own needs in these areas.  
In supporting generic R&D in these areas, the EU should consider also the dual-use 
problem. Knowledge e.g. in robotics should not lead to development of military robots 
elsewhere that in turn would increase threats to the EU or its societies. Efforts should be 
taken to separate, as far as possible, dangerous military uses from the ones that one would 
wish. 
 
R&D of IT security should continue. 
 
On a general level, the EU should care that in the course of research in cognitive science, 
traditional ethical concerns about human experimentation should be considered. (There is 
a certain danger in military R&D, also internationally.) As soon as artificial entities 
approaching human levels of intelligence would become actually foreseeable, the 
associated fundamental ethical problems should be investigated and tackled.  
 
Unlike the area of nanotechnology (see paper A.11), in-depth technology assessment of 
military uses of cognitive science and IT and studies of preventive arms control are 
missing. Due to its time urgency, in particular the area of autonomous combat systems 
should be investigated. 
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 14. Identifying trends in science and 
technology-based military innovation in the US 
 
Dr. Björn Hagelin, SIPRI 
 
 
1. Background 
 
The research and development (R&D) phase is normally seen as the first phase in the 
process of producing military equipment. However, there is another early part of the 
process that may be called ‘S&T-based military innovation’. While the ‘D’ in military 
R&D refers to the specific development of military equipment with defined charac-
teristics, the ‘T’ in military research and technology (R&T) emphasizes the exploratory 
development of military technology. S&T-based military innovation implies deliberate 
military exploitation of both domestic and foreign S&T in support of ideas and problem 
solving related to the development of new military capabilities. 
 
S&T results have always been important as inputs to military R&D. However, S&T-
based military innovation as a deliberate activity is likely to become more pronounced in 
the major military R&D countries. The research branches of ministries of defence and 
armed forces are likely to increase their financial support to and various forms of 
cooperation with national and foreign S&T organizations in specific areas and disciplines 
as a result of the reformulation of military doctrine from threat-based to capability-based 
strategies. This change supports a need to develop a range of capabilities rather than a set 
of defined military platforms. This is further supported by anti-terrorist warfare and the 
risks for asymmetric threats; the increasing military usefulness of commercially available 
technologies and equipment because of rapid turnover of technologically advanced 
civilian products compared with long development and production cycles of major wea-
pon platforms; the lack of sufficient national military expenditure for new and advanced 
military platforms; and globalization of processes for technological development and 
production. 
 
S&T-based military innovation implies deliberate, long-term support of S&T activities by 
defence ministries, military R&D and/or acquisition organizations, and armed forces. 
Such support may be extended to individual scientists or selected projects and take the 
form of, for instance, direct financial support, exchange programmes, shared facilities 
and joint research programmes, or it may involve military participants in ‘centers of 
excellence’.  
 
In other words, it implies an increasing involvement of non-military participants in the 
military innovation process, such as universities, other public and private organizations as 
well as business enterprises. There are three additional characteristics of these activities. 
First, military support, participation and sharing of results are normally not complicated 
by military security restrictions since S&T-based military innovation activities are 
generally not defined as military activities. The S&T results may be manifested in a 
variety of forms, ranging from intangible individual knowledge and skills to tangible 
outputs in the form of scientific reports and other publications, the creation of new 
research equipment and methods, and the production of final goods. 
 
Second, S&T-based military innovation need not be expensive for the military. Normally, 
military funding is added to ongoing S&T projects in the civilian sector or the military is 
one among several supporters of new projects. Thirdly, for such relatively limited 
expenses the military gets direct access to S&T results and need not wait for them to be 
circulated through normal dissemination channels. This is important for the speed of the 
national military R&D process as well as for increasing the chances of being ahead of 
competitors and foes.  
 
It should be obvious that only a few nations or groups of nations have the capabilities to 
organize complete and effective S&T-based military innovation. The USA is of special 
importance, not only because it is the largest R&D spender. It has used S&T-based 
military innovation as ‘standard procedure’ since at least 1945 by which it has ‘tapped’ 
national as well as foreign S&T. The USA is an international (ab-)’norm’, and 
comparisons are often made between US and European military R&D expenditures.  
 
 
2. US S&T-based military innovation 
 
The USA has a varied military R&D structure. One aspect of this structure is the diversity 
of agencies involved. In App. D there are four agencies listed under the Department of 
Defence (DOD) as well as the three military services. There are also Federally Funded 
Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) administered by industrial firms, by 
universities and colleges, or by (other) non-profit organizations. To the four defence 
agencies listed in App. D one may add at least five other agencies: the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization, the Defense Information Systems Agency, the Defense Logistics 
Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Special Operations Command. The 
Director of Operational Test & Evaluation may also be relevant as well as Test & 
Evaluation under the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.  
 
In the Appendices broad trends in US R&D funding are presented. It is possible to 
distinguish S&T-based military innovation within these trends by focusing on the 
‘neutral’ aspect of S&T, i.e. funding mainly for basic research by a military donor such as 
the DOD and its agencies and armed forces to non-military recipients/users such as 
universities and colleges and other non-profit organizations in the US and abroad. In fact, 
much of the military sponsoring of basic research has been and is made by the special 
R&D organizations of the military services. Apart from the Navy’s Office of Naval 
Research, the Air Force in particular developed a strong research-based innovation 
ambition supported by organizations such as the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, 
the Air Force Technology Division, and the Office of Aerospace Research. In addition, 
every US military branch established organizations focusing on foreign S&T, such as the 
Army Foreign Science & Technology Center, the Air Force Foreign Technology 
Division, and the Naval European Research Contracting Program. Offices were 
established abroad to exploit promising foreign S&T, primarily from Europe, such as the 
Office of Naval Research/London, the European Office of Aerospace R&D and the Army 
European Research Office. Since the early 1970s, these offices have been located in 
London.  
 
The existence of US S&T-based military innovation does not mean that it will always be 
successful in all its aspects. However, the correct question is no really whether it can be 
successful or not, but rather how successful it can be - the results from S&T-based 
military innovation can only be evaluated against capabilities generated in the future. 
And the policy is still relevant. A US National Research Council 2002 study reflected a 
commitment of the US scientific, engineering and health communities to help respond to 
the challenges after 11 September 2001.34 The emphasis on anti-terrorist warfare and 
homeland defence has had a direct impact on the FY 2004 R&D appropriations.35 One of 
the four major directorates in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established in 
late 2002 is science and security, and two of the DHS budget function categories are 
national defence and general science. The DHS is also looking for technologies and 
expertise in friendly nations.36  
 
3. European relevance 
 
It has been suggested that the transatlantic gap is not at the level of basic technologies but 
at the level of military applications.37 All comparisons show that Europe spends less than 
the USA on military R&D. Europe does not have a regional S&T-based military 
innovation policy, although the military relevance of the multi-faceted nature of S&T has 
been reflected in the European Cooperation for the Longer-term in Defence (EUCLID) 
cooperative programme and in national definitions of strategic technologies.38 Moreover, 
the potential military relevance of European S&T is suggested by the US military 
exploitation of European S&T.39  
 
                                                 
34 National Research Council of the National Academies, Making the nation safer: The role of science and technology 
in countering terrorism, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2002. 
35 Smith, C., ‘Homeland Defense and Security big winners in proposed funding for federal R&D’, News & reporter 
help, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, DC, 19 Aug. 2003, URL 
<http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2003/ 0819rd.shtml>; American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(Washington, DC), ‘Congress proposes increases for Defense and Homeland Security R&D, flat funding for other 
programs’, August status report on R&D in FY 2004 appropriations, 19 Aug. 2003, URL 
<http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/sum81503.pdf>. 
36 National Science Foundation, InfoBrief, NSF 04-300, Arlington, VA: Oct. 2003; National Science 
Foundation, Data Brief (Division of Science Resources Studies), 26 Feb. 2001; ‘Science and society: A NATO asset in 
a global world’, NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace, no. 4, 2002, p. 265. 
37 The Center for Strategic and International Studies, The future of the transatlantic defense community. Final report of 
the CSIS Commission on transatlantic security and industrial cooperation in the 21st century. Washington, DC: CSIS 
Press, Jan. 2003. 
38 See chapters in Gummett, P. and Stein, J. A. (eds.), European defence technology in transition, Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997.  
39 Hagelin, B., One for all or all for one? A study of Pentagon tapping of foreign science and technology, Report no. 
42, Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research: Uppsala 1997).  
With growing military ambitions and political initiatives such as the EDA and security 
research, initial steps towards a European S&T-based military innovation policy might 
have been taken. But without a deliberate policy, a functioning policy is far off. Besides, 
there is no discussion about possible European exploitation of S&T knowledge outside 
Europe with the notable exception of repeated references to US technology. Important 
strategic decisions in the EU that may have consequences for future European S&T-based 
military innovation and for future transatlantic ‘balance’ in this particular field include 
what military ambition Europe should try to achieve, how to do this, and to what extent 
this ambition should depend on US and/or European capabilities.  
 
Moreover, should the EU develop an S&T-based military innovation policy it will have 
consequences for public transparency and democratic control. Military funding of S&T is 
today not regularly compiled by all EU nations, not easy to come by when compiled, and 
it is not available on a regional European level. It is therefore not possible to make 
comparisons between individual European countries or between the EU and US or other 
foreign countries with regard to the implementation of a S&T-based military innovation 
policy. 
 
Since S&T-based military innovation implies more involvement of non-military 
participants in military innovation it might also bring ethical complications for the non-
military performers involved. Part of the ethical problem is to know what kind of military 
innovation is supported by particular S&T activities to which one might be contributing, 
and whether this is in support of national security or the security of a foreign country. 
This makes transparency of S&T-based military innovation all the more important.  
 
The main purpose of S&T-based military innovation is to strengthen security. But 
activities aimed at staying technologically ahead of potential opponents are related to 
another, less explicit purpose, namely to gain commercial benefits over military 
competitors. While international cooperation to support the security of friends and allies 
is a common goal, cooperation in order to gain commercial benefits over competitors in 
the same countries may not be, especially if the partners are based on either side of 
European national borders or sides of the Atlantic and if the purpose is to tap partner 
S&T skills for national benefits.40 
 
In short: 
- as the US is, at the same time, a European partner and competitor, since transatlantic 
technological relations are at times problematic, and since the importance of what has 
here been defined as S&T-based military innovation may be increasing, more detailed 
knowledge of US S&T-based military innovation in the post-cold war security 
environment could contribute to the formulation of EU policies and implementations in 
this area. The appendices suggest one source for gaining such knowledge. There is more 
                                                 
40 It has been noted that questions surrounding the reduction and restructuring of inherited scientific and industrial 
capabilities have not been subject to any systematic international discussion; Bailes, A. J. K., Melnyk, D. and Anthony, 
I., Relics of Cold War. Europe’s Challenge, Ukraine’s Experience, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 6 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Nov. 
2003), p. 19. 
detailed information to be found in data sources published, for instance, by the DOD and 
R&D agencies of the US military services; 
- should the EU be concerned about the transatlantic military R&D gap or rather be 
concerned about certain aspects of that gap, such as S&T-based military innovation and 
military applications of S&T/R&D; 
- should the EU be concerned about DOD tapping of European S&T results and the lack 
of information about such activities; 
- does the EU need a deliberate S&T-based military innovation policy; 
- should such a policy include the deliberate search for foreign non-US S&T results in 
support of EU military R&D; 
- do the answers to these questions have consequences for EU position and policy in 
areas such as technology transfers and military acquisition.  
 
15: Trends in Conventional Military Technology 
 
Dr Jocelyn Mawdsley, previously at University of Manchester, now at School of 
Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, UK  
 
This report considers trends in conventional military technology. It does this by 
considering two aspects: the trends in cutting edge conventional military technology, 
predominantly led by the United States, and trends in the proliferation of conventional 
military technologies. Finally, it asks what implications this might have for European 
Union science and research policy. 
 
 
1. Trends in Conventional Military Technology Research and 
Development 
 
Any survey of trends in conventional military technology research and development must 
inevitably concentrate primarily on the plans of the United States, as the United States is 
the undisputed leader in conventional military technology. The size of the US defence 
market is attractive to non-American firms and so American R&D strategies are normally 
followed by major European firms as well. Similarly, the demands of NATO 
interoperability and the desire of leading European military powers not to fall far behind 
the USA in military technology tends to mean that American military innovation is 
adopted to a greater or lesser extent by European countries even if initial reactions were 
negative (missile defence being one example).  
 
It is important to stress that the United States is pre-eminent not just because it spends the 
most on military technology research, but also because of the robustness and vibrancy of 
its commercial R&D capacities. Graphs 1-3 in the supporting statistical annex show there 
are clearly differentiated patterns in EU and US research spending. Overall, the US 
spends slightly more of its gross domestic expenditure on research and development than 
the EU’s big spender, Germany, and considerably more than the EU average but a far 
greater proportion of this spending is on defence R&D (Graph 1).  
 
If we consider government budget appropriations (GABORD) in isolation an even clearer 
picture emerges (Graph 2). In 2001 (last available all-EU figures), although the EU spent 
more on civil research than the USA (there is more proportionally more commercially 
funded civil R&D in the USA), the US government spent far more on defence R&D. 
Finally, if we consider trends in GABORD (Graph 3), we are not seeing (contrary to 
some reports) vast increases in US spending on defence R&D but rather a consistent 
proportion of GABORD dedicated to it, giving a degree of predictability to US 
researchers and firms. In contrast, in the EU we see little consistency either on the 
appropriate amount of GABORD to be dedicated to defence R&D or in spending trends. 
Some countries, like Sweden and Spain (although there are some doubts about the 
Spanish data), are steadily increasing their spending on defence research, others like 
Britain, France and Germany remain relatively consistent but with vastly differing 
proportions of GABORD invested in defence (an average over the last five years of 
around 35% in Britain, 23% in France and 8% in Germany).  
 
These figures point to very differing views on the importance of defence research as an 
economic driver and security necessity across the EU. It should also be noted that in the 
EU it is customary to expect defence firms to bear some of the costs of R&D themselves; 
this is not the case in the US. 
 
One thing is clear: the US spends most on defence research. In defence research, unlike 
in civilian research, it tends to be the customer (government) rather than the firms, who 
sponsor and encourage major technology shifts (Dombrowski, Gholz and Ross, 2002). 
This means that US implementation of its defence transformation plans and their funding 
of the RDT&E that underpins this implementation must be considered key to the future of 
conventional military technology. According to Zimet et al (2003) the process of 
transformation involves new technologies (war-fighting systems), new operational 
concepts (network-centric warfare, effects-based operations, rapid reaction forces), and 
new organisational structures (homeland defence, special forces, joint operations).  
 
The overall aim of this transformation is to develop joint, network-centric, distributed 
forces capable of superior rapid decision-making and massing their effects across the 
battlefield. Crucially on a technology front, the key to US defence transformation is a 
move away from a focus on more advanced versions of traditional platforms like ships 
and planes towards system integrated technology. This shift is already beginning to have 
an impact on the US defence industrial base, which will also affect European firms 
wanting to enter the US defence market. The move to systems integrated technology, like 
the RMA of the 1990s, depends considerably on being able to ‘spin in’ existing civil 
technologies (from the current explosion in civil technological advances) into military 
use.  
 
The trend away from defence research ‘spinning off’ to produce civil breakthroughs and 
thus economic growth, which has been visible since the 1980s, thus seems set to 
continue. This is shown by the breakdown of current US defence RDT&E spending, 
which shows that most money is spent on evaluating and testing existing technologies 
(Figure 1 and Table 1). Indeed, the Bush administration has moved away from viewing 
defence R&D as a way to enhance US commercial industrial competitiveness (a trend in 
the Clinton administrations); the defence mission’s needs to provide security are the clear 
priority. This, in marked comparison to EU security research plans, is also the case with 
US Homeland Security research spending.41 
 
It is thought that three technological breakthroughs may make these new sorts of 
weapons possible: the further miniaturising of computers, advances in robotics and 
nanotechnology (molecular scale machines). These developments are all likely to be 
achieved by civil not defence research as pointed out above.  Conventional ships, planes 
and missiles are close to the limits of useful performance and engineering advances.  
                                                 
41 See the forthcoming proceedings of a NATO Advanced Research Workshop ‘Science and Technology in 
the Anti-Terrorism Era’ held at Manchester University in September 2004. 
Highly centralised information and battle management systems like AWACS are 
vulnerable to saturation attack by precision-guided weapons and to swamping by 
electronic warfare.  However, a new range of small weapons-cum-sensors: micro aircraft 
that fly by their own sensors and mini-computers; intelligent jumping mines, that can 
communicate with one another and other systems; networked groups of missiles using 
different sensors and each carrying many self-guided sub-munitions including mini-
nukes: is thought likely to be developed.  Such weapons could form a dense, 
decentralised web, sharing information and building up a picture of attacks or targets 
through their separate sensors (Hirst, 2001).  Such a network would be also much harder 
to destroy. However, it will also be considerably harder to keep this technology in one 
country’s or a small group of allies’ hands. 
 
 
2. Trends in Conventional Military Technology Proliferation 
 
The arms trade has developed over the past century to a situation where for the small 
group of states at the forefront of military technological innovation, a qualitative edge has 
become a critical component of military strength. The processes of spread and continued 
technological advance are mutually re-enforceable, and when the diffusion of military 
technology increases more rapidly, so do the demands for extra budget resources in 
militarily powerful states to re-establish their lead. Since the end of the Cold War the 
following trends can be discerned: 
 
• Overall, the volume of the arms trade has decreased since the end of the Cold War 
(SIPRI, 2003) and we are now seeing two groups of purchasers: rich buyers 
buying the now more available advanced weapons technology and others 
focussing on acquiring second-hand weapons and small arms and light weapons. 
This latter group has received much academic, NGO and media attention over the 
last ten years as the devastating effects of SALW proliferation in internal wars 
became clear. 
• The end of the Cold War though and the development throughout the 1990s of an 
increasingly commercial and international arms trade, facilitated by a growing use 
of devices like offsets, which have enlarged the pool of buyers at the top end of 
the market, has also speeded up the proliferation of advanced military technology, 
not only through direct transfers but via the diversion of these technologies to 
unauthorised uses and banned third parties. Decisions on arms trade policy have 
acquired an economic rather than security focus (see for example section 2 of 
European Commission (2003)). 
• There is a current lack of expertise in the arms control of advanced conventional 
military technology, but some reports (e.g. Smith and Larson: 2002) suggest that a 
better understanding of how this part of the arms trade functions and the 
subsequent development of improved control mechanisms will be key needs in 
the next decade. 
• The rising use of offset has also enabled a growing number of countries to set up 
defence production capabilities (with varying degrees of success), which may in 
future lead to further proliferation. The dependence, discussed above, of today’s 
cutting edge conventional military technology on dual-use and commercially 
developed technology, which is commercially widely available, means that these 
new infrastructures will be able to advance more quickly than in former times 
towards advanced weapon production capability. 
• Markusen (2004) argues that the need for the United States to keep its quality 
edge in this environment, is leading to industry and the armed forces calling for 
the development of next generation technology faster than they otherwise would 
have, thus pushing up defence spending unnecessarily. The requirements of 
interoperability for its allies risk drawing them into an arms race. 
 
 
3. Implications for European Science and Research Policy 
 
General Remark 
The trends suggest that at present investment in conventional military research is unlikely 
to produce major scientific or economic advances. It would make sense therefore to limit 
this to any specific needs defined by the European Defence Agency. If the European 
Security and Defence Policy is going to develop very different military doctrines to those 
in the US (as is sometimes suggested), its technology needs may be different. The needs 
of peacekeeping operations for example would be likely to be a substantially higher 
priority. Community funds should be additional to, rather replacing national spending and 
aimed at those areas specified by the EDA as needed to implement the ESS. Any 
allocation of resources to research in this area though should be user-driven rather than 
defence industry driven, to avoid any inadvertent push towards the adaptation of 
technologies that are inappropriate for European security goals but commercially 
attractive, as they are already being sponsored by the US. These decisions should be 
decoupled from the question of possible subsidy of the defence industrial base, which is 
predominantly a security or industrial policy question. 
  
 
4. Recommendations for decisions taken today for FP 2007-2013 
 
 Threats  
• There is a danger that the EU-US disagreements on civilian aerospace subsidy 
will spill over into the defence field, and that the perceived need to compete with 
the US would draw the EU into an economically destructive arms race. Ensuring 
that needs are defined by users not industry as outlined above should help to limit 
this threat. 
 Challenges  
• We need to better understand how civilian technological advances can be spun 
into meet internal and external security needs as defined by user groups in both 
cases. Sweden currently seems to be managing this successfully in the field of 
network centric warfare, and their system should be investigated. There should be 
funds made available for the evaluation, testing and demonstration of the potential 
of these technologies for security use.  
 Opportunities  
• To avoid duplication, ways of encouraging national defence research 
organisations to put in joint bids for such funds should be investigated. Could a 
special scheme, including all the necessary security provisions, similar to that 
currently operated by the European Science Foundation be put into place? Or by 
offering such funds to the EDA to use through the Europa memorandum system? 
• A focus on the specific needs articulated by the EDA should help funding to be 
targeted in a way that moves ESDP further down the path of being able to fulfil 
all Petersberg tasks as quickly as possible. 
 Risks  
• The problem of conventional weapons proliferation needs to regain political 
saliency as an issue. We need to understand better how the arms trade operates 
and what the consequences of proliferation of all types of conventional military 
technology are, how proliferation is likely to occur in the future and what the 
security consequences are. It will be necessary to develop new types of arms 
control strategies to deal with new types of actors and technologies. Social 
science research in this area should be encouraged. While the Commission’s wish 
to break down barriers between military and civilian research and to 
internationalise research is understandable, it may have undesirable security 
consequences. The reasons why these barriers were put into place deserve 
revisiting.  
 Scenarios  
• The US will continue to be the most advanced country where conventional 
military technology is concerned; however its belief that technology especially via 
missile defence can provide almost total security is already pushing countries that 
feel threatened by the US to concentrate on finding ways round these defences, 
thus pushing up US defence spending to even higher levels. If the European 
Union avoids the temptation of trying to compete with the US in this field, but 
instead tries to develop a comprehensive holistic security policy, it may 
paradoxically achieve greater security. 
 
 
5. Recommendations for DG Research based on trends looking to 2010 
  
Threats   
• Proliferation of advanced conventional weapons technology may increase 
dramatically if new defence industrial powers like India, South Korea and South 
Africa who invested substantially in the 2000s in developing defence industrial 
capacities, now need to break into the world export market to make the 
maintenance of large DIBs feasible, and so sell cheap advanced technology to a 
wider pool of buyers. The ESS should be amended to take this threat into account 
if the arms trade does evolve in this direction. 
• The EU decided to try to compete with the US in conventional weapons 
technology thus changing the ESS to mirror the US NSS, and is now locked into 
an arms race, which requires ever greater resources to be diverted into the military 
sector with predictably disastrous economic consequences. 
 Challenges  
• Ensuring that the money available for testing, evaluating and demonstrating the 
potential of civilian technology for internal and external security purposes is both 
open to small, niche firms or research programmes and encouraging greater 
European co-operation but also maintaining security.  
 Opportunities  
• Hopefully, by this point the EDA will be sufficiently well developed to be able to 
build on growing links between European defence research agencies and 
duplication of research can be further reduced by its research programmes. 
 Risks  
• As outlined at point A. 
Scenarios 
• Probably continued American dominance but much will depend on the extent of 
the success of the defence transformation project – early signs in Iraq suggest that 
technological military supremacy does not equate to absolute military supremacy. 
 
 
 
 
Literature 
 
Dombrowski, Peter, Eugene Gholz and Andrew Ross (2002), “Selling Military Transformation: 
the Defense Industry and Innovation”, Orbis, Summer 2002: pp.523-36 
 
European Commission, (2003), “European Defence - Industrial and Market Issue - Towards an 
EU Defence Equipment Policy”, COM (2003) 113 final, Brussels, European Union 
 
Hirst, Paul (2001), War and Power in the Twenty First Century, Cambridge, Polity Press 
 
Markusen, Ann, (2004), “Arms Trade as Illiberal Trade” in Jurgen Brauer and J. Paul Dunne 
(Eds.), Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and Cases in Arms Trade 
Offsets, Routledge, London: pp.66-88 
 
Smith, James and Jeffrey Larson, (2002), “All our Tomorrows”: A Long-Range Forecast of 
Global Trends Affecting Arms Control Technology, INSS Occasional Paper 44, United States 
Air Force Academy, Colorado 
 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (2003) SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
 
Zimet, Elihu et al, (2003), “Technology, Transformation and New Operational Concepts”, 
Defense Horizons, Number 31 September 2003 
Supporting Statistical Annex 
 
Graph 1: Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a percentage of GDP in 2002 
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Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators May 2004 
 
 
Graph 2: Total Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays for R&D (GABORD) in 
2001 (million current PPP $) 
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Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators May 2004 
 
Graph 3: Defence Budget R&D as a Percentage of Total GABORD 
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Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators May 2004 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of 2005 US Defence RDT&E Budget across Budget Activities 
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Table 1: The Largest 20 US RDT&E Programmes 
 
Project Name Organisation Name Budget Activity Name 2005 Budget Request ($ 
thousands) 
Ballistic Missile Defence 
Midcourse Defence 
Segment 
Missile Defence Agency Advanced Component 
Development & Prototypes 
4384775 
Armoured Systems 
Modernisation (ASM)-
SDD 
Army Budgeted by DoD System Development and 
Demonstration 
2700455 
Joint Strike Fighter Air Force Budgeted by 
DoD 
System Development and 
Demonstration 
2307420 
Joint Strike Fighter Navy Budgeted by DoD System Development and 
Demonstration 
2264507 
SC-21 Total Ship System 
Engineering 
Navy Budgeted by DoD System Development and 
Demonstration 
1431585 
Comanche42 Army Budgeted by DoD System Development and 
Demonstration 
1229664 
Ballistic Missile Defence 
Terminal Defence Segment 
Missile Defence Agency Advanced Component 
Development & Prototypes 
937748 
VHXX Executive Helo 
Development 
Navy Budgeted by DoD System Development and 
Demonstration 
777398 
Transformational 
SATCOM (TSAT) 
Air Force Budgeted by 
DoD 
Advanced Component 
Development & Prototypes 
774836 
Ballistic Missile Defence 
Tests and Targets 
Missile Defence Agency Advanced Component 
Development & Prototypes 
713658 
Advanced EHF 
MILSATCOM (SPACE) 
Air Force Budgeted by 
DoD 
Advanced Component 
Development & Prototypes 
612049 
Advanced Hawkeye Navy Budgeted by DoD System Development and 
Demonstration 
597015 
Ballistic Missile Defence 
Sensors 
Missile Defence Agency Advanced Component 
Development & Prototypes 
591957 
Satellite Communications 
(SPACE) 
Navy Budgeted by DoD Operational Systems 
Development 
573092 
Multi-Sensor C2 Aircraft 
(MC2A) 
Air Force Budgeted by 
DoD 
System Development and 
Demonstration 
538860 
Ballistic Missile Defence 
System Interceptor 
Missile Defence Agency Advanced Component 
Development & Prototypes 
511262 
Space Based Infrared 
System (SBIRS) High 
EMD 
Air Force Budgeted by 
DoD 
System Development and 
Demonstration 
508448 
Materials and Electronics 
Technology 
Defence Adv. Research 
Programme 
Applied Research 502044 
Non-Line of Sight Cannon Army Budgeted by DoD System Development and 
Demonstration 
497643 
Multi-Missile Maritime 
Aircraft 
Navy Budgeted by DoD System Development and 
Demonstration 
496029 
Ballistic Missile Defence 
Boost Defence Segment 
Missile Defence Agency Advanced Component 
Development & Prototypes 
492614 
Source: Derived from Department of Defense Budget Document R-1 
 
 
                                                 
42 A decision was subsequently taken not to proceed with the Comanche Programme in March 2004. 
